at such strength and maturity as to be well able to provide for themselves, and ought rather with filial duty to give some assistance to her distresses ?

As to the manner; that is, the imposing taxes on the colonies by the authority of Parliament, it is said to be harsh and arbitrary; and that it would have been more consistent with justice, at least with maternal tenderness, for administration here to have settled quotas on each of the colonies, and have then transmitted them with injunctions that the sums allotted should be immediately raised by their respective legislatures, on the penalty of their being imposed by Parliament in case of their non-compliance. But was this to be done, what would be the consequence? Have their Assemblies shewn so much obedience to the orders of the Crown, that we could reasonably expect that they would immediately tax themselves on the arbitrary command of a minister? Would it be possible here to settle those quotas with justice, or would any one of the colonies submit to them, were they ever so just? Should we not be compared to those Roman tyrants, who used to send orders to their subjects to murder themselves within so many hours, most obligingly leaving the method to their own choice, but on their disobedience threatening a more severe fate from the hands of an executioner? And should we not receive votes, speeches, resolutions, petitions, and remonstrances in abundance, instead of taxes? In short, we either have a right to tax the colonies, or we have not If Parliament is possessed of this right, why should it be exercised with more delicacy in America than it has ever been even in Great Britain itself? If on the other hand, they have no such right, sure it is below the dignity as well as justice of the Legislature to intimidate the colonies with vain threats, which they have really no right to put in execution.

One method indeed has been hinted at, and but one, that might render the exercise of this power in a British Parliament just and legal, which is the introduction of representatives from the several colonies into that body; but as this has never seriously been proposed, I shall not here consider the impracticability of this method, nor the effects of it if it could be practised; but only say that I have lately seen so many specimens of the great powers of speech of which these American gentlemen are possessed, that I should be much

afraid that the sudden importation of so much eloquence at once, would greatly endanger the safety and government of this country; or in terms more fashionable, though less understood, this our most excellent Constitution. If we can avail ourselves of these taxes on no other condition, I shall never look upon it as a measure of frugality; being perfectly satisfyed that in the end it will be much cheaper for us to pay their army than their orators.

I cannot omit taking notice of one prudential reason which I have heard frequently urged against this taxation of the colonies, which is this: That if they are by this means impoverished, they will be unable to purchase our manufactures, and consequently we shall lose that trade from which the principal benefit which we receive from them must arise. But surely, it requires but little sagacity to see the weakness of this argument; for should the colonies raise taxes for the purposes of their own government and protection, would the money so raised be immediately annihilated? What some pay, would not others receive? Would not those who so receive it, stand in need of as many of our manufactures, as those who pay? Was the army there maintained at the expence of the Americans, would the soldiers want fewer coats, hats, shirts, or shoes than at present? Had the judges salaries ascertained to them, would they not have occasion for as costly perriwigs, or robes of as expensive scarlet, as marks of their legal abilities, as they now wear in their present state of dependency? Or had their Governors better incomes settled on them for observing their instructions, than they can now with difficulty obtain for disobeying them, would they expend less money in their several Governments, or bring home at their return less riches to lay out in the manufactories of their native country?

It has been likewise asserted that every shilling which our colonies can raise either by cultivation or commerce, finally centers in this country; and therefore it is argued we can, acquire nothing by their taxation, since we can have no more than their all; and whether this comes in by taxes or by trade, the consequence is the same. But allowing this assertion to be true, which it is not, yet the reasoning upon it is glaringly false for surely it is not the same whether the wealth derived from these colonies flows immediately into the coffers of the public, or into the pockets of individuals

from whence it must be squeezed by various domestic taxes before it can be rendered of any service to the nation. Surely it is by no means the same, whether this money brought in by taxes enables us to diminish part of that enormous debt contracted by the last expensive war, or whether coming in by trade it enables the merchant, by augmenting his influence together with his wealth, to plunge us into new wars and new debts for his private advantage.

From what has been here said, I think that not only the right of the legislature of Great Britain to impose taxes on her colonies, not only the expediency, but the absolute necessity of exercising that right in the present conjuncture, has been so clearly though concisely proved, that it is to be hoped that in this great and important question all parties and factions, or in the more polite and fashionable term, all connections will most cordially unite; that every member of the British Parliament, whether in or out of humour with Administration, whether he has been turned out because he has opposed, or whether he opposes because he has been turned out, will endeavour to the utmost of his power to support this measure. A measure which must not only be approved by every man who has any property or common sense, but which ought to be required by every English subject of an English Administration.

FINIS

FROM DANIEL DULANY'S 'CONSIDERATIONS ' 1

Considerations on the Propriety of imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, for the purpose of Raising a Revenue, by Act of Parliament.

Second edition. Annapolis, 1765.

IN the Constitution of England, the three principal forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, are blended together in certain proportions; but each of these orders, in the exercise of the legislative authority, hath its peculiar department from which the other are excluded. In

1 Dulany was a Maryland lawyer, educated at Eton, Clare, and the Temple. He never changed his position as to the legality of external taxation by Parliament, and eventually became a loyalist.

this division, the granting of supplies or laying taxes is deemed to be the province of the House of Commons, as the representative of the people. All supplies are supposed to flow from their gift; and the other orders are permitted only to assent, or reject generally, not to propose any modification, amendment, or partial alteration of it.

This observation being considered, it will undeniably appear that in framing the late Stamp Act, the Commons acted in the character of representatives of the colonies. They assumed it as the principle of that measure, and the propriety of it must therefore stand or fall as the principle is true or false: for the preamble sets forth that the Commons of Great Britain had resolved to give and grant the several rates and duties imposed by the Act; but what right had the Commons of Great Britain to be thus munificent at the expence of the Commons of America? To give property not belonging to the giver, and without the consent of the owner, is such evident and flagrant injustice in ordinary cases, that few are hardy enough to avow it; and therefore when it really happens, the fact is disguised and varnished over by the most plausible pretences the ingenuity of the giver can suggest. But it is alledged that there is a virtual, or implied representation of the colonies springing out of the Constitution of the British Government. And it must be confessed on all hands, that as the representation is not actual, it is virtual, or it doth not exist at all; for no third kind of representation can be imagined. The colonies claim the privilege which is common to all British subjects, of being taxed only with their own consent given by their representatives, and all the advocates for the Stamp Act admit this claim. Whether therefore . the imposition of the stamp duties is a proper exercise of constitutional authority or not, depends upon the single question, whether the Commons of Great Britain are virtually the representatives of the Commons of America or not.

The advocates for the Stamp Act admit in express terms, that the colonies do not chuse members of Parliament', but they assert that the colonies are virtually represented in the same manner with the non-electors resident in Great Britain'.

How have they proved this position? Where have they defined, or precisely explained what they mean by the expression, virtual representation?

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They argue, that the right of election being annexed to certain species of property, to franchises, and inhabitancy in some particular places, a very small part of the land, the property, and the people of England, is comprehended in those descriptions. All landed property not freehold, and all monied property are excluded. The merchants of London, the proprietors of the public funds, the inhabitants of Leeds, Halifax, Birmingham, and Manchester, and that great corporation of the East India Company, none of them chuse their representatives, and yet are they all represented in Parliament, and the colonies being exactly in their situation, are represented in the same manner.'

The notion of a virtual representation of the colonies. . . is a mere cob-web, spread to catch the unwary, and intangle the weak. I would be understood. I am upon a question of propriety, not of power; and, though some may be inclined to think it is to little purpose to discuss the one, when the other is irresistible, yet are they different considerations; and, at the same time that I invalidate the claim upon which it is founded, I may very consistently recommend a submission to the law, whilst it endures.

Lessees for years, copyholders, proprietors of the public funds, inhabitants of Birmingham, Leeds, Halifax, and Manchester, merchants of the City of London, or members of the corporation of the East India Company, are, as such, under no personal incapacity to be electors; for they may acquire the right of election, and there are actually not only a considerable number of electors in each of the classes of lessees for years, &c., but in many of them, if not all, even members of Parliament. The interests therefore of the non-electors, the electors, and the representatives, are individually the same; to say nothing of the connection among neighbours, friends, and relations. The security of the non-electors against oppression, is that their oppression will fall also upon the electors and the representatives. The one can't be injured, and the other indemnified.

Further, if the non-electors should not be taxed by the British Parliament, they would not be taxed at all; and it - would be iniquitous, as well as a solecism in the political system, that they should partake of all the benefits resulting from the imposition and application of taxes, and derive an