6. WASHINGTON AS A SOLDIER. From the "North American Review" of October, 1882. THE conflict which tried Washington and gave birth to the Republic was not to develop new principles of war, but to illustrate those which do not change with the physical appliances of force. It began without formal declaration on either side. Great Britain struck her first blows at local rebels, and did not see that revolt was universal. The people every where struck back, as if they were rightfully free. The policy which, through secret orders to the Colonial governors, had sought first to disarm, and then subdue, only intensified the popular longing to be free. Each colony committed overt, disloyal acts, before the clash at Lexington was known. at the South. However tardily the world realized the fact, the war, from the first, was that of Great Britain against three millions of strong people, already practically a nation. Her right policy was that which would have directed her arms in a war against any independent State. To seize all commercial and social centres at once, so that combined resistance could not be successfully organized, was as important as for the Colonies to demonstrate the universal unity and activity of their assertion of independence. It was as well settled then, as since, that geographical elements shape strategical and tactical movements; and that, as armies have their right, centre, and left divisions, so in countries of large extent there are right, centre, and left zones, or belts of operation, geographically taken, which strategy must respect. The right zone embraced New England, sharply severed from the centre by the Hudson River, as the left zone was defined by the waters of the Delaware and Chesapeake. From New York as a base, there was quick access by water to Newport, within striking distance of Boston; and the control of tide-waters, well supported, left New England powerless to aid the centre. As early as 1775, Lord Dartmouth advised the evacuation of Boston, the occupation of New York and Newport, and "the seizure of some respectable port to the southward, from which to attack sea-coast towns in the winter. The struggle for New York was the practical beginning of the war upon a scientific basis. To isolate the American forces in the three zones, was true British policy. It was the policy of Washington to hold his forces in each zone to the closest possible co-operation, and thus prevent a conflict in three zones at the same time, or beyond his effective reach and control. It is by holding these propositions in view that we apprehend the full significance of operations in New Jersey, which practically linked the three zones, and became the strategic battle-field of the war. The British army left Boston, March 17, 1775, for Halifax, to refit. On the 18th, Washington despatched General Heath's division to New York, and on the 23d, when the British army actually put to sea, the entire army, except a police garrison, followed. The movements which resulted in the Battle of Long Island, the retreat to White Plains, and the opening of the first New Jersey campaign are familiar. Retreat" is a misnomer for that march it was generalship. At every stage of the advance, the troops were so disposed that only a wilful detention by General Lee, of his large division, prevented a direct engagement with Howe. Instead of a purpose to reach Philadelphia, Washington, as early as December 12, determined to take the offensive. The Battle of Trenton was the blow he struck. Howe wrote to England for reinforcements, and New Jersey was delivered. Contem poraries honored the exploit. The "Fabian Policy," so called, had been enlivened by sudden brilliant acts, each of which was like an inspiration in its fitness, and a lightning stroke in its execution. Brooklyn and the retreat, Harlem and the withdrawal, Chatterton Hill and White Plains, the march itself, Trenton and Princeton, suggest all; and these were crowned by such art in choice of a mountain camp, that, as at the hub of a wheel, he alike threatened the Hudson, communicated with New England, kept New York and Staten Island under alarm, and covered the capital. These were so clasped within easy reach that Howe could attack neither without risk to his base. The campaign of 1777 was equally disastrous to General Howe, and on the 3d of July he again took refuge in New York. The transfer of operations to the middle zone, in August, evoked marvellous acts of consummate military skill. To face 18,000 British regulars with less than 12,000, and contest the field at the Brandywine; to cross the Schuylkill and threaten the rear of the successful foe; to take the offensive at Germantown, and again at Monmouth, until the entire British army was again at New York, but still threatened by that central post in New Jersey, harmonized with the true philosophy and the settled purpose of Washington to win final victory. The practical transfer of active operations to the southern zone, in 1779, did not divert the great leader from his theory of the proper conduct of the war. On the 18th of May, 1781, Lafayette took command in Virginia, but Washington with his French allies still threatened New York, and Clinton demanded immediate reinforcements from Cornwallis, being "threatened with siege." Meanwhile, brick ovens were erected opposite Staten Island, and Washington allowed the enemy to capture fictitious despatches, threatening the city. On the 21st, the Ameri can army, and, on the 25th, the French army crossed the Hudson. On August 30th, Washington was at Philadelphia, not missed by Clinton. He passed Philadelphia with his whole army, on the 2d of September, not missed by Clinton. On the 5th he reached Chester, and learned that the expected French fleet of De Grasse had entered the Chesapeake, and still he had not been missed by Clinton. On the 6th, but too late, Clinton understood it all. That grasp of the New Jersey fastnesses, which held supreme direction of operations and defeated all British combinations during five years of war, was at last relaxed, only that it might assure that permanent triumph which its consummate strategy had made possible. On the 14th of September, Washington joined Lafayette; and on the 19th of October, Cornwallis surrendered. The war was at an end! Against every possible obstacle, in spite of small levies, scarce supplies, general corruption, universal bankruptcy, jealous subordinates, and factious politicians, there had been manifested, wherever Washington ap-peared, such strategical adjustments as assured the highest attainable advantages over the theatre of war, as a whole; such tactical action as made the most of the troops engaged, with no signal disaster in the extremest hour of peril; such prompt management of supplies as best to utilize the means furnished by Congress; such appliances in engineering as met emergencies; and such instruction in minor tactics that the Continental troops were rarely in fault. Add to these, that military policy, or statesmanship in war, which was so clear and penetrating that Congress and subordinates only advanced the war as its suggestions were accepted as influential and paramount, and the summary seems complete. Upon such premises of fact, it is affirmed, that there was one mind, that of Washington, which absolutely penetrated all the signal issues of the war for American Independence by its magnetic force, and, from Boston to Yorktown, so controlled and developed those issues that victory became the logical necessity of its philosophy and action, and made him, indeed, " First in War." HENRY B. CARRINGTON. 7. MOUNT VERNON, THE HOME OF THE following lines were written on the back of a picture at Mount Vernon, by Rev. William Day. THERE dwelt the Man, the flower of human kind, There dwelt the Soldier, who his sword ne'er drew There dwelt the Hero, who ne'er killed for fame, There dwelt the Statesman, who, devoid of art, And, O Columbia, by thy sons caressed, |