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governments, on the kindred subjects of prohibiting the slave trade and of abolishing slavery in Cuba, extended over several years. During this period, the diplomatists of both countries "snubbed" each other in the most undignified manner. Cabinet of Madrid having the best of the controversy, however, repeatedly placed the Cabinet of England in a most unenviable position. The following extracts from a note of Lord John Russell to the English minister at Madrid, dated January 31, 1853, closed this exciting controversy on the part of the British Government. Lord John Russell says:

"Your lordship may be assured, that however friendly the counsels of her Majesty may be to Spain, whatever may be the interest of this country not to see Cuba in the hands of any other power than Spain, yet, in the eyes of the people of this country, the destruction of a trade which conveys the natives of Africa to become slaves in Cuba, will furnish a large compensation for such a transfer. For such an exhibition of public feeling the government of Spain should be prepared."

To this threatening note the Spanish government replied, through Conde de Alcoy, February 9, 1853:

"Her Majesty's government has seen with deep regret the hint made by your lordship as to the effect which the supposed increase of the slave-trade is likely to produce on the opinion of England, with regard to the manner of viewing the fact of the island of Cuba being taken possession of by another power; and I assure your lordship that what on this subject is particularly painful to her Majesty's government, and even more regretable than any considerations affecting the immediate interests of Spain, is the melancholy reflection that the change of opinion in England, which your lordship anticipates, would be a triumph for the partisans of force, and a defeat of the upholders of right; because from the moment in which it should be declared that, for more or less plausible reasons, although not connected with the questions of right, it is lawful to look with indifference at the spoliation of one nation by another nation, the subversion of all principles and the oblivion of the law of nations, on which the peace of the world is resting, would then be sanctioned.

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"At all events, the government, who knows the loyalty and the noble feelings of the Spanish nation, is well aware that should the case arrive for it to defend her right, this nation will do her duty as she has done on former occasions, without counting the elements of resistance, and relying only on God and the sanctity of her cause, and on her constancy and valor."

In reviewing this correspondence in connexion with subsequent developments implicating the French Government also, John S. Thrasher, in his preliminary Essay, justly remarks:

"This position of Spain towards England, was soon after changed for one of complete harmony with regard to the social and political relations of Cuba, and it is somewhat remarkable that the change in the position of the Spanish Government was so sudden and unexpected by England, that conflicting despatches were written on the same day to each other, by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in London, and the British minister at Madrid. On the 16th of March, 1853, the Earl of Clarendon writes to Lord Howden that the position of Spain endangers the friendly relations between the two countries; and on the same day Lord Howden writes to the Earl of Clarendon, that the Spanish government has agreed to a settlement of a question which has long been a matter of painful discussion and dispute.' What the conditions of this settlement were, can only be partially conjectured from subsequent events, and from the measures taken by Spain in Cuba. Lord John Russell stated in Parliament, on the 4th of May following, that they were satisfactory to England.

Coincident with this arrangement between England and Spain, there are two remarkable statements made by British statesmen. On the occasion of the rejection by the United States, of the proposition made by England and France, to enter into a tripartite treaty relative to Cuba, Lord John Russell directs the British minister at Washington to say to the American Secretary of State :

'Finally, while fully admitting the right of the United States to reject the proposal made by Lord Malmesbury, and Mons. de Turgot, Great Britain must at once resume her entire liberty, and upon any occasion that may call for it, be free to act either singly or in conjunction with other powers as to her may seem fit.'

Lord Clarendon, while Secretary for Foreign Affairs, subsequently made in Parliament this celebrated announcement relative to the united policy of England and France:

'I will further add that the union between the two governments has not been confined to the Eastern question. The happy accord and good understanding between France and England, have been extended beyond the Eastern policy to the policy affecting all parts of the world, and I am heartily rejoiced to say, that there is no portion of the two hemispheres with regard to which the policy of the two countries, however heretofore antagonistic, is not now in entire harmony.'

The foregoing extracts, with the subsequent measures taken by Spain in Cuba, render it evident that the political relations of the island to England, which were for a long time the subject of warm discussion, have experienced a radical change. The conduct of the British naval commanders in the midAmerican waters last winter, sustains this view."

That Mr. Thrasher's conclusions are correct, there is little doubt, though we do not believe these European powers will

accomplish their purposes in relation to Cuba or any other portion of the American continent. But we must pass from the consideration of the policy of European cabinets to that of our own government.

Although no example is recorded in the history of European nations, ancient or modern, from which to draw precedents in support of this measure of President Buchanan, yet the absence of such precedents is doubly compensated by the magnanimity and patriotism of his policy, which is in common with the uniform practice of the United States in her dealings with other nations.

It is not proposed to do violence to any principle of international law, in entering into negotiation for the purchase of Cuba from Spain, but on the contrary, the proposition to purchase is indicative of a desire on the part of the executive authority of this country to pay deference to past usages in such cases; usages, however, established, as has been suggested, by the magnanimity of our own government, and never practised by any other nation, for they invariably extend their dominions by the power of conquest, while we extend ours by purchase, or by peaceful annexation.

It is a matter of surprise that the opponents of this measure hinge their argument almost solely upon the supposed objection of Spain to dispose of the island. They go so far as to denounce it as an attempt of the administration to despoil that nation of one of her fairest provinces, entirely ignoring at the same time all interests of the inhabitants of Cuba in the annexation of their own country to the United States. It is obvious these objections originate in a false conception of the rights of the people of Cuba, and are utterly repugnant to every principle of justice. Indeed, the first objection, and the only one of weight, that suggests itself to the mind of the statesman, to the proposed purchase of Cuba, is the possibility that her people might not be willing to consummate the transfer; and that the appearance of the transaction partakes too much of a sordid financial business arrangement, and not sufficiently of that spirit of liberty and independence which should have long since severed the unnatural and cruel connexion subsisting between Cuba and Spain. But regarded in its true light, the proposition to purchase Cuba is merely a proposition to purchase from Spain the governmental right she claims to exercise, over that island, and vest it in a free sovereign people, in which the community of Cuba would thus become merged.

These Republicans, in their zeal to defend the rights of Spain to Cuba, seem to forget that, by a fair application of their reasoning and the adoption of their ethics, the same title as

the crown of Spain now possesses to Cuba, could be acquired by the United States, in less time than would be occupied in the transmission of an official communication from our government to the court at Madrid, recapitulating the many outrages committed by Spanish officials in Cuba against the rights of American citizens.*

Although we can find among European nations no precedent, as has been remarked, for the liberal and just policy of the United States in the acquisition of territory, there are numerous examples for another policy, or rather another right-the right of self-defence. In seeking for precedents, in the intercourse between foreign nations, for the course pursued by the administration in regard to the purchase of Cuba, it is a little strange that the oppositionists of the measure did not meet with them in all their reading.

"Self-defence is the first law of nature, and it must be recognised by every code which proposes to regulate the conditions and relations of man."

Thus wrote Lord Ashburton to Secretary Webster, in 1842, in referring to the burning of the steamer Caroline in American waters, by order of the British authorities, during the Canadian rebellion. Suppose a certain contingency should arise, and Cuba must fall into other hands than those of Spain, is it not possible that the application of this paramount law of selfdefence might become necessary? Is it believed for a moment that the American people would allow this gem of the seas to fall into the hands of European despotism, when once freed from the grasp of the Spanish crown?

Again, it should be borne in mind, that all titles to any portion of this continent, claimed to be vested in any European nation, are the result of conquest; and, if this mode of acquiring title to foreign territory is legitimate and just for European nations, how much more legitimate and just for the United States to exercise this right in rescuing a neighboring people, who are anxious to join our country, from tyranny and despotism. It is not for us to advocate any such rule of action, although it is the recognised law of European powers, engrafted in their international code, and governing their intercourse with each other and with foreign people. Yet, were we governed by the rule of other nations, we would be justified in acquiring a title to Cuba, without the investment of one dollar of money.

The United States can entertain no ill-will towards Spain; on the contrary, she can claim our deepest sympathy. Once the most flourishing and refined nation in Europe, she has now fallen into the hands of England and France, and is being rapidly absorbed by these nations, who have ever proved her worst enemies, while the United States was always her friend.

It is true that our government has been compelled, occasionally, to differ with Spain; but then she has uniformly been treated with great forbearance and magnanimity by us. We could not save to her Cuba, if we would, for she has been losing ground everywhere for the last three centuries,* and no human