are these words- born within the allegiance of England,' and again,' born without the allegiance of England.' There is no trope of speech more familiar,' says he, than to use the place of addition for the person. So we say commonly, the line of York, or the line of Lancaster, for the lines of the duke of York, or the duke of Lancaster. So we say the possessions of Somerset or Warwick, intending the possessions of the dukes of Somerset, or earls of Warwick. And in the very same manner, the statute speaks, allegiance of England, for allegiance of the King of England.' *

Dependence on the mother country seems to have been understood in this sense, both by the first planters of the colonies, and also by the most eminent lawyers at that time in England.

Those who launched into the unknown deep, in quest of new countries and habitations, still considered themselves as subjects of the English monarchs, and behaved suitably to that character; but it nowhere appears that they still considered themselves as represented in an English Parliament, or that they thought the authority of the English Parliament extended over them. They took possession of the country in the king's name: they treated, or made war with the Indians by his authority: they held the lands under his grants, and paid him the rents reserved upon them: they established governments under the sanction of his prerogative, or by virtue of his charters :- -no application for those purposes was made to the Parliament: no ratification of the charters or letters patent was solicited from that assembly, as is usual in England with regard to grants and franchises of much less importance.

My Lord Bacon's sentiments on this subject ought to have great weight with us. His immense genius, his universal learning, his deep insight into the laws and constitution of England, are well known and much admired. Besides, he lived at that time when settling and improving the American plantations began seriously to be attended to, and successfully to be carried into execution. Plans for the government and regulation of the colonies were then forming: and it is only from the first general idea of these plans, that we can unfold, with precision and accuracy, all the more minute and intricate parts of which they now consist. The settlement of colonies,' 4 Ld. Bac. 192, 193, Case of the postnati of Scotland.

*

says he, must proceed from the option of those who will settle them, else it sounds like an exile: they must be raised by the leave, and not by the command of the King. At their setting out they must have their commission, or letters patent, from the king, that so they may acknowledge their dependency upon the crown of England, and under his protection.' In another place he says, that they still must be subjects of the realm.' 'In order to regulate all the inconveniences which 'will insensibly grow upon them,' he proposes, 'that the King should erect a subordinate council in England, whose care and charge shall be to advise and put in execution all things which shall be found fit for the good of those new plantations; who, upon all occasions, shall give an account of their proceedings to the king or the council board, and from them receive such directions as may best agree with the government of that place.' It is evident from these quotations that my Lord Bacon had no conception that the Parliament would or ought to interpose, either in the settlement or the government of the colonies. The only relation in which he says the colonists must still continue is that of subjects: the only dependency which they ought to acknowledge is a dependency on the Crown.

This is a dependence which they have acknowledged hitherto; which they acknowledge now; and which, if it is reasonable to judge of the future by the past and the present, they will continue to acknowledge hereafter. It is not dependence like that contended for on Parliament, slavish) and unaccountable, or accounted for only by principles that are false and inapplicable: it is a dependence founded upon the principles of reason, of liberty and of law. Let us investigate its sources.

The colonists ought to be dependent on the King, because they have hitherto enjoyed, and still continue to enjoy, his protection. Allegiance is the faith and obedience which every subject owes to his prince. This obedience is founded on the protection derived from government: for protection and allegiance are the reciprocal bonds which connect the prince and his subjects. Every subject, so soon as he is born, is under the royal protection, and is entitled to all the advantages

* It was chiefly during the confusions of the republic, when the king was in exile, and unable to assert his rights, that the House of Commons began to interfere in colony matters.

arising from it. He therefore owes obedience to that royal power, from which the protection which he enjoys is derived. But while he continues in infancy and nonage he cannot perform the duties which his allegiance requires. The performance of them must be respited till he arrive at the years of discretion and maturity. When he arrives at those years, he owes obedience not only for the protection which he now enjoys, but also for that which from his birth he has enjoyed; and to which his tender age has hitherto prevented him from making a suitable return. Allegiance now becomes a duty founded upon principles of gratitude, as well as on principles of interest it becomes a debt, which nothing but the loyalty of a whole life will discharge. As neither climate, nor soil, nor time entitle a person to the benefits of a subject, so an alteration of climate, of soil, or of time cannot release him from the duties of one. An Englishman who removes to foreign countries, however distant from England, owes the same allegiance to his King there which he owed him at home; and will owe it twenty years hence as much as he owes it now. Wherever he is, he is still liable to the punishment annexed by law to crimes against his allegiance; and still entitled to the advantages promised by law to the duties of it: it is not cancelled, and it is not forfeited. Hence all children born in any part of the world, if they be of English parents continuing at that time as liege subjects to the King, and having done no act to forfeit the benefit of their allegiance, are ipso facto naturalized: and if they have issue, and their descendants intermarry among themselves, such descendants are naturalized to all generations.' *

Now we have explained the dependence of the Americans. They are the subjects of the King of Great Britain. They owe him allegiance. They have a right to the benefits which arise from preserving that allegiance inviolate. They are liable to the punishments which await those who break it. This is a dependence which they have always boasted of. The principles of loyalty are deeply rooted in their hearts; and there they will grow and bring forth fruit while a drop of vital blood remains to nourish them. Their history is not stained with rebellious and treasonable machinations: an inviolable attachment to their sovereign and the warmest zeal for his glory shine in every page.

* 34 Ld. Bac. 192. Case of the postnati of Scotland.

From this dependence, abstracted from every other source, arises a strict connection between the inhabitants of Great Britain and those of America. They are fellow-subjects; they are under allegiance to the same prince; and this union of allegiance naturally produces a union of hearts. It is also productive of a union of measures through the whole British dominions. To the King is intrusted the direction and management of the great machine of government. He therefore is fittest to adjust the different wheels and to regulate their motions in such a manner as to co-operate in the same general designs. He makes war, he concludes peace, he forms alliances, he regulates domestic trade by his prerogative, and directs foreign commerce by his treaties with those nations with whom it is carried on. He names the officers of government, so that he can check every jarring movement in the administration. He has a negative on the different legislatures throughout his dominions, so that he can prevent any repugnancy in their different laws.

The connection and harmony between Great Britain and us, which it is her interest and ours mutually to cultivate, and on which her prosperity, as well as ours, so materially depends, will be better preserved by the operation of the legal prerogatives of the Crown, than by the exertion of an unlimited -authority by Parliament.*

* After considering, with all the attention of which I am capable, the foregoing opinion-that all the different members of the British Empire are distinct states, independent of each other, but connected together under the same sovereign in right of the same Crown-I discover only one objection that can be offered against it. But this objection will, by many, be deemed a fatal one. How, it will be urged, can the trade of the British Empire be carried on, without some power, extending over the whole, to regulate it? The legislative authority of each part, according to your doctrine, is confined within the local bounds of that part: how, then, can so many interfering interests and claims, as must necessarily meet and contend in the commerce of the whole, be decided and adjusted?'

Permit me to answer these questions by proposing some others in my turn. How has the trade of Europe-how has the trade of the whole globe, been carried on? Have those widely extended plans been formed by one superintending power? Have they been carried into execution by one superintending power? Have they been formed-have they been carried into execution, with less conformity to the rules of justice and equality, than if they had been under the direction of one superintending power?

It has been the opinion of some politicians, of no inferior note, that all regulations of trade are useless; that the greatest part of them are

116

JOSEPH GALLOWAY'S PLAN OF UNION 1

Submitted to the Continental Congress, 28 September 1774

Resolved, That this Congress will apply to His Majesty for a redress of grievances, under which his faithful subjects in America labour, and assure him that the colonies hold in abhorrence the idea of being considered independent communities on the British Government, and most ardently desire the establishment of a political union, not only among themselves, but with the mother state, upon those principles of safety and freedom which are essential in the constitution of all free governments, and particularly that of the British hurtful; and that the stream of commerce never flows with so much beauty and advantage, as when it is not diverted from its natural channels. Whether this opinion is well founded or not, let others determine. Thus much may certainly be said, that commerce is not so properly the object of laws, as of treaties and compacts. In this manner, it has been always directed among the several nations of Europe.

But if the commerce of the British Empire must be regulated by a general superintending power, capable of exerting its influence over every part of it, why may not this power be intrusted to the King, as a part of the royal prerogative? By making treaties, which it is his prerogative to make, he directs the trade of Great Britain with the other states of Europe: and his treaties with those states have, when considered with regard to his subjects, all the binding force of laws upon them ( Bl. Com. 252). Where is the absurdity in supposing him vested with the same right to regulate the commerce of the distinct parts of his dominions with one another, which he has to regulate their commerce with foreign states? If the history of the British Constitution, relating to this subject, be carefully traced, I apprehend we shall discover, that a prerogative in the Crown, to regulate trade, is perfectly consistent with the principles of law. We find many authorities that the King cannot lay impositions on traffic; and that he cannot restrain it altogether, nor confine it to monopolists; but none of the authorities, that I have had an opportunity of consulting, go any farther. Indeed many of them seem to imply a power in the Crown to regulate trade, where that power is exerted for the great end of all prerogative-the public good.

If the power of regulating trade be, as I am apt to believe it to be, vested, by the principles of the Constitution, in the Crown, this good effect will flow from the doctrine: a perpetual distinction will be kept up between that power, and a power of laying impositions on trade. The prerogative will extend to the former: it can, under no pretence, extend to the latter; as it is given, so it is limited, by the law.

1 Journals of the Continental Congress (Ford ed.), i. 49–51. The Plan was defeated by a majority of one colony.