spection, as also the want of military knowledge in the generals and staff of the army, which often led officers to exaggerate the importance of events passing under their own eyes, and so to submit reports tending to mislead the general commanding in chief. From whatever cause it arose, an opportunity was lost. If Generals Franklin and Porter had shown the same energy as General Sumner on the evening and night of the 31st, the whole army might have crossed the Chickahominy, and the battle of the 1st would on the part of the Confederates have been not for victory, but for existence. As it was, both armies occupied nearly the same ground after the battle as they had done before, with the exception that three Federal corps in place of two were on the right bank of the Chickahominy. General M'Clellan's right and left wings were still separated by a large extent of ground, as their opponents continued to hold the woods opposite Generals Franklin and Porter, and prevented direct communication between those corps and the three corps which had crossed the stream.

On the old battle ground of the 31st the troops encamped. Among the half-buried dead, and the swamps teeming with corruption, arising from the numerous bodies of men and horses, did the soldiers erect their huts and pitch their tents. The water they drank was drained from the graves, and the whole air reeked with stench; the hot sun drew up the vapours from the saturated ground, and the swamps of the Chickahominy became as fatal as the bullets of the enemy. In his first despatches General M'Clellan under-estimated his loss; but he was fearful lest even the numbers he owned to should tend to dishearten his army, therefore he requested the

President to receive his communications as confidential. Ultimately he acknowledged to the total loss of 7,000 men. According to General Johnston's report, the Confederate loss amounted to less than 4,500, of which the whole fell on the divisions of Generals Longstreet, Hill, and Smith. General Huger's division was not engaged. On the 31st it did not arrive in sufficient time to be of service, and on the 1st June it appears that the Confederates were unwilling to renew the action, and fought entirely on the defensive. They had missed their opportunity on the previous day, and were anxious to return to their former defensive tactics.

In General Johnston they lost an able officer, and one who hitherto had conducted operations with much skill. In consequence of his wound, he was disabled for a considerable time, and although on the field he was succeeded by General G. Smith,* yet the chief command was given to General Lee; and thus the apparent misfortune sustained by the temporary loss of the services of General Johnston was more than compensated for by the opportunity it gave of bringing to the front one of the most able men, if not the most able man, that the war has produced. Few men in the old United States army had been more beloved and respected than General Lee: his character was said to resemble that of Washington. Of an old Virginian family, possessed of wealth and position, he had embraced the profession of arms and had served with distinction in Mexico. When the secession of Virginia took place he unwillingly resigned his commission in the army; but convinced

General G. Smith had been a personal friend of General M'Clellan, and was present at his marriage.

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that his primary duty lay with his State, he without hesitation threw himself heart and soul into her cause. His property and family residence lying close to Washington, became the spoil of his enemies, and both were rendered valueless. From a rich man he was reduced to comparative poverty, but, not excelling in this respect many of his fellow-countrymen,' he willingly resigned all, seeking for no compensation, for the sake of the cause he fought for. Both in mind and person he seemed especially qualified to become the leader and to win the affections of the Southern army. Free from all selfishness, he attached to himself by sentiments of personal affection the generals under his command; of simple habits, and singularly unostentatious in manner, he set an example to the army and to the senior officers of self-denial, of patience under hardships, and of a disregard of all state. He also gave a tone to the army in other and higher qualities. A deeply religious man, he checked the licentiousness too common in camps, whilst in respect of his conduct towards his enemies he lessened, as far as possible, the horrors of war, and in the subsequent campaigns waged in the enemy's country afforded an example of forbearance which many of the Federal generals would have done well to have imitated. His willingness to share privations with his men,* and the cool courage he displayed in action, endeared him to the private soldiers; and if such men as Generals Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart may be said to have been the arms of the army, General Lee may truly be accounted as its head. Such was the

It is said that during all the campaigns in which General Lee has been engaged he has always occupied a tent, and refused to sleep under a roof, even during the most severe weather.

man now in command of the army for the defence of Richmond.

After the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines, both armies entrenched themselves. General M'Clellan erected field-works, and threw up a line of breast-works, flanked with small redoubts, extending from the White Oak Swamp in a semicircle to the Chicahominy, and enclosing within the lines the railway and the several roads and bridges constructed to afford communication with his right wing, which continued to hold the country in the neighbourhood of Mechanicsville and Cold Harbour. He applied frequently for reinforcements in order to replace the losses incurred by battle and sickness, and asked permission to draw regiments from Fortress Monroe. To these applications President Lincoln replied by promises, and assurances of help from the Shenandoah Valley as soon as General Jackson should have been disposed of.

Not only was the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley supposed (and rightly so) to influence materially the strategy of the General in command of the army defending Richmond, but there was constant apprehension, as was evinced by General M'Clellan's despatches, of a junction between the army of the West, under General Beauregard, and that of General Lee. Therefore, during the pause that occurred in the active operations before Richmond, it will be well to follow up the events in the West, which resulted both from the capture of New Orleans and from the operations in Tennessee.

The battle of the Seven Pines, although indecisive, was yet a proof that the capture of Richmond was a task which would tax all the energies of the North, and the practical experience of the difficulties of cam

paigning in Virginia showed that the rapid marches and brilliant operations anticipated by the Northern people were either impossible from the nature of the country, or inapplicable to the half-disciplined troops and unpractised officers of the Federal armies.*

* The terms 'half-disciplined and unpractised' are not intended offensively, or even disparagingly. There had not as yet been sufficient time either to form properly disciplined soldiers or to train experienced officers. Doubtless there are instances where talent may, in the case of a general, lead to the performance of even greater tasks than experience, and where enthusiasm and determination may, in the case of the troops, effect the accomplishment of greater enterprises than discipline; but up to the time alluded to in this chapter no Northern general and no Northern troops had given signs of either great talent, or of the intense enthusiasm requisite to counterbalance faults in discipline and organisation.