what principles then, on what motives of action can we depend for the security of our liberties, of our properties, of everything dear to us in life, of life itself? Shall we depend on their veneration for the dictates of natural justice? A very little share of experience in the world, a very little degree of knowledge in the history of men, will sufficiently convince us that a regard to justice is by no means the ruling principle in human nature. He would discover himself to be a very sorry statesman, who would erect a system of jurisprudence upon that slender foundation. 'He would make', as my Lord Bacon says, imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and his discourses, like the stars, would give little light, because they are so high.' But this is not the worst that can justly be said concerning the situation of the colonies, if they are bound by the acts of the British Legislature. So far are those powerful springs of action, which we have mentioned, from interesting the members of that Legislature in our favor, that, as has been already observed, we have the greatest reason to dread their operation against us. While the happy commons of Great Britain congratulate themselves upon the liberty which they enjoy, and upon the provisions-infallible, as far as they can be rendered so by human wisdom-which are made for perpetuating it to their latest posterity; the unhappy Americans have reason to bewail the dangerous situation to which they are reduced, and to look forward with dismal apprehension to those future scenes of woe, which in all probability will open upon their descendants. What has been already advanced will suffice to show that it is repugnant to the essential maxims of jurisprudence, to the ultimate end of all governments, to the genius of the British Constitution, and to the liberty and happiness of the colonies, that they should be bound by the legislative authority of the Parliament of Great Britain. Such a doctrine is not less repugnant to the voice of her laws. In order to evince this, I shall appeal to some authorities from the books of the law, which show expressly, or by a necessary implication, that the colonies are not bound by the Acts of the British Parliament because they have no share in the British Legislature. The first case I shall mention was adjudged in the second year of Richard the Third. It was a solemn determination of all the judges of England, met in the exchequer chamber, to consider whether the people in Ireland were bound by an Act of Parliament made in England. They resolved, 'that they were not, as to such things as were done in Ireland; but that what they did out of Ireland must be conformable to the laws of England, because they were the subjects of England. Ireland,' said they, ' has a Parliament, who make laws; and our statutes do not bind them; because they do not send knights to Parliament; but their persons are the subjects of the king, in the same manner as the inhabitants of Calais, Gascoigne, and Guienne '* From this authority it follows that it is by no means a rule, that the authority of Parliament extends to all the subjects of the Crown. The inhabitants of Ireland were the subjects of the king as of his Crown of England; but it is expressly resolved, in the most solemn manner, that the inhabitants of Ireland are not bound by the statutes of England. Allegiance to the King and obedience to the Parliament are founded on very different principles. The former is founded on protection; the latter, on representation. An inattention to this difference has produced, I apprehend, much uncertainty and confusion in our ideas concerning the connexion, which ought to subsist between Great Britain and the American colonies. The last observation which I shall make on this case is, that if the inhabitants of Ireland are not bound by, Acts of Parlia- › ment made in England, a fortiori, the inhabitants of the American colonies are not bound by them. There are marks of the subordination of Ireland to Great Britain, which cannot be traced in the colonies. A writ of error lies from the King's Bench in Ireland,† to the King's Bench, and consequently to the House of Lords, in England; by which means the former kingdom is subject to the control of the courts of justice of the latter kingdom. But a writ of error does not lie in the King's Bench, nor before the House of Lords, in England, from the colonies of America. The proceedings in their courts of justice can be reviewed and controlled only on an appeal to the King in Council.** The foregoing important decision, favorable to the liberty of all the dominions of the British Crown that are not repre * 4 Mod. 225; 7 Rep. 22 b, Calvin's case. ** I Bl. Com. 108, 231. sented in the British Parliament, has been corroborated by subsequent adjudications.1 I must not be so uncandid as to conceal, that in Calvin's case, where the above-mentioned decision of the judges in the exchequer chamber concerning Ireland, is quoted, it is added by way of explanation of that authority, which is to be understood, unless it (Ireland) be especially named.' Nor will I conceal that the same exception is taken notice of, and seems to be allowed, by the judges in the other cases relating to America. To any objection that may, hence, be formed against my doctrine, I answer, in the words of the very accurate Mr. Justice Foster, that general rules thrown out in argument, and carried farther than the true state of the case then in judgment requireth, have, I confess, no great weight with me'. The question before the judges in the cases I have reasoned from, was not how far the naming of persons in an Act of Parliament would affect them; though, unless named, they would not be bound by it: the question was, whether the legislative authority of Parliament extended over the inhabitants of Ireland or Jamaica or Virginia. To the resolution of the latter question the resolution of the former was by no means necessary, and was, therefore, wholly impertinent to the point of the adjudication. But farther, the reason assigned for the resolution of the latter question is solid and convincing: the American colonies are not bound by the Acts of the British Parliament, because they are not represented in it. But what reason can be assigned why they should be bound by those facts in which they are specially named? Does naming them give those who do them that honor, a right to rule over them? Is this the source of the supreme, the absolute, the irresistible, the uncontrolled authority of Parliament? These positions are too absurd to be alleged; and a thousand judicial determinations in their favor would never induce one man of sense to subscribe his assent to them. I am sufficiently aware of an objection that will be made to what I have said concerning the legislative authority of the British Parliament. It will be alleged that I throw off all 1 He cites Blankard v. Galdy, 4 Mod. 215, Salk. 411. See, however, Campbell v. Hall, 20 Howell's State Trials, 239. dependence on Great Britain. This objection will be held forth in its most specious colors, by those who, from servility > of soul or from mercenary considerations would meanly bow their necks to every exertion of arbitrary power it may likewise alarm some who entertain the most favorable opinion of the connection between Great Britain and her colonies, but who are not sufficiently acquainted with the nature of that connection which is so dear to them. Those of the first class, I hope, are few; I am sure they are contemptible, and deserve to have very little regard paid to them: but for the sake of those of the second class, who may be more numerous, and whose laudable principles atone for their mistakes, I shall take some pains to obviate the objection, and to show that a denial of the legislative authority of the British Parliament over America is by no means inconsistent with that connection which ought to subsist between the mother country and her colonies, and which, at the first settlement of those colonies, it was intended to maintain between them; but that, on the contrary, that connection would be entirely destroyed by the extension of the power of Parliament over the American plantations. Let us examine what is meant by a dependence on Great (Britain for it is always of importance clearly to define the terms that we use. Blackstone, who, speaking of the colonies, tells us, 6 that they are no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions', explains dependence in this manner. Dependence is very little else, but an obligation to conform to the will or law of that superior person or state, upon which the inferior depends. The original and true ground of this superiority, in the case of Ireland, is what we usually call, though somewhat improperly, the right of conquest; a right allowed by the law of nations, if not by that of nature; but which, in reason and civil policy, can mean nothing more than that, in order to put an end to hostilities, a compact is either expressly or tacitly made between the conqueror and the conquered, that if they will acknowledge the victor for their master he will treat them for the future as subjects, and not as enemies.' * The original and true ground of the superiority of Great Britain over the American colonies is not shown in any book of the law, unless, as I have already observed, it be derived * I Bl. Com. 107, 103. C from the right of conquest. But I have proved, and I hope satisfactorily, that this right is altogether inapplicable to the colonists. The original of the superiority of Great Britain over the colonies is, then, unaccounted for; and when we consider the ingenuity and pains which have lately been employed at home on this subject, we may justly conclude that the only reason why it is not accounted for is that it cannot be accounted for. The superiority of Great Britain over the colonies ought therefore to be rejected; and the dependence of the colonies upon her, if it is to be construed into an obligation to conform to the will or law of the superior state,' ought, in this sense, to be rejected also. My sentiments concerning this matter are not singular. They coincide with the declarations and remonstrances of the colonies against the statutes imposing taxes on them. It was their unanimous opinion that the Parliament have no right to exact obedience to those statutes; and consequently, that the colonies are under no obligation to obey them. The dependence of the colonies on Great Britain was denied in those instances; but a denial of it in those instances is, in effect, a denial of it in all other instances. For, if dependence is an obligation to conform to the will or law of the superior state, any exceptions to that obligation must destroy the dependence. If, therefore, by a dependence of the colonies on Great Britain, it is meant that they are obliged to obey the laws of Great Britain, reason, as well as the unanimous voice of the Americans, teaches us to disown it. Such a dependence was never thought of by those who left Britain in order to settle in America, nor by their Sovereigns who gave them commissions for that purpose. Such an obligation has no correspondent right for the Commons of Great Britain have no dominion over their equals and fellow-subjects in America; they can confer no right to their delegates to bind those equals and fellow-subjects by laws. There is another, and a much more reasonable meaning, which may be intended by the dependence of the colonies on Great Britain. The phrase may be used to denote the obedience and loyalty which the colonists owe to the kings of Great Britain. If it should be alleged that this cannot be the meaning of the expression, because it is applied to the kingdom and not to the King, I give the same answer that my Lord Bacon gave to those who said that allegiance related to the the kingdom and not to the King, because in the statutes there |