December of the same year, had been similarly recognized. The Court of Appeal thereupon, while holding that the decision of the lower Court had been a correct one in the light of the facts as they then stood, reversed its holding and held that the Soviet Government was one the legal validity of whose acts should be judicially recognized.

Attempt was made by the counsel for the respondents to draw a distinction, at least as to its retroactive effect, between the recognition of a Government as de jure and its recognition as de facto only. In his opinion Lord Justice Banks said:

"For some purpose no doubt a distinction can be drawn between the effect of the recognition by a sovereign State of one form of Government or of the other, but for the present purpose, in my opinion, no distinction can be drawn. The Government of this country having .. recognized the Soviet Government as the Government really in possession of the powers of sovereignty in Russia, the acts of that Government must be treated by the courts of this country with all the respect due to the acts of a duly recognized foreign sovereign State."

As to the allegation that the decree of confiscation was so immoral as not to furnish a basis for rights that the courts of a foreign State could be called upon to give effect to, the Lord Justice said:

"The question before the court is not one in which the assistance of the court is asked to enforce the law of some foreign country to which legitimate objection might be taken, as in Hope v. Hope, 8 De Gex. Mac. and G. 731, and Kaufman v. Gerson, 20 Times L. R. 277 (1904), 1 K. B. 591. The question before the court is as to the title to goods lying in a foreign country [at the time of sale] which a subject of that country, being the owner of

them by the law of that country, has sold under a f.o.b. contract for export to this country. The court is asked to ignore the law of the foreign country under which the vendor acquired his title, and to lend its assistance to prevent the purchaser from dealing with the goods. I do not think that any authority can be produced to support the contention."

In support of his judgment, the Lord Justice then quoted the following from the opinion of Mr. Justice Blackburn in Santos v. Illidge (8 C.B., N.S. 876):

"Assuming the taking to have been prohibited by a British Act, still the taking having been of property locally situated in a foreign country in a manner lawful according to the laws of that country, I apprehend that the property actually passed by the sale and vested in the purchasers, though they committed a felony according to our law by taking it. . . . Though the venders were British subjects, the validity of the transfer must, on every principle of law, depend upon the local law of Brazil and not upon that of the country of the purchaser.” In Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co.13 Justice Chitty said:

One of the principal grounds relied on by the plaintiffs is that the agreement of compromise was made on behalf of the de facto Government of the Republic which was not the de jure Government. But the court is bound to take cognizance of the recognition of a de facto Government by the Government of this country, and it was admitted by plaintiff's counsel at the bar that the de facto Government was duly recognized by the Queen. So soon as it has been shown that a de facto Government of a foreign State has been recognized by the Government of this country, no further inquiry is permitted in a court of justice here. The court declines to investigate, and indeed has no proper means of investigating, the title of the actual Government of a foreign State which has been thus recognized. This attempted distinction between the de 13 L. R. 36 Ch. D. 489 (1887).

facto and the de jure Government which runs through the statement of claim is untenable.

In Ricaud v. American Metal Co.14 the Supreme Court of the United States, answering questions certified to it by a Circuit Court of Appeals, declared that the seizure, condemnation and sale of personal property in Mexico by agents of the Carranza Government, which was then seeking to overthrow the older Huerta Government, and which later was recognized by the United States as the de facto, and, still later, as the de jure Government of Mexico, operated to divest the title of an American citizen not in or a resident of Mexico when the seizure and condemnation occurred. If entitled to any redress, this citizen, it was declared, would have to seek it either in the courts of Mexico or through the political departments of the American Government. The court, speaking

through Mr. Justice Clarke, said:

The revolution inaugurated by General Carranza against General Huerta proved successful, and the Government established by him has been recognized by the political department of our Government as the de facto and later as the de jure Government of Mexico, which decision binds the judges as well as all other officers and citizens of the Government. . . . This recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions of the Carranza Government from the commencement of its existence. . . . It is settled that the courts will take judicial notice of such recognition as we have here, of the Carranza Government by the political department of our Government . . . and that the courts of one independent Government will not sit in judgment on the validity of the acts of another, done within its own territory. . . . This rule, however, does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It requires only that when it is made to appear that the foreign Government has acted in a given way on the subject matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned, but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision.

"246 U. S. 304. See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297.

Local and General De Facto Governments. The international doctrine as to de facto Governments becomes one especially difficult to apply in the case of political organizations which, in opposition to the de jure governments, are able to maintain a de facto control over only a portion of the territory of the State concerned. In such cases they are spoken of as Local to distinguish them from General de facto Governments. Professor Borchard, in an able article 15 has dealt with this topic and from that article we quote the following:

A general Government de facto, having completely taken the place of the regularly constituted authorities in the State, binds the Nation. So far as international obligations are concerned, it represents the State. It succeeds to the debts of the regular Government it has displaced, and transmits its own obligations to succeeding titular Governments. Its loans and contracts bind the State, and the State is responsible for the governmental acts of the de facto authorities. In general its treaties are valid obligations of the State. It may alienate the national territory, and the judgments of the courts are admitted to be effective after its authority has ceased. An exception to these rules has occasionally been noted in the practice of some of the States of Latin America, which declare null and void the acts of a usurping de facto intermediary Government when the regular Government it has displaced succeeds in restoring its control. Nevertheless, acts validly undertaken in the name of the State and having an international character cannot lightly be repudiated and foreign Governments generally insist on their bending force. . . .

The responsibility of a State for the acts of a local de facto Government involves more delicate questions. . . . The power of such a de facto Government to involve the responsibility of the State depends largely upon its ultimate success, so that most of its international acts, e. g., treaties, etc., are affected with a suspensive condition. Nevertheless, even if it fails, definite executed results follow from its merely temporary possession of administrative control within a defined area.

15 "International Pecuniary Claims Against Mexico" in the Yale Law Journal, March, 1917 (vol. XXVI, p. 339). In footnotes, Professor Borchard cites authorities supporting his propositions.

Thus, as Professor Borchard goes on to show, foreigners, as a matter of necessity, must submit to the jurisdiction thus exercised, and cannot be later punished or penalized by the de jure Government for so doing, and taxes thus paid cannot rightfully again be collected. As a general rule, however, a succeeding de jure Government is not liable for the debts contracted by the de facto Government which has been overthrown,-persons contracting with such a Government do so at their peril.

It is well established as a doctrine of International Law that when a de jure Government has been recognized as a belligerent by those who are in arms against it, it is thereby released from its liability to its own citizens for the acts of those in rebellion against its authority. However, it cannot thereby release itself from all responsibility to other Powers or to their citizens, for the acts of the belligerent authorities.