VI. Of ANALOGY. This head comprifes every thing that is fimilar to what is advanced in a propofition. Writers in defence of chriftianity make excellent ufe of this topic when, anfwering objections against any thing that appears difficult or myfterious in revealed religion, they show that the fame difficulty occurs on the fubject of natural religion. For example, when it is objected that, in the scriptures, we meet with frequent inftances of innocent perfons fuffering with the guilty, and fometimes on the account of the guilty, they reply, that the like frequently happens in the course of common providence; as when children fuffer through the extravagance of their parents, who, by more œconomy, might have made a better provision for them; and when tempefts and earthquakes overwhelm, in undiftinguished deftruction, perfons of all conditions and characters, &c. In all branches of fcience it is of the greatest importance to show the analogy, or mutual correspondence, of the feveral propofitions; and it is always deemed an argument in favour of a new discovery, if it be analogous to others already made, and if that analogy be wanting, we require much ftronger evidence of other kinds. Lawyers argue from this topic when they urge, in favour of their client, precedents of the determination of other causes. Since the uniformity of the proceedings in law, and the fameness of right in the fame circumftances, require that every perfon be intitled to the fame juftice that another had done him, in a cafe nearly like, or analogous to his own. Comparisons alfo belong to this head. VII. Of CONTRARIES. It is, upon many fubjects, no less useful to confider what things are contrary, or oppofite to the terms of the propofition, than what are connected with them. As when moralifts, in order to demonftrate the advantages of a virtuous life, defcribe the fatal effects of vicious courfes upon the minds, the bodies, the reputation and fortunes of men; or, on the contrary, in order to set the hatefulness of vice in a stronger light, they contraft it with a view of the amiableness of virtue. In all fuch cafes as thefe this argument concludes in a very ftrong manner: for virtue and vice, being directly oppofite to one another, it is very obvious to reflect, that all their effects and influences must be the very reverfe of one another. VIII. Of EXAMPLE. It greatly illuftrates and confirms even moral maxims to fhow them exemplified in real hiftory, in the characters and lives of men. Thus the fatal effects of ambition will be made much more fenfible, if, after examining the nature and tendency of that paffion in general, the writer fubjoin the ex ample ample of Alexander, Julius Cæfar, Charles of Sweden, &c. and the value of wife and good princes will be greatly enhanced by a view of the amiable characters, and useful lives of Titus, Trajan, Antoninus, &c. and it is of particular use to divines, to fupport all their maxims by examples from the fcriptures. It is likewife a happy confirmation of a principle in mechanics, mathematics, and philofophy, if it can be brought to an experiment, be subjected to the fenfes, and reduced to practice. IX. Of AUTHORITY, It is a great confirmation of our belief of even univerfal propofitions, which have no connexion with particular perfons, places, or times, to have a teftimony in favour of them from perfons whofe opinions are generally allowed to be just. A confiderable part of that strong affent which we give to truths of an abftract nature, as to mathematical theorems, and philosophical discoveries, which may be even our own investigating, and much more if they be not, is derived from the authority of others, who concur with us in profeffing an affent to them; which may help us to account for a feeming paradox, viz. why the difciples of fome Greek masters of philosophy usually, in a course of time, grew more zealously attached to the tenets of their respective schools, than the founders themselves originally were, Cicero argues from this topic, when, in proof of a future ftate, he alleges, not only the natural arguments for it, but, what he seems to lay the chief stress upon, the concurrent teftimony of all the wife ancients. ་ Lawyers argue from this, when, in favour of a determination, not fixed by custom and precedent, they allege the opinions of perfons learned in the law, given without any view to the case in hand. Argumenta ad hominem, or those in which we appeal to a man's known principles and profession, belong to this head. If the authority of others have any weight with a man, much more may it be presumed that his own opinion, that is, his own authority, will weigh with him. LECTURE LECTURE IV. Of particular TOPICS; and Objections to the Use of TOPICS anfwered. PARTICUL ARTICULAR topics are those which furnish arguments for particular propofitions; or those which relate to particular perfons, times, and places. Of these I shall do little more than give diftinct tables. The tables will, likewife, be very general; so that each article may be fubdivided again and again, without end. But what is here done is abundantly fufficient for a treatise on the art in general, and it will be very eafy for any person to carry the divifion as far as he pleases for his own ufe. Topics of arguments for limited propofitions, viz. fuch as relate to particular FACTS. With respect to these we may confider The Perfon, The Time, The Place, The Motive, The Manner, The Inftrument, The Evidence, The Law concerning it, &c. &c. &c. I fhall |