THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.

6-19

offer. I had hoped to come up with the position, that desperate fighting alone enemy, during the 15th, in sufficient could drive them from the field, and all force to beat them again, and drive felt that a great and terrible battle was them into the river. My instructions at hand. In proceeding to the narrative were, that if the enemy were not on the of the events of this and the succeeding march, they were to be at once attack-day, I must here repeat what I have obed; if they were found in force and position, the corps were to be placed in position for attack, but no attack was to be made until I reached the front. On arriving at the front, in the afternoon, I found but two divisions, Richardson's and Sykes', in position; the rest were halted in the road, the head of the column some distance in rear of Richardson. After a rapid examination of the position, I found that it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed locations to be selected for our batteries of position, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg Pike. The corps were not all in their places until the next morning, some time after sunrise.

"On the 16th, the enemy had slightly changed their line, and were posted upon the heights in the rear of the Antietam creek, their left and centre being upon and in front of the road from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and protected by woods and irregularities of the ground. Their extreme left rested upon a wooded eminence near the cross-roads to the north of J. Miller's farm, the distance at this point between the road and the Potomac, which makes here a great bend to the east, being about three-fourths of a mile. Their right rested on the hills to the right of Sharpsburg, near Snavely's farm, covering the crossing of the Antietam, and the approaches to the town from the southeast. The ground from their immediate front and the Antietam is undulating. Hills intervene whose crests in general are commanded by the crests of others in their rear. On all favorable points, their artillery was posted. It became evident from the force of the enemy and the strength of their

served in reporting upon the other subjects of this communication, that I attempt in this preliminary report nothing more than a sketch of the main features of this great engagement, reserving for my official report, based upon the reports of the corps commanders, that full description of details which shall place upon record the achievements of individuals and of particular bodies of troops. The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy's left-at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more-by assailing the enemy's right, and as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their centre with any reserve I might then have on hand. The morning of the 16th (during which there was considerable artillery firing) was spent in obtaining information as to the ground, rectifying the position of the troops, and perfecting the arrangements for the attack.

"On the afternoon of the 16th, Hooker's corps, consisting of Rickett's and Doubleday's divisions, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, under Meade, was sent across Antietam creek, by a ford and bridge to the right of Kedysville, with orders to attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's left. Mansfield, with his corps, was sent in the evening to support Hooker. Arrived in position, Meade's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, which was at the head of Hooker's corps, became engaged in a sharp contest with the enemy, which lasted until after dark, when it had succeeded in driving in a portion of the opposing line, and held the ground. At daylight the contest was renewed between Hooker and the enemy in his front. Hooker's attack

GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S REPORT.

651

teries of their artillery, also, were slept that night conquerors on a field won brought up and opened. It became by their valor, and covered with the evident that our force was not sufficient to enable the advance to reach the town, and the order was given to retire to the cover of the hill, which was taken from the enemy earlier in the afternoon. This movement was effected without confusion, and the position maintained until the enemy retreated. General Burnside had sent to me for reinforcements late in the afternoon, but the condition of things on the right was not such as to enable me to afford them. During the whole day our artillery was everywhere bravely and ably handled. Indeed, I cannot speak too highly of the efficiency of our batteries, and of the great service they rendered. On more than one occasion, when our infantry was broken, they covered its reformation, and drove back the enemy. The cavalry had little field for operations during the engagement, but was employed in supporting the horse artillery batteries in the centre, and in driving up stragglers, while awaiting opportunity for other service. The signal corps, under Major Myers, rendered during the operations at Antietam, as at South Mountain, and during the whole movements of the army, efficient and valuable service. Indeed, by its services here, as on other fields elsewhere, this corps has gallantly earned its title to an independent and permanent organization. The duties devolving upon my staff during the action were most important, and the performances of them able and untiring.

"With the day closed this memorable battle, in which, perhaps, nearly 200,000 men were for fourteen hours engaged in combat. We had attacked the enemy in position, driven them from their line on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the other. Under the depression of previous reverses, we had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of former successes and inflated with a recent triumph. Our forces

dead and wounded of the enemy. The night, however, presented serious questions; morning brought on grave responsibilities. To renew the attack again on the 18th, or to defer it, with the chance of the enemy's retirement after a day of suspense, were the questions before me. A careful and anxious survey of the condition of my command, and my knowledge of the enemy's force and position, failed to impress me with any reasonable certainty of success, if I renewed the attack without reinforcing columns. A view of the shattered state of some of the corps sufficed to deter me from pressing them into immediate action, and I felt that my duty to the army and the country forbade the risks involved in a hasty movement, which might result in the loss of what had been gained the previous day. Impelled by this consideration, I awaited the arrival of my reinforcements, taking advantage of the occasion to collect together the dispersed, give rest to the fatigued, and remove the wounded. Of the reinforcements, Couch's division, although marching with commendable rapidity, was not in position until a late hour in the morning; and Humphrey's division of new troops, fatigued with forced marches, were arriving throughout the day, but were not available until near its close. Large reinforcements from Pennsylvania, which were expected during the day, did not arrive at all. During the 18th, orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the 19th. On the night of the 18th, the enemy, after having been passing troops in the latter part of the day from the Virginia shore to their position behind Sharpsburg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their line. This movement they executed before daylight. Being but a short distance from the river, the evacuation presented but little difficulty. It was, however, rapidly followed

up.

A reconnoissance was made across army fresh from a recent, and to them the river on the evening of the 19th, a great victory, and to reap the disadwhich resulted in ascertaining the near vantages of their being freshly and presence of the enemy in some force, plentifully supplied with ammunition and in our capturing six guns. A sec- and supplies. The object and results ond reconnoissance, the next morning, of this brief campaign may be summed which, with the first, was made by a up as follows: In the beginning of the small detachment from Porter's corps, month of September, the safety of the resulted in observing a heavy force of National Capital was seriously endanthe enemy there. The detachment with- gered by the presence of a victorious drew with slight loss. The enemy's loss enemy, who soon after crossed into is believed, from the best sources of in- Maryland, and then directly threatened formation, to be nearly 30,000. Their Washington and Baltimore, while they dead were mostly left on the field, and a occupied the soil of a loyal state, and large number of wounded were left be- threatened an invasion of Pennsylvania. hind. The army of the Union, inferior in num"While it gives me pleasure to speak bers, wearied by long marches, deficient of the gallantry and devotion of officers in various supplies, worn out by numand men, generally displayed through erous battles, the last of which had this conflict, I feel it necessary to men- not been successful, first covered, by tion that some officers and men skulked its movements, the important cities of from their places in the ranks until the Washington and Baltimore; then boldly battle was over. Death on the spot attacked the victorious enemy in their must hereafter be the fate of all such chosen strong position, and drove them cowards, and the hands of the military back, with all their superiority of numcommanders must be strengthened with bers, into the State of Virginia; thus all the power of the government to in- saving the loyal states from invasion, lict it summarily. The early and dis-end rudely dispelling the rebel dreams graceful surrender of Harper's Ferry of carrying the war into our country and deprived my operations of results which would have formed a brilliant sequence to the substantial and gratifying success already related. Had the garrison held out twenty-four hours longer, I should, in all probability, have captured that part of the enemy's force engaged in the attack on the Maryland Heights, while the whole garrison, some 12,000 strong, could have been drawn to reinforce me on the day of the decisive battle-certainly on the morning of the 18th. I would thus have been in position to have destroyed the rebel army. Under the same circumstances, had the besieging force on the Virginia side at Harper's Ferry not been withdrawn, I would have had 35,000 or 40,000 less men to encounter at Antietam, and must have captured or destroyed all opposed to As it was, I had to engage an

ine.

subsisting upon our resources. Thirteen guns and thirty-nine colors, more than fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more than six thousand prisoners, were the trophies which attest the success of our arms.

Rendering thanks to Divine. Providence for its blessing upon our exertions, I close this brief report. I beg only to add the hope that the army's efforts for the cause in which we are engaged will be deemed worthy to receive the commendation of the government and the country."*

The Union loss in the several battles on South Mountain and at Antietam, according to the report of General Halleck, was 1,742 killed, 8,066 wounded,

Preliminary Report of military operations since the evacuation of Harrison's Landing. Major-General McClellan to Brigadier-General Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army. Headquarters Army of the Poto mac, October 15: $62.