experience oppression-they do not think their title to equal rights realized until they enjoy them; nor will they esteem that a good government, whatever may be its name, which does not uniformly, impartially and effectually protect them.

The more free the people are, the more strong and efficient ought their government to be, and for this plain reason, that it is a more arduous task to make and keep up the fences of law and justice about twenty rights than about five or six; and because it is more difficult to fence against and restrain men who are unfettered, than men who are in yokes and chains. Being a free people, we are governed only by laws, and those of our own making-these laws are rules for regulating the conduct of individuals, and are established according to, and in pursuance of that contract which each citizen has made with the rest, and all with each. He is not a good citizen who violates his contract with society; and when society execute their laws, they do no more than what is necessary to constrain individuals to perform that contract, on the due operation and observance of which the common good and welfare of the community depend; for the object of it is to secure to every man what belongs to him, as a member of the nation; and by increasing the common stock of property, to augment the value of his share in it. Most essentially, therefore, is it the duty and interest of us all, that the laws be observed, and irresistibly executed.

I might now proceed to call your attention to certain statutes which merit particular attention, and it would not be difficult to place them in points of view, in which their importance to the public would appear in strong lights-but having already detained you so long, and these subjects not being new to you, I will forbear enlarging on them on the present occasion.

The manner in which you are to fulfil the duties now incumbent on you, is specified in the oath you have taken.

The experience of ages commends the institution of grand juries; it has merited and received constant encomiums, and I trust, gentlemen, that your conduct on this and similar occasions, will afford new proofs of its utility and excellence.*

Charge of Judge Wilson, as President of a Special Court of the United States, for the Middle Circuit and Pennsylvania district, holden at the Court House, in the city of Philadelphia, on the 22d day of July, 1793, to the Grand Jury of said Court.

GENTLEMEN OF THE GRAND JURY:

It is my duty to explain to you the very important occasion on which this Court is specially convened, and to state the points of law not less important to the application of which that occasion gives rise.

To the Judge of the Pennsylvania district information was given on oath, that certain citizens of the United States had acted in several capacities as officers on board an armed schooner, said to be commissioned

This charge, though not delivered to the particular Grand Jury by whom the bill against Henfield was found, was prepared for the purpose of settling the law generally as applying to the class of offenders, of whom Henfield was one, and in this light it is here introduced.

by France as a cruiser or private ship-of-war; and with others on board that schooner did capture and make prize of several ships or vessels belonging to his Britannic Majesty, and otherwise assist in an hostile manner in annoying the commerce of the subjects of his said Britannic Majesty, who is at peace with the United States, contrary to their duty as citizens of the United States.

On receiving this information the Judge issued his warrant for apprehending the persons against whom complaint was made, that they might answer for their doings in the premises, and be dealt with according to law.

That legal proceedings in this and some other business might be had speedily, one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Judge of the Pennsylvania District issued their warrant, directing that on this day, and at this place a special session of the Circuit Court for this District should be held, and that Grand and Traverse Jurors should be summoned to attend it. As the Court however is authorized generally to try criminal causes, if any other crimes or offences cognizable in it be laid before you or are in your knowledge, it is your duty to present them. But to the business to which you have been particularly called, and to articles intimately connected with it, I shall confine the remarks which I have to give you in charge.

I introduce them by noticing, with pleasure, the near and endearing relation between the freedom and the dignity of man. In governments unfavourable to both, treaties and the construction of treaties are numbered among the arcana imperii, the secrets of empire, enclosed within the cabinets of princes and secluded from the judgment of the citizens, whose lives and fortunes however they chiefly affect; under our national Constitution, treaties compose a portion of the public and supreme law of the land, and for their construction and enforcement are brought openly before the tribunals of our country. Of those tribunals Juries form an essential part; under the construction given by those Juries, treaties will suffer neither in their importance nor in their sanctity.

Sapientissima res tempus-says the profound Bacon in one of his aphorisms, concerning the augmentation of the sciences-time is the wisest of things. If the qualities of the parent may be expected in the offspring, the common law, one of the noblest births of time, may be pronounced the wisest of laws.

This expression, says a great lawyer, Finch on Law, 74, 75, is not new and strange, or barbarous and peculiar to ENGLAND. It is the proper term for other laws also. Euripides mentions the common laws of GREECE; and Plato defines common law to be that, which being taken up by the common consent of a country, is called law. In another place the same illustrious philosopher names it the golden and sacred rule of reason which we call COMMON LAW.

To the common law of ENGLAND, however, the phrase is often peculiarly appropriated. Of this common law, the antiquity is unquestionably very high. But the precise era of its commencement, and the several springs from which it originally flowed, it is very difficult, if not altogether impracticable to trace. One reason for this may be drawn from the very nature of a system of common law. As it is accommodated to the situation and circumstances of the people; and as that

situation and those circumstances insensibly change, a proportioned variation of laws insensibly takes place; and it becomes impossible to ascertain the period when this change began, or to mark the different steps of its progress.

It might be amusing and instructive, but at this time it would be improper, to sketch the general outlines of the system through the government of the SAXONS down to the conquest of the Normans. Suffice it to observe, and the observation is important, that the common law, as now received in America, bears, in its principles and in many of its more minute particulars, a stronger and a fairer resemblance to the common law as it was improved under the former, than to that law as it was disfigured under the latter.

The accommodating principle of a system of common law will adjust its improvement to every grade and species of improvement, Fort. 257, 264, in consequence of practice, commerce, observation, study or refinement. As the science of legislation is the most noble, so it is the most slow and difficult of sciences. Willing to avail itself of experience, it receives additional improvement from every new situation to which it arrives; and in this manner attains, in the progress of time, higher and higher degrees of perfection, resulting from the accumulated wisdom of ages.

On some occasions the spirit of a system of common law is accommodating; but on others its temper is decided and firm. The means are varied according to times and circumstances, but its great ends are kept steadily and constantly in view.

How effectually has the spirit of liberty animated this system in all the vicissitudes, revolutions and dangers to which it has been exposed! In matters of a civil nature the common law works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice. In matters of a political nature it works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of freedom.

It was this spirit which dictated the frequent and formidable demands on the Norman princes, for the complete restoration of the Saxon jurisprudence. It was this spirit which, in Magna Charta, manifested a strict regard to the rights of the Commons as well as those of the Peers. It was this spirit which extracted sweetness from all the bitter contentions between the rival houses of York and Lancaster. It was this spirit which preserved England from the haughtiness of the Tudors and from the tyranny of the Stuarts. It was this spirit which rescued the States of America from the oppressive claims and from all the mighty efforts made to enforce the oppressive claims of a British Parliament. The common law, says my Lord Coke, Calvin's case, 6 Rep. 88, is a social system of jurisprudence. She receives other laws and systems into a friendly correspondence; and associates to herself those who can give her information, or advice, or assistance.

Does a contract bear a peculiar reference to the local laws of any particular foreign country? By the local laws of that foreign country the common law will direct the contract to be interpreted and adjusted. Does a mercantile question occur? She determines it by the law of merchants.

Does a question arise before her, which properly ought to be resolved by the law of nations? By that law she will decide the question. For

that law in its full extent is adopted by her. The infractions of that law form a part of her code of criminal jurisprudence. 4 Blac. Com. 67.

In our present business, gentlemen, this great subject deserves a full and a pointed illustration. Such as it is in my power, on a short notice, to give, I now proceed to lay before you.

The law of nature when applied to States or political societies, receives a new name, that of the law of nations. But though it receives a new appellation, it retains unimpaired its qualities and its powers. The law of nations as well as the law of nature, is of obligation indispensable. The law of nations as well as the law of nature is of "origin divine."

There are, it is true, laws of nations-perhaps it is to be wished that they were designated by another name-there are laws of nations which are founded altogether on human consent; of this kind are national treaties. But the municipal laws of a State are not more distinct from the law of nature than those consentual laws of nations are in their source and power distinct from the law of nations properly so called. Indeed those consentual laws of nations are not less controlled by the law of nations properly so called, than municipal laws are controlled by the law of nature. The law of nations is the law of states and sovereigns. On states and sovereigns it is obligatory in the same manner and for the same reasons, as the law of nature is obligatory upon individuals. Universal and unchangeable is the obligation of both.

How great, how important, how interesting are these truths! They announce to a free people how solemn their duties are! If a practical knowledge and a just sense of those duties were diffused universally among the citizens, how beneficial and lasting would the fruits be!

It seems to have been thought that the law of nations respects and regulates their conduct only in their intercourse with each other. A very important branch of this law containing the duties which a nation owes to itself, has in a great measure escaped attention.

Of a state, as well as of an individual, self-preservation is a primary duty.

To love and to deserve an honest fame is another duty of a state as well as of a man. To a state as well as to a man, reputation is a valuable and an agreeable possession. It represses hostility and secures

esteem.

In transactions with other nations, the dignity of a state should never be permitted to suffer the smallest diminution.

Need it be mentioned here, that happiness is the centre to which states as well as men are universally attracted! To consult its own happiness, therefore, is the duty of a nation.

When men have formed themselves into a political society, they may reciprocally enter into particular engagements and contract new obligations in favour of the community or of its members. But they cannot, by this union, discharge themselves from any duties which they previously owed to those who form a part of the political association. Under all the obligations due to the universal society of the human race, the citizens of a state still continue. To this universal society it is a duty that each nation should contribute to the welfare, the perfection and the happiness of the others.

If so, the first degree of this duty is to do no injury. Among states as well as among men, justice is a sacred law. This sacred law prohibits one state from exciting disturbances in another, from depriving it of its natural advantages, from calumniating its reputation, from seducing its citizens, from debauching the attachment of its allies, from fomenting or encouraging the hatred of its enemies. Vat. 127.

But nations are not only prohibited from doing evil, they are also commanded to do good to one another. On states as well as individuals the duties of humanity are strictly incumbent; what each is obliged to perform for others, from others it is entitled to receive. Hence the advantage as well as the duty of humanity.

It may be uncommon, but it is unquestionably just to say, that nations ought to love one another. From the pure source of benevolence the offices of humanity ought to flow.

By a nation these enlarged and elevated virtues should be cultivated with peculiar assiduity and ardour; of an individual, however generous his disposition may be, the sphere of exertion is frequently narrow; but of a nation this sphere is comparatively boundless. By exhibiting a glorious example in her constitution, in her laws, and in the administration of her constitution and laws, she may diffuse instruction, she may diffuse reformation, she may diffuse happiness over the whole terrestrial globe.

These maxims of national law, though the sacred precepts of nature, and of nature's God, have been too often unknown and unacknowledged by nations. Even where they have been known and acknowledged, their calm still voice has been drowned by the clamours of ambition and by the thunder of war.

Is it then unnecessary or improper here to say, peace should be deemed the basis of the happiness of nations, "peace on earth!" This is a patriotic as well as an angelic wish.

But with war and rumours of war our ears in this imperfect state of things are still assailed.

Into this unnatural state ought a nation to suffer herself to be drawn without her own act, or the act of him or them, to whom for this purpose she has delegated her power?

Into this unnatural state should a nation suffer herself to be drawn by the unauthorized, nay by the unlicensed conduct of any of her citizens?

These, gentlemen, are questions to which you are now called to give the closest and deepest attention.

That a citizen, who in our state of neutrality, and without the authority of the nation, takes an hostile part with either of the belligerent powers, violates thereby his duty, and the laws of his country, is a position so plain as to require no proof, and to be scarcely susceptible of a denial.

Under the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and France, it may be made a question, whether the privateers of that power have a right to "fit out their ships in our ports."

This question arises from the twenty-second article of that treaty. "It shall not be lawful for any foreign privateers, not belonging to the