CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST.

THE fall of New Orleans materially affected the position of the Confederate army of the West, as not only did it deprive General Beauregard of the resources of a great city and of the means of recruiting his forces from its population, but it also opened the waters of the Mississippi to the Federal fleet, and so enabled their gunboats to hinder communication with the western bank, and to render difficult the transmission of cattle and other stores from Texas. Thus, General Beauregard's advanced position at Corinth became difficult to hold, and it was a question whether a more southern line of defence should be adopted where he would be nearer his depôts, and also in a position of greater security. At present he was threatened by the Federal army of the West encamped at Pittsburg Landing, by the combined naval and military force on the Upper Mississippi River, and by the possibility of an attempt on his left rear by detachments of the Federal force from New Orleans.

That the spring campaign would be followed up by the Federals, there was abundant evidence. The capture of Island No. 10 at once allowed of the advance of the fleet under Commodore Foote, which was only

stopped by the guns of Fort Pillow. This fort, hastily constructed soon after the commencement of hostilities, was situated about 60 miles above Memphis, on the left bank of the river. High ground had been selected on which to erect the works, and for a short time it offered an obstacle to the further progress of the Federal fleet. The efforts of the naval force were directed to its reduction, whilst General Halleck concentrated all the disposable troops on the Tennessee River.

As has been previously stated, General Beauregard, since the battle of Shiloh, had been joined by the troops of Generals Vandorn and Price from Arkansas, but even with these reinforcements he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to retain his position. However, no rumour of any intention to abandon the lines at Corinth reached the Federal camp; the Confederate force was supposed to be large, and after the lesson taught them at Shiloh, the Northern generals were cautious of committing themselves to an engagement under disadvantageous circumstances. Changes were made in the organisation of the army; and, apparently with the intention of marking disapprobation for the defeat of the first day at Shiloh, General Grant was susperseded in the command of the army of Tennessee by General Thomas. To the troops originally included in that army was added the division of General Pope, who had marched from the neighbourhood of Fort Pillow to the encampment of the main body of the forces near Pittsburg Landing.

With great caution did the army advance; each successive camp was fortified, and careful lines of defence, quickly constructed with the spade and axe, covered the front, and prevented a repetition of a surprise of

the pickets, as on the first day's battle of Shiloh.* Attempts were made to turn the enemy's position, and to cut the lines of rail both west of Corinth, between that place and Memphis, and to the east, in the neighbourhood of Decatur. These movements were not wholly unopposed. On the 9th May, General Pope's pickets were driven in, and his division forced to retreat, whilst attempting the capture of Farmington and the destruction of the railroad; but, on the other hand, a detachment from General Mitchell's force at Pulaski occupied Rodgersville, on the frontier of Alabama. The main advance was, however, directed against Corinth, and on the 16th of May the Federal army encamped about five miles from the place, and commenced, as usual, to fortify themselves. There were frequent skirmishes between the pickets. The forest concealed the numbers of the enemy, and afforded cover for his sharpshooters, who, as was asserted, frequently placed themselves in the trees, in order more effectually to pick off the enemy's skirmishers. There was no attempt to storm the Con

* General Sherman, in an address to his division of the 31st May, dated Corinth, congratulates it on its industry in strongly entrenching seven distinct camps since the march from the camp at Shiloh. The distance between Shiloh and Corinth is about twenty-five miles. A correspondent, writing from General Pope's army, notices the same peculiar features of the march. He writes:-'One curious feature of the advance now is, that of throwing works of defence up along the whole line. The fortifications completed to-day cannot be less than twelve miles in length, extending from the extreme right to the extreme left wing. They are strongly made with logs and earth, lined by rifle pits, and distant from Corinth six miles. Every movement is characterised by extreme caution. To-morrow the lines advance four miles, when another parallel will be constructed. In case any reverse should happen, these defences would be invaluable.'

federate position; and, as was the case at Yorktown, great preparations were made, to end in a somewhat similar result. So close were the Federal lines to Corinth, that the sound of the trains could be heard as they entered and departed from the village; and on the 27th and 28th May, it was remarked and reported to General Halleck that there was especial activity on the railroad, apparently denoting some movement of the enemy. The light and sound of explosions, as of scattered ammunition, was also noticed; and General Halleck at length entertained suspicions that operations of which he was unacquainted were in progress in the enemy's camp; he therefore ordered a strong reconnaissance to be pushed forward, which was accordingly done, and on the morning of the 29th May the Federal troops entered Corinth without any resistance. General Halleck had been completely out-manoeuvred; he had concentrated a large army, had preserved the greatest caution, had at length completed his preparations for attack, when his opponent, having also matured his plans, and sent all his stores, wounded, and sick to the rear, drew in his pickets and disappeared. A few stragglers were captured, and possibly a small quantity of stores; but there can be no doubt that General Halleck's campaign was a failure.

General Pope was sent forward to pursue the retreating columns, and grossly exaggerated, if not untrue, reports of his successes were forwarded to Washington; but these despatches scarcely served their turn to delude the people of the North, and in the ridicule they cast upon their authors, were productive of more harm than good to the Federal cause. On June 4th, General Halleck sent the following despatch to Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War :

'General Halleck's Head-quarters, June 4. General Pope, with forty thousand men, is thirty miles south of Florence, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and fifteen thousand stand of arms, captured. Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their arms. A farmer says, that when Beauregard

learned that Colonel Elliott had cut the railroad on his line of retreat, he became frantic, and told his men to save themselves the best way they could. We captured nine locomotives and a number of cars. One of the former is already repaired, and is running to-day; several more will be in running order in a few days. The result is all that I could possibly desire.

6 H. W. HALLECK, 'Major-General Commanding.'

What could be more absurd than such a despatch! The actual facts as relating to General Pope's exploits were subsequently ascertained to have scarcely any foundation, whilst the report regarding General Beauregard was puerile in the extreme. That General conducted his retreat with great order, and received little or no annoyance from General Pope. After evacuating Corinth he took up a defensive position about twenty-five miles to the south, which he held until the 8th, when, owing to the want of good water, he retreated without molestation farther into the State of Mississippi, making Tupelo, about fifty miles south of Corinth, his head-quarters. In a letter published by General Beauregard with reference to General Halleck's despatch, he denied categorically the statements it contained, at the same time owning to certain losses, which evidently gave some colour to the other