consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear and determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy, cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collectio of the national revenue; impeachments of any National icers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.1

10. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole.2

II. Resolved, that a republican government and the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government and territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State.3

12. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engage

ments.

13. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.4

14. Resolved, that the legislative, executive and judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.

15. Resolved, that the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation by the Convention, ought at a proper time or times, after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representatives 1 Ibid., art. iii. 2 Ibid., art. iv, s. iii. Ibid., art. iv, s. iv.

Ibid., art. v.

recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people, to consider and decide thereon.1

He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the United States to pass away unimproved.

It was then resolved-That the House will to-morrow resolve itself into a committee of the whole house to consider of the state of the American Union, and that the propositions moved by Mr. Randolph be referred to the said committee.

Mr. CHARLES PINCKNEY laid before the House the draft of a federal government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and indep lent States of America.Mr. Pinckney's plan 2 ordered that the same be referred to the committee of the whole appointed to consider the state of the American Union.

Adjourned.

(b) Democracy and the Lower House.

31 May (Madison)

In committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions. The 3d Resolution that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches' was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doctor Franklin, who was understood to be partial to a single House of legislation.

Resolution 4, first clause that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States' being taken up,

Mr. SHERMAN [Conn.] opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people, he said, immediately should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled.

Mr. GERRY [Mass.]. The evils we experience flow from the, excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are 1 Cf. Constitution, art. vii.

2 For the Pinckney plan, see Debates in the Federal Convention (Hunt and Scott ed.), pp. 596-8. Charles Pinckney (b. 1758) was the youngest member of the Convention. His cousin, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, also on the South Carolina delegation, is referred to in the debates as General Pinckney.

the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massachusetts it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of government. It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Massachusetts for the reduction of salaries 1 and the attack made on that of the Governor, though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore he was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levilling spirit.

1

Mr. MASON [Va.] argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Government. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons. It ought to know and sympathise with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in several instances, particularly in Virginia, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits, etc., etc. He admitted that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity and policy; considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations might be, the course of a few years not only might but certainly would distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of society. Every selfish motive, therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of citizens.

Mr. WILSON [Penn.] contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as

1 Cf. above, pp. 209-12, 221,

broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist\ without the confidence of the people. In a republican government this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the National Legislature. All interference between the general and local governments should be obviated as much as possible. On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had proceded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at large.

Mr. MADISON considered the popular election of one branch of the National Legislature as essential to every plan of free government. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first, the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the executive and judiciary branches of the government. He thought, too, that the great fabric to be raise would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.

Mr. GERRY did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British Constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State Tegislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection, however, to an election by the people, if it were so qual fed that men of honor and character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound to choose.

Mr..BUTLER [S. C.] thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.

On the question for an election of the first branch of the National Legislature by the people : 1

Mass. зу Conn. div. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. div. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay,

(c) Monarchy and the Executive.

I June (Madison)

Penn. ay.

R.I.
Her Ma
N. Hamp.

The committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7, ' that a National Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the National Legislature', etc. . . .

Mr. PINCKNEY was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace and war, etc., which would render the Executive a monarchy of the worst kind, to wit, an elective one.

Mr. WILSON moved that the Executive consist of a single person. Mr. C. PINCKNEY Seconded the motion, so as to read that a National Executive, to consist of a single person, be instituted'.

A considerable pause ensuing, and the chairman asking if he should put the question, Dr. FRANKLIN observed that it was a point of great importance, and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.

Mr. RUTLEDGE [S. C.] animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive Power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer the public affairs best.

Mr. SHERMAN said he considered the executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which

1 The Convention voted, as had the Continental Congress, by States, a majority ballot of each State delegation determining the vote of

that State.