EARL RUSSELL'S STATEMENT. of a very grave nature has reached her Majesty's Government. This intelligence was conveyed officially to the knowledge of the Admiralty by Commander Williams, agent for mails on board the contract-steamer Trent. It appears from the letter of Commander Williams, dated Royal Mail Contract Packet Trent, at sea, November 9,' that the Trent left Havana on the 7th instant, with her Majesty's mails for England, having on board numerous passengers. Commander Williams states that, shortly after noon on the 8th, a steamer, having the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colors, was observed ahead. On nearing her at 1.15 P. M., she fired a round shot from her pivot-gun across the bows of the Trent, and showed American colors. While the Trent was approaching her slowly, the American vessel discharged a shell across the bows of the Trent, exploding half a cable's length ahead of her. The Trent then stopped, and an officer with a large armed guard of marines boarded her. The officer demanded a list of the passengers, and compliance with this demand being refused, the officer said he had orders to arrest Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarlane and Eustis, and that he had sure information of their being passengers in the Trent. While some parley was going on upon this matter, Mr. Slidell stepped forward and told the American officer that the four persons he had named were standing before him. The commander of the Trent and Commander Williams protested against the act of taking, by force, out of the Trent, these four passengers, then under the protection of the British flag. But the San Jacinto was at that time only two hundred yards from the Trent, her ship's company at quarters, her ports open and tompions out. Resistance was, therefore, out of the question, and the four gentlemen before named were forcibly taken out of the ship. A further demand was made that the commander of the Trent should 141 proceed on board the San Jacinto, but he said he would not go unless forcibly compelled likewise, and this demand was not insisted upon. It thus appears that certain individuals have been forcibly taken from on board a British vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage, an act of violence which was an affront to the British flag and a violation of international law. Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government, or that, if he conceived himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the instructions which he had received. For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow such an affront to the national honor to pass without full reparation, and her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that, when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to the British Government such redress as alone could satisfy the nation, namely: the liberation of the four gentlemen, and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him. You are at liberty to read this dispatch to the Secretary of State, and, if he shall desire it, you will give him a copy of it. I am, etc., RUSSELL." A private note to Lord Lyons from Earl Russell accompanied this dispatch with the following further instructions: "Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of her Majesty's Government, your lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation and to repair immediately to London; if, however, you should be of opinion that the requirements of her Majesty's Government are substantially complied with, you may report the facts to her Majesty's Government for their consideration, and remain at your post till you receive further orders." A copy of the first of these dispatches was sent to Mr. Seward and was answered by him in a communication of considerable length, addressed to Lord Lyons on the 26th of December. He began by reciting the statement of the capture as set forth by Earl Russell, and corrected and explained several of its details which had been misunderstood or exaggerated by the mail agent. It was true, he said, that a round shot had been fired by the San Jacinto from her pivot gun when the Trent was rapidly approaching. But as the facts have been reported to this Government, the shot was nevertheless intentionally fired in a direction so obviously divergent from the course of the Trent as to be as harmless as a blank shot, while it should be regarded as a signal. So, also, we learn that the Trent was not approaching the San Jacinto slowly when the shell was fired across her bows, but, on the contrary, the Trent was, or seemed to be, moving under a full head of steam, as if with a purpose to pass the San Jacinto. We are informed, also, that the boarding-officer, (Lieutenant Fairfax,) did not board the Trent with a large armed guard, but he left his marines in his boat when he entered the Trent. He stated his instructions from Captain Wilkes to search for the four persons named, in a respectful and courteous, though decided manner, and he asked the captain of the Trent to show his passenger-list, which was refused. The Lieutenant, as we are informed, did not employ absolute force in transferring the passengers, but he used just so much as was necessary to satisfy the parties concerned that refusal or resistance would be unavailing. So, also, we are informed that the captain of the Trent was not, at any time, or in any way, required to go on board the San Jacinto." Accompanying these explanations was the explicit statement "that Captain Wilkes, in conceiving and executing the proceeding in question, acted upon his own suggestions of duty, without any direction or instruction, or even foreknowledge of it on the part of this Government;" and that "no directions had been given him or any other naval officer, to arrest the four persons named, or any of them, on the Trent or on any other British vessel, or any other neutral vessel, at the place where it occurred or elsewhere," and that, consequently, "the British Government will justly infer from these facts, that the United States not only have had no purpose, but even no thought of forcing into discussion the question which has arisen, or any other which could affect in any way the sensibilities of the British nation." Mr. Seward further presented, as essential circumstances in the case, the recognition by Great Britain of the maritime rule that "whatever is contraband is liable to capture and confiscation in all cases," and set forth the pretensions of the socalled ambassadors whom he described as MR. SEWARD ARGUES THE CASE. 143 persons named, and their supposed dispatches contraband of war? Second: Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and search the Trent for these contrakand persons and dispatches? Third: Did he exercise that right in a lawful and proper manner? Fourth: Having found. the contraband persons on board, and in presumed possession of the contraband dispatches, had he a right to capture the persons? Fifth: Did he exercise that right of capture in the manner allowed and recognized by the law of nations?" "If," said he, "all these inquiries shall be resolved in the affirmative, the British Government will have no claim for re citizens of the United States proceeding With these preliminary statements, Mr. Seward cleared away the ground for a full logical discussion of the whole subject. The question, said he, whether this proceeding of Captain Wilkes was authorized by and conducted according to the law of nations, involved the following inquiries: First: Were the 66 The several questions thus presented were in an elaborate argument affirmatively maintained, except the last. Here, the Secretary frankly admitted, the difficulties of the case began. The subject, as it involved the rights of the captured persons, was ingeniously handled, and the conclusion reached that unless there were some overruling necessity in the case, rendering it impracticable, the vessel should be brought into port for trial, that the character of the alleged contraband persons might be determined under the protection and with the sanction of a court of law. The grave objections to the captor himself determining the matter on the deck of his vessel, were forcibly stated. "The captor is armed, the neutral is unarmed. The captor is interested, prejudiced, and perhaps violent; the neutral, if truly neutral, is disinterested, subdued and helpless. The tribunal is irresponsible, while its judgment is carried into instant execution." It would be a proceeding fraught with danger to the peace of nations. "Practically, it is a question between law with its imperfections and delays, and war with its evils and desolation.' In reference to the special act of Captain Wilkes, it was admitted, in this argument, that he had in a measure voluntarily released the Trent, and had consequently lost the legal advantage of his position. Having arrived at this conclusion, the Secretary further supported it by the example and authority of the declarations of his own Government, particularly instancing a letter of instructions from James Madison, when Secretary of State in the administration of Thomas Jefferson, to James Munroe, then our minister to England. On that occasion the necessity was directly maintained of determining all rights of seizure of persons and property in neutral ships by bringing them before a legal tribunal. The conclusion was irresistible: "If I decide this case in favor of my own Government, I must disallow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this Government could not deny the justice of the claims presented to us in this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us. The claim of the British Government," it was added, "is not made in a discourteous manner. This Government, since its first organization, has never used more guarded language in a similar case." Nor did the Secretary neglect the assertion or proviso that "if the safety of this Union required the detention of the captured persons, it would be the right and duty of this Government to detain them. But the effectual check and waning proportions of the existing insurrection, as well as the comparative unimportance of the captured persons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, happily forbid me from resorting to that defence. Nor am I unaware that American citizens are not in any case to be unnecessarily surrendered for any purpose into the keeping of a foreign State. Only the captured persons, however, or others In who are interested in them, could justly raise a question on that ground." fact, the case was turned to a corroboration of the long agitated policy of the United States in respect to the rights of neutrals. Gracefully waiving any old assumptions or precedents from the acts of Great Britain, the Secretary preferred to express his satisfaction "that by the adjustment of the present case, upon principles confessed by Americans, and yet, as I trust, mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a question is finally and rightly adjusted between them, which heretofore, exhausting not only all forms of peaceful discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more than half a century alienated the two countries from each other, and perplexed with fears and apprehensions all other nations." It remained only to pronounce the liberation of the prisoners who were now declared to be at the disposal of the British minister. the first of January they were accordingly taken in a small steamer running in Boston Harbor from their quarters at Fort Warren, and placed on board of the British steam gunboat Rinaldo, at anchor near Provincetown. They were carried in this vessel to St. Thomas, and thence by the regular packet to Southampton. On The equitable and honorable decision of the Secretary of State in the surrender of the commissioners, was further fortified by a friendly dispatch from M. Thouvenel, the head of the administration of foreign affairs at Paris, strongly urging the delivery of the prisoners by an appeal to the liberal principles and practice of the United States in the protection of neutrals. This was handsomely acknowledged by Mr. Seward, who further took advantage of the opportunity to express the wish on the part of the Government of the United States "that the occasion which had elicited this correspondence might be improved, so as to secure a more definite agree DIPLOMATIC EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION. ment upon the whole subject by all maritime powers." This was a delicate appeal in behalf of the assertion of the points of the treaty of Paris, and the broader principle of Mr. Marcy's position, which had been urged in the outset of President Lincoln's administration, but which, as we have seen, had been thwarted by the recognition of the belligerent rights of the Southern insurgents. 145 will not be unfaithful to their traditions and policy as an advocate of the broadest liberality in the appreciation of the principles of international law to the conduct of maritime warfare." As in his reply to M. Thouvenel, Mr. Seward hoped that the occasion would be improved to the revision and further settlement on these questions of the Law of Nations. As the conclusion of this diplomatic history, we may cite the note. The Prussian and Austrian Govern- by Earl Russell, on the 23d of January, ments, through their respective minis- in reply to Mr. Seward's dispatch to ters, also expressed to the Cabinet at Lord Lyons, combatting several of the Washington their sense of the proceed- American Secretary's positions, especiing of Captain Wilkes as an infringe- ally in reference to the assertion that ment of the rights of neutrals to which "the circumstance that the Trent was America herself was so firmly pledged, proceeding from a neutral port to anwith the suggestion that the demand of other neutral port does not modify the England for redress could not be consid- right of the belligerent capture." That, ered unreasonable. "As far as we are said Earl Russell, would authorize the informed of them," wrote Count Bern- capture of a packet carrying a Confederstoff from Berlin, "we entertain the con- ate agent from Dover to Calais, or a viction that no terms have been proposed Confederate vessel of war might capture by England by which the dignity of Pres- a Cunard steamer on its way from Haliident Lincoln could reasonably be offend- fax to Liverpool on the ground of its ed." The language of Count de Rech- carrying dispatches from Mr. Seward to berg in his note to Chevalier de Hulse- Mr. Adams. "Her Majesty's Governmann was similar: "According to the ment, therefore," he added, "think it notions of international law adopted by necessary to declare that they would not all the Powers, and which the American acquiesce in the capture of any British Government has itself often taken as a merchant ship in circumstances similar basis for its conduct, England could not to those of the Trent, and that the fact dispense in the present case, to protest of its being brought before a Prize Court, against the insult to her flag and demand though it would alter the character, a just reparation. Moreover, it appears would not diminish the gravity of the to us that the demands made in this re- offence against the law of nations, which spect by the Cabinet of St. James have would thereby be committed." In refernothing hurtful to the Cabinet at Wash-ence to the assertion of Mr. Seward that ington, and that the latter may perform" if the safety of the Union required an act of equity and moderation without the detention of the captured persons it the slightest sacrifice of its dignity." To this Mr. Seward responded, calling the attention of the Imperial Government "to two important facts ;-first, that the United States are not only incapable for a moment of seeking to disturb the peace of the world, but are deliberately just and friendly in their intercourse with all foreign nations; and, secondly, that they would be the right and duty of his Government to detain them," he regarded him as "entirely losing sight of the vast difference which exists between the exercise of an extreme right and the commission of an unquestionable wrong. His frankness compels me to be equally open and to inform him that Great Britain could not have submitted to the perpe |