International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice PerspectiveThe United States has recently imposed or threatened economic sanctions of varying kinds against many nations, including South Africa, Poland, Nicaragua, Panama, Brazil, Japan, and China. In fact, the incidence of sanctioning behavior is generally on the increase in the international community. In this incisive study, William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg introduce, analyze, and clarify issues that are key to understanding sanctioning behavior. The authors review several models for evaluating the economic effectiveness of sanctions, but they argue that only a public choice analysis, with its emphasis upon politics, can answer three crucial questions about sanctions: (l) Why, in the light of their notoriously weak economic impacts, are they being used more and more frequently? (2) Why is it that they take the particular forms they do? and (3) Why are they often successful even when their economic impact is slight? Kaempfer and Lowenberg provide detailed answers to these questions, contending that it is political and economic interests within the sanctioning country that determine not only when sanctions will be adopted but also the particular form such sanctions will take. And despite the rhetoric of economic pain, it is the political impact of sanctioning that accounts for whatever success economic sanctions have enjoyed. A model of clear analytic exposition, International Economic Sanctions provides a definitive account of economic sanctions from the perspective of public choice theory. It is essential reading for any scholar of international political economy. |
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Page 84
... pressure on share prices , thereby forcing firms to disinvest their operations in target countries . However , the link between divestment and disinvestment is somewhat tenuous at best , because the large size and efficiency of capital ...
... pressure on share prices , thereby forcing firms to disinvest their operations in target countries . However , the link between divestment and disinvestment is somewhat tenuous at best , because the large size and efficiency of capital ...
Page 86
... pressure on the part of interest groups in the sanctioning country acting through shareholder initiatives or if disinvestment is mandated by statutory or legislative action of the sanctioning government . But there are numerous other ...
... pressure on the part of interest groups in the sanctioning country acting through shareholder initiatives or if disinvestment is mandated by statutory or legislative action of the sanctioning government . But there are numerous other ...
Page 153
... pressure generated by sanctions . For example , such pressure could be perceived as raising the probability of eventually achieving the goal sought by a domestic interest group , which in turn might encourage activists in that group to ...
... pressure generated by sanctions . For example , such pressure could be perceived as raising the probability of eventually achieving the goal sought by a domestic interest group , which in turn might encourage activists in that group to ...
Contents
Alternative Approaches to International Economic | 15 |
Notes | 22 |
A Model of the Sanctioning Process | 41 |
Copyright | |
8 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
adoption function analysis antiapartheid apartheid assets autarky behavior benefits C₁ capital sanctions Chapter collective action critical mass deadweight costs demand disinvestment divestment economic damage economic impact effects of sanctions embargo endogenous equilibrium example explain Figure firms foreign policy free riding free-rider ideology impact of sanctions important incentive income increase individual's induce interest group model interest group pressures interest groups international economic sanctions international relations international sanctions investment sanctions Journal Kaempfer and Lowenberg Kuran large number level of sanctions marginal utility nonactivist objectionable policy offer curve opposition outcomes participation policy changes Political Economy political effectiveness political influence political processes politicians pressure group produce public choice approach public choice theory redistribution reducing relative rent-seeking reputational utility restrictions rise sanctioning country sanctions episodes sanctions policy shift signal social South Africa Sullivan Principles supporting the group target country target nation target polity terms of trade threshold model trade sanctions Uhlaner voters Willett