place of birth (jus soli) or the nationality of the parent or parents (jus sanguinis) or upon both. Also without significance are the special conditions, if any, upon which a State permits either naturalization or the renunciation of citizenship (expatriation).

Resident Aliens. The second class of persons who owe obedience to a State is made up of those persons who, though citizens of other States, are for the time being within the territorial limits of the State in question. These persons are universally held to be in genuine allegiance to this State, although it is an allegiance which lasts only so long as they remain within the borders of this State, and is somewhat qualified, in practice at least, by the rule that the local sovereignty will not compel aliens to bear arms except for the purpose of maintaining domestic order, in the benefits of which they themselves partake, or, possibly, to prevent invasion, but in no case are they required to fight against the countries of their natural allegiance.

It is, then, proper to hold that the civitas, or bodypolitic, of a State includes all persons who are within its territorial limits, as well as those of its own citizens who are beyond its borders.

The status of aliens with regard to their allegiance to the local sovereignty is not influenced by the fact whether or not they are domiciled.2 Domiciliation, according to all developed systems of law, carries with it certain changes in the legal rights and responsibilities of the persons affected by it, but it does not increase or alter the

"In its ordinary acceptation, a person's domicile is the place where he lives or has his home. In a strict and legal sense, that is properly the domicile of a person, where he has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning." Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Vt. Reports, 350. No term of actual residence is necessarily required in order to establish a domicile. It may be created the moment a person comes to a place animo manendi.

allegiance which the alien owes to the territorial sovereign. Nor is the existence of this allegiance placed in doubt by reason of the fact that, as a matter of international comity and expediency, a resident alien is not ordinarily called upon to perform certain military services which are, or may be, exacted of the citizen. The allegiance to the territorial sovereign which is imposed upon the resident alien finds its ethical or practical basis in the maxim protectio trahit subjectionem et subjectio protectionem. Thus Webster, when Secretary of State, in his report in Thrasher's case in 1851, declared:

Independently of a residence with intention to continue such a residence; independently of any domiciliation; independently of the taking of any oath of allegiance, or renouncing any former allegiance, it is well known that by the public law an alien, or a stranger born, for so long a time as he continues within the dominions of a foreign government, owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for treason or for such other causes as a native-born subject might be, unless his case is varied by some treaty stipulation."

Double Citizenship. The ascription to resident aliens of allegiance to the local sovereign does not, of course, carry with it the annulment or even a temporary suspension of the allegiance due by those aliens to the States of which they may be citizens, although, as we have already seen, their native States are, as a practical fact, not able to exercise any jurisdiction over them, save with the consent of the local State.

Not simply a double allegiance, but a double primary citizenship is created when the citizens of a State which does not recognize the right of expatriation is naturalized by another State. In certain cases there may even be a triple citizenship, as, for example of

"Webster's Works 6, 526. For approvals of this doctrine by the United States Supreme Court, see United States v. Carlisle, 16 Wall 147; and United States v. Wong Kim Ark., 169 U. S., 649.

a child born in England of American parents and residing later in France. And it may be possible to imagine cases, under the operation of varying municipal laws, in which the allegiance of an individual may be claimed by four or more States. It is possible for a person to be without any citizenship and thus to be an alien in whatever State he may happen to be. An illustration of this condition of statelessness is given in the International Law Notes for February, 1916, where it is said:

An illegitimate child born in Russia of an English mother is actually destitute of nationality because the English Common Law regards him as an alien and there is no statute to help him, while, according to Russian law, he does not acquire Russian nationality. Again, all individuals who have absolutely and finally lost their original nationality, without acquiring another, are, in fact, destitute of nationality. In Austria, for instance, one emigrating without permission of the State loses his nationality and so is destitute of nationality until he acquires another.

In practice the point is usually of little consequence, since such individuals are in most States treated in much the same way as subjects. Hall suggests the adoption of an International rule ascribing a nationality of domicile to such persons.*

To some writers this multiple citizenship has seemed abnormal and as indicating that the definition of citizenship has broken down. In truth, however, there is nothing that is confusing or that is logically inconsistent in this phenomenon of public law. When we revert to the fact that sovereignty, the relation of a political superior to a political inferior, is personal in character, that it is a purely legal concept, and that, as a concept, it is applicable only in the field of municipal law, and, especially, when we clearly apprehend the nature of that legal omnipotence which that legal theory predicates of the State, and distinguish this claim from exclusiveness of

For other instances of "statelessness," see Yale Law Journal, vol. XXVII, p. 840.

territorial jurisdiction asserted in international law,when these principles and premises are borne in mind, the difficulties conceived to surround the subject of citizenship and allegiance wholly disappear.5

In what has been already said, it has appeared that the essential status of the resident alien is not greatly different from that of the citizen. Such differences of rights and obligations as do exist are the creations of municipal law and are often no greater than those which exist between different classes of citizens. Thus, from the broad constitutional standpoint,the inhabitants of the Philippines, tribal Indians upon their reservations, the inhabitants of incorporated territories of the States of the Union, are all citizens or subjects of the United States. The differences in political and civil rights, however, which by the constitution and by statute separate them into distinct classes are certainly no greater or even as great as those which, in many of the States, mark off the domiciled alien from the general citizen body. And, in this connection, it may be remarked that there has been in modern times a marked and unbroken tendency among all civilized States to minimize the distinctions which municipal law creates between the citizen and the domiciled or even the undomiciled alien. Thus in England today the civil and political disqualifications of the alien, in times of peace at least, are very few and relatively unimportant; and, in a number of the States of the American Union, even the suffrage is granted to the aliens who have taken out what are called their "first papers," that is, have indicated that it is their intention to seek naturalization when their length of residence within the country, will, under federal statute, permit them to do so.

"Under the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914, in England, this point has been important in several cases where persons have attempted to prove that they have lost their original nationality.

Rights with Respect to Aliens. It is but reasonable that States, when they concede to other States the right to exercise jurisdiction over such of their own nationals as are within the territorial limits of such other States, should insist that those States should provide systems of law and of courts, and, in actual practice, so administer them, as to furnish substantial legal justice to alien residents. This does not mean that a State must or should extend to aliens within its borders all the civil, or, much less, all the political rights or privileges which it grants to its own citizens; but it does mean that aliens must or should be given adequate opportunity to have such legal rights as are granted to them by the local law impartially and judicially determined, and, when thus determined, protected.

Enlightened international practice during recent years has led States to grant to resident aliens most of the civil rights that are granted to their own citizens, but this has been the result of humanity and international comity, and not of a conceded juristic necessity. In other words, each sovereign State has a discretionary right to determine what, if any, civil and political rights aliens within its borders are to possess, and, indeed, whether, upon any terms, they are to be permitted to enter or remain within its borders. Thus, throughout the world, instances abound in which, for special reasons, aliens in general, or aliens of particular countries, are denied the enjoyment of specific legal rights, privileges, or immunities which the citizens of the countries in which they are freely enjoy. For instance, in the United States, the nationals of certain other countries are not allowed to enter at all. So, also, in addition to the specific civil disabilities suffered by all aliens, certain classes of aliens are not permitted to seek naturalization as American citizens,