9 whole were probably not engaged; and the formation of the ground and natural strength of the position gave an advantage to a small body acting on the defensive. But the same faults seem to have been made at Secessionville as in many of the earlier engagements of the war. The troops were not pushed forward with sufficient energy to the attack; they were allowed to waste their time in firing, in place of advancing rapidly to the assault; and in view of the importance of the end proposed, it is difficult to understand why the columns were withdrawn so early in the day as 10 A.M., when two brigades of the supporting division had scarcely been under fire. The loss in the action on the Federal side was, at the very least, six hundred men, of which far the greater portion fell in General Stevens's division.* That of the Confederates was a little over two hundred.† The smallness of the garrison of so important a place is a proof how hardly the Confederate Government was at that time pressed for men, and how necessary it had become to provide other means of recruiting the army than by voluntary enlistment. The successes of the North had given a fresh impetus to the warlike feelings of her population, and their far larger numbers, joined to the assistance derived from immigration, enabled her to recruit her armies without undergoing the pressure of a Conscription Act. The South, on the contrary, had exhausted what may be termed the available warlike portion of her population in the first levies which fought the battles of the earlier campaigns; * General Stevens acknowledged to the loss of 32 officers and 497 men in his division. Colonel Lamar, 'Confederate,' reports to have buried 341, and that 107 were captured. † General Pemberton's official report. and in order to supply the gaps in the armies, and to carry on the war with sufficient vigour, she was obliged to have recourse to a Conscription Act. This was willingly agreed to by her people, as they perceived that no partial efforts would suffice for the end in view, but that the whole strength of the country should be put forth, and that this could only be done by enrolling under arms the larger portion of the population, which enrolment would be attained in the fairest and most satisfactory manner by conscription. Shortly after this failure at Secessionville, the Federal forces retired from James Island to Hilton Head, and no further attempt was made on Charleston until a much later period of the war. CHAPTER IV. CAMPAIGN OF VIRGINIA. IT has already been shown how intimately connected were the campaigns of the York Town Peninsula and of the Shenandoah Valley. The withdrawal of General Shields' division from General Banks, for the purpose of reinforcing General M'Dowell's corps preparatory to a march on the Chickahominy, had invited. the attack of General Jackson, which resulted in the complete defeat of Banks; whilst the defeat of Banks, and the panic resulting therefrom, led to the countermarch of Shields' division, under M'Dowell* in person, from Fredericksburg to its former position in the Shenandoah Valley, thereby preventing the proposed General M'Dowell addressed to the Government a strong letter of remonstrance on the policy of transferring so large a portion of his force from Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah. His out-pickets had already effected a junction with those of General M'Clellan; and he fully appreciated the importance of co-operation with that general, and of a conjoined movement on Richmond. He also represented that he could better cut off General Jackson's retreat by an advance on the rail between Gordonsville and Richmond than by a march to the Shenandoah. The only answer he received to this remonstrance was a repeated order to march to the Shenandoah. Subsequent events have proved the correctness of General M'Dowell's views. General M'Dowell took little part in the campaign which followed in the Shenandoah, in consequence of injuries he received from a fall from his horse. co-operation with General M'Clellan, and in a great measure crippling his movements. After the Government at Washington had recovered from its panic, and had ascertained how small a force General Jackson really had under his command, it resolved to endeavour to intercept his retreat from the lower Shenandoah Valley, and to compel him either to fight far superior numbers or to surrender. To effect this object, General Shields' division, numbering 10,000, was ordered at once, having retraced its steps, to hasten as quickly as possible to Strasburg; whilst at the same time General Fremont, with from 15,000 to 20,000 men, was directed to march on the same point; and the two united were thus to place themselves directly on General Jackson's line of retreat. Thus it was supposed that the Confederate general would be opposed not only by his old adversary, General Banks, strengthened with reinforcements, but also by a force greatly superior to his own in his rear. No doubt, to an ordinary man, General Jackson's position would have been one of great danger; but previous to his pursuit of General Banks, whilst арраrently neglecting the ordinary rules of war, he had calculated the costs; and trusting to his own powers as a general, and to the good qualities, both as regarded marching and fighting, of his men, he had abandoned, or rather greatly endangered, his own line of communications in seeking to defeat his adversary in detail. Having thus with 15,000 men succeeded not only in checking the attack of the Federals in the Shenandoah Valley, but also in greatly hindering, and, as subsequent events proved, in frustrating altogether General M'Clellan's attack on Richmond, General Jackson devoted all his energies to escaping from the net which appeared to be rapidly closing round him. On the 30th of May he made a feint against Harper's Ferry; and on the 31st retreated up the valley, followed as far as Martingsburg by General Banks. In the meantime General Fremont, abandoning his former project of advancing into the upper valley, hastened by mountain roads to intercept General Jackson's retreat at Strasburg. On the 25th of May he left Franklin with troops scarcely recovered from the fatigues of the march consequent on their attempt to relieve Generals Milroy and Schenck, and on the 26th he arrived at Petersburg, thirty miles distant from Franklin. Here the baggage, tents, and even knapsacks were left, so that nothing might incumber the troops on the rapid march which was in prospect. Five days' rations were issued; and thus leaving Petersburg, and passing through Moorfield and Wardensville, General Fremont halted on the night of the 31st of May at the intersection of the Strasburg and Winchester Roads, east of the Grand Chain, but west of the lower spurs of the mountains which shut in the Shenandoah Valley. On the 1st of June the march was renewed; and as the advanced guard was crossing the last of the lower hills it encountered the rear guard of General Jackson. This caused a slight delay, and also proved that General Fremont had arrived one day too late, and that his adversary had escaped. Still Shields might possibly fall upon his left flank, and hold him in check until Fremont should come up. The latter pressed on, and on the 1st of June entered Strasburg, a few hours before the main body of General Shields' division. But again had General Jackson escaped his pursuers, he had passed through the town unmolested, and, in a night of rain, thunder, and lightning, continued his retreat, his rear well |