Indians, is of doubtfull policy with respect to those Indians more particularly connected with New York and Pensylvania; and that it is evidently disadvantageous, inconvenient, and even dangerous with respect to the much larger body of Indians, who possess the country to the westward, and with whom your Majesty's subjects in Quebec in particular do carry on so extensive a commerce.

3. That independent of this objection, and of any doubt that might attend the practicability of its execution in its full extent, the whole Plan does consist of such a variety of establishments, and necessarily leads to such extensive operations, as to bring on an increasing expence which in point of commerce, may exceed the value of the object to which it applies, and being greater than the trade can bear, must, if the present Plan should be permanent, either fall upon the colonies (in which case it will be impracticable to settle the proportion each colony should bear), or become a burthen upon this country, which we humbly conceive would be both unreasonable and highly inconvenient.

For these reasons therefore and under these circumstances, we are humbly of opinion that the laying aside that part of the present Plan which relates to the Indian trade, and intrusting the entire management of that trade to the colonies themselves, will be of great advantage to your Majesty's service, as a means of avoiding much difficulty, and saving much expense both at present and in future.

It is certainly true, that while the management of this trade was in the hands of the colonies antecedent to the establishment of Superintendants, many abuses were committed by the traders, little care was taken to subject them to proper regulations, and the misconduct of the colonies in this particular contributed not a little to involve us in the enormous expences of an Indian war.

But we trust, that the experience which the old colonies have had of the ill effects of such inattention and neglect, will induce all of them to use more caution and better management for the future; and particularly to adopt such of the regulations established by the present Superintendants as have evidently operated to the benefitt of the trade, and to the giving that satisfaction and content to the Indians. . . . We beg leave . . . to represent it to your Majesty as our humble opinion, that it will be in the highest degree

expedient to reduce all such posts in the interior country, as are not immediately subservient to the protection of the Indian commerce and to the defeating of French and Spanish machinations among the Indians, or which . . cannot be maintained but at an expence disproportioned to the degree of their utility. . . .

[Mention is made of the illicit trade between Louisiana and the Choctaws], and as their commerce both from Louisiana and the British colonies is carried on through a great variety of paths and routs, and does not depend upon rivers and lakes, . . . it is evident that . . . neither the trade of your Majesty's subjects can be protected, nor the connection and intercourse between Louisiana and the Indians prevented, by forts or military establishments.

In the Northern District the principal Indians form themselves into two great Confederacies; the one composed of the Six Nations and their allies and dependants, the other, called the Western Confederacy, composed of a great variety of powerfull tribes occupying that extensive country which lyes about the Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior, and to the West and Northwest.

The commerce and connection with the first of these bodies of Indians was, antecedent to the war, confined chiefly to the Province of New York, upon the teritories of which their principal hunting ground lyes, and the trade was carried on at fortified truck-houses upon the Lake Ontario. Since the peace a large share of this trade is carried on from Pennsylvania by the channel of the Ohio, and from thence by Venango and Rivière-aux-Bœufs into Lake Erie. The commerce and connection with those Indians which form the Western Confederacy, were . . . altogether confined to the French in Canada, and is now principally carried on from thence by your Majesty's subjects there, through the channel of the Ottawa River and by the lakes.

It does appear to us that the keeping up military festablishments at Detroit, Michilimacinac, and Niagara, and the having two, or at most three armed vessels on the Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior, may be necessary for keeping up and preserving that good correspondence with the Indians, which is essential to the safety, improvement, and extension of the trade with them.

All such forts as shall be judged necessary to be kept up for the security of your Majesty's dominions against a foreign enemy, or for forcing obedience to and a due execution of the Laws of Trade, ought to be garrisoned by troops in your Majesty's pay, commanded by officers appointed by your Majesty; as it would in our humble opinion be dangerous to publick safety, and inconsistent with the true principles of this Government, that forts and military establishments intended to answer such important objects, should be entrusted to any other hands. . .

This consideration therefore naturally leads us to the last head of inquiry referred to us by the Earl of Shelburne's letter, viz. How far the establishment of new governments on the Mississippi, the Ohio, and at Detroit, would contribute to answer the purpose of lessening either the present civil or military expence or would procure the several other important advantages set forth in the papers referred to us.

Now, although it does not appear from the papers referred to us, that propositions have been made for the establishment of more than three new governments or colonies in the interior parts of America; viz. one at the Detroit between Lakes Erie and Huron ; one at or near the mouth of the Ohio; 2 and one in the Illinois country at or near the mouth of the river of that name ; 3 and therefore by the strict letter of his lordship's reference, the present consideration seems to be confined to these only; yet as it does appear... that they are meant to support the utility of colonizing in the interior country, as a general principle of policy; and that in fact they have nothing less in view than the entire possession and peopling of all that country, which has communications with the rivers Mississippi and St. Lawrence, it does in our humble opinion, open a much wider field of discussion than might at the first glance seem to be necessary.

1 Promoted by Major Thomas Mant and 59 other officers who had served in Pontiac's rebellion. They proposed to transport 624 families to a land grant covering more than the present State of Michigan.

2 The plan of General Phineas Lyman and a group of former officers and others, called the Military Adventurers'. They asked for most of Kentucky and half of Tennessee.

3 A plan promoted by Benjamin Franklin, Sir William Johnson, and other leading colonists, embracing most of Illinois and Wisconsin. A map showing these three schemes is in Alvord, Mississippi Valley, i. 318. The Vandalia or Walpole scheme is not mentioned here, as the period of its organized activity came later.

The proposition of forming inland colonies in America is, we humbly conceive, entirely new; it adopts principles in respect to American settlements different from what has hitherto been the policy of this kingdom; and leads to a system which, if pursued through all its consequences, is in the present state of this country of the greatest importance.1 The great object of colonizing upon the Continent of North America has been to improve and extend the commerce, navigation, and manufactures of this Kingdom, upon which its strength and security depend: (1) by promoting the advantageous fishery carried on upon the northern coast; (2) by encouraging the growth and culture of naval stores, and of raw materials to be transported hither in exchange for perfect manufacture and other merchandize; (3) by securing a supply of lumber, provisions, and other necessaries for the support of our establishments in the American islands. In order to answer these salutary purposes it has been the policy of this Kingdom to confine her settlements as much as possible to the sea coast and not to extend them to places unacessible to shipping and consequently more out of the reach of commerce, a plan which at the same time . . . had the further political advantage of guarding against all interfering of foreign powers and of enabling this Kingdom to keep up a superior naval force in those seas, by the actual possession of such rivers and harbours as were proper stations for fleets in time of war.

Such, may it please your Majesty, have been the considerations inducing that plan of policy hitherto pursued in the settlement of your Majesty's American colonies, with which the private interest and sagacity of the settlers co-operated from the first establishments. . . . It was upon these principles and with these views, that Government undertook the settling of Nova Scotia in 1749; and . . . that it was so liberally supported by the aid of Parliament.

The same motives. . . did, as we humbly conceive, induce the forming the colonies of Georgia, East Florida, and West Florida to the south, and the making those provisional arrangements in the Proclamation in 1763, by which the interior country was left to the possession of the Indians. . . .

The rest of the Report, beginning with this paragraph, is quoted with approval in the Report of the Board of Trade and Plantations on the Vandalia scheme. Franklin, Works (Bigelow ed.), v. 5-17.

It is well known that, antecedent to the year 1749, all that part of the sea coast of the British Empire in America which extends north-east from the Province of Main to Cançeau in Nova Scotia, and from thence north to the mouth of St. Lawrence's River, lay waste and neglected, though naturally affording or capable by art of producing every species of naval stores, the seas abounding with whale, cod, and other valuable fish, and having many great rivers, bays, and harbours fit for the reception of ships of war. . . . [These considerations] induced that Plan for the settlement of Nova Scotia, to which we have before referred. .

The establishment of Government in this part of America induced a zeal for migration; and associations were formed for taking up lands and making settlements in this Province by principal persons residing at those colonies. In consequence of these associations upwards of 10,000 souls have passed from those colonies into Nova Scotia, who have either engaged in the fisheries, or become exporters of lumber and provisions to the West Indies; and further settlements to the extent of 21 townships of 100,000 acres each, have been engaged to be made there by many of the principal persons in Pennsylvania, whose names and association for that purpose now lye before your Majesty in Council.

The Government of Massachusets Bay, as well as the proprietors of large tracts to the eastward of the Province of Main, excited by the success of these settlements, are giving every encouragement to the like settlements in that valuable country lying between them and Nova Scotia; and the proprietors of twelve townships, lately laid out there by the Massachusets Government, now solicit your Majesty for a confirmation of their title.

Such, may it please your Majesty, is the present state of the progress making in the settlement of the northern parts of the sea coasts of North America, in consequence of what appears to have been the policy adopted by this Kingdom; and many persons of rank and substance here are proceeding to carry into execution the Plan, which your Majesty (pursuing the same principles of commercial policy) has approved for the settlement of the islands of St. John and Cape Breton, and of the new established colonies to the south; and therefore... we cannot be of opinion that it would . . . be adviseable to divert your Majesty's subjects in America from the