VIII. Aug. invitation to annex itself to the union; but the CHAP. American mind, in the strength of independence, foresaw its expansion. The rising states beyond the 1787. mountains were clamorous for the unobstructed navi- 29. gation of the Mississippi, which might lead to the acquisition by treaty of all the land east of that river; and the boundary on the south, as well of Georgia as of Florida, had never been adjusted with Spain. Gouverneur Morris had at an early day desired to restrict the limits of the United States; he now gave his ancient fears to the winds, and, acceding in advance to the largest eventual annexations, he proposed these few and simple words: "New states may be admitted by the legislature into the union," with the full understanding' and intention that an ordinary act of legislation should be sufficient by a bare majority to introduce foreign territory as a state into the union. This clause the convention accepted without a debate, and without a division. 1 Maryland, impelled by a desire to guard the right 30. of the United States to the back lands, and to be the champion of Kentucky, of Maine, of Vermont, and of the settlements on the Tennessee river and its branches, would have granted to the legislature of the United States unlimited power to dismember old states, but was supported only by Delaware and New Jersey. Vermont might once have been included within "the limits" of New York, but certainly remained no longer within its jurisdiction. By chang ing the word "limits" to "jurisdiction," the conven 1 Gilpin, 1458; Elliot, 493. neur Morris by Sparks, iii. 183, CHAP. tion, still following Gouverneur Morris, provided for VIII. its future admission to the union without the con1787. sent of New York. In regard to the south-western 30. settlements, the preliminary consent of the states of Aug. which they then formed a part was not dispensed with. In like manner no state could be formed by the junction of two or more states or parts thereof without the concurrence of such states. The country north-west of the Ohio having already been provided for, the rule for the admission of new states was thus completed for every part of the territory of the states or of the United States. The convention, still using the language of Gouverneur Morris, and no one but Maryland dissenting, assigned to the legislature the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States. Every word in the constitution bearing on the subject of slavery was chosen with the greatest caution; every agreement was jealously guarded. After the section relating to the slave-trade, the committee of detail inserted: "No capitation tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census hereinbefore directed to be taken." This was intended to prevent congress from enforcing a general emancipation by the special taxation of slaves." 1 1 Gilpin, 1234, 1415; Elliot, 379, 471. CHAPTER IX. THE PRESIDENT. IX. How to call forth one of the people to be their CHAP. executive chief for a limited period of years, and how to clothe him with just sufficient powers, long 1787. baffled the convention. Federal governments, in Greece, in Switzerland, and in Holland, like the confederation of the United States, had been with out a separate executive branch; and the elective monarchies of Poland, of the Papal states, and of Germany, offered no available precedents. The re- Aug. port of the committee of detail introduced no improvement in the manner of selecting a president; and it transferred to the senate the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors and judges of the supreme court.' Questions relating to his du ties long remained in doubt; the mode of his election was reached only just before the close of the convention. 6. 17. The Virginia plan confided the choice of the ex- July ecutive to the national legislature. "An election by the national legislature," objected Gouverneur Morris, 'Gilpin, 1234; Elliot, 379. July 1 CHAP. on the seventeenth of July, "will be the work of IX. intrigue, of cabal, of corruption, and of faction; it 1787. will be like the election of a pope by a conclave 17. of cardinals; of a king by the diet of Poland; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment." He moved for an election by the "citizens of the United States." Sherman preferred a choice by the national legislature. Wilson insisted on an election by the people; should no one have a majority, then, and then only, the legislature might decide between the candidates.' Charles Pinckney opposed the election by the people, because it would surrender the choice to a combination of the populous states led by a few designing men. "To refer the choice of a proper character for a chief magistrate to the people," protested Mason, "would be as unnatural as to refer a trial of colors to a blind man." • "An election by the people," observed Williamson, "is an appointment by lot." On the first vote Pennsylvania stood alone against nine states. Martin proposed to entrust the appointment to the legislatures of the states; and was supported only by Delaware and Maryland. On the mode of choosing the president, the length of his period of office and his re-eligibility would be made to depend. The convention, in committee, had fixed that period at seven years with a prohibition of re-election. On the motion of William Houston, of Georgia, supported by Sherman and Gouverneur Morris, this compulsory rotation was struck out IX. July by six states, against Delaware, Virginia, and the CHAP. two Carolinas. The executive becoming re-eligible, Broom revived the idea of a shorter period of ser- 1787. vice.' McClurg held that the independence of the 17. executive was no less essential than the independence of the judiciary; that a president, elected for a small number of years by the national legislature, and looking to that body for re-election, would be its dependent. To escape from corrupt cabals and yet preserve a good officer in place, he moved that the tenure of office should be good behavior. Gouverneur Morris beamed with joy. Broom found all his difficulties obviated. "Such a tenure," interposed Sherman, "is neither safe nor admissible; re-election will depend on good behavior." 4 5 Madison, who to the last refused with unabated vigor to entrust the choice of the national executive to the national legislature, and at heart would not have been greatly disinclined to the longest period of service for the executive, if "an easy and effectual removal by impeachment could have been settled," argued from the necessity of keeping the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers independent of each other, that the tenure of good behavior for the executive was a less evil than its dependence on the national legislature for re-election. Mason replied: "An executive during good behavior is only a softer name for an executive for life; the next easy step will be to hereditary monarchy. Should the motion succeed, I may myself live to see |