spect to the territorial extent of the jurisdiction claimed by them is an accepted principle of the public law of all States.

1a

In Foster v. Neilson, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of the existence of territorial jurisdiction, said: "A question like this is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal question, and, in its discussion, the courts of every country must respect the pronounced will of the legislature." In Ex parte Cooper 2, the same court considered itself bound by the action of the political departments of the government in claiming jurisdiction to an extent of fifty-nine miles from the shores of Alaska. Most emphatic of all is the statement of the court in Jones v. United States 3. In that case, speaking for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Gray said:

Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances. . . . All courts of justice are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the Government whose laws they administer or of its recognition or denial of the sovereignty of a foreign power, as appearing from the public acts of the legislature and executive, although those acts are not formally put in evidence, nor in accord with the pleadings.

Effect of Annexation on Laws of Annexed Territory. It necessarily follows from the general principles of sovereignty that, after annexation, the laws previously obtaining in a given territory no longer are able to draw legal vitality from the former sovereignty, and that, in

1a 2 Peters 253. 2143 U. S. 472. 137 U. S. 202.

sofar as they are to continue to have legal power, they must look to the will of the new sovereign. This will may be expressed tacitly, or by affirmative expression, and as a matter of enlightened political practice, annexing States generally follow the rule that these laws, so far as they are not contrary to their own public policies, shall continue in force until expressly altered or repealed. Thus in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. McGlinn, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

The contention of the Railroad Company is that the Act of Kansas became inoperative within the Reservation upon the cession to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over it. We are clear that this contention cannot be maintained. It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereignty to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government, are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters.

5

114 U. S. 542. This case involved the cession to the United States by one of its own member-States of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The principles declared are, however, drawn from international jurisprudence.

"Laws of these kinds are forbidden by the United States Constitution.

In the case of the United States v. Percheman, the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the validity of certain land grants of the Spanish governor of Florida issued prior to the annexation of that territory by the United States. In the opinion rendered by the Court, Chief Justice Marshall said:

It is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, or private rights annulled. The people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be the modern rule even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case of an amicable cession of territory.

This is strong language, but there is no suggestion that it does not lie within the legal power of the new government (subject, of course, to the limitations of its own constitutional laws) to act as it might seem fit with regard to the private as well as to the public rights of the inhabitants of annexed territories.

State Succession. In Part One of this volume the general principles governing the transfer of the obligations of a State whose territory is annexed in whole or in part by another State, have been stated and do not need to be here repeated. It will, however, be worth while to refer to the holding of the British court of King's Bench in the case of West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v. Rex, decided in 1905. This case is an interesting one not only as regards the matter of State Succession, but as exhibiting the nature of an "Act of State" as conceived of in English law (a topic later to be discussed) and also

7 Pet. 51. 12 K. B. 391.

as illustrating the relation of international law to the law of England. In this case, by a petition of right, the plaintiff sought to recover certain amounts of gold which, prior to the war between Great Britain and the South African Republic, had been seized by that government. The claim was that, by annexation of the Republic to Great Britain, the liability in the matter had been shifted from the former to the latter. On demurrer is was held that the petition disclosed no right which could be enforced against the King in any municipal

court.

The court not only denied that there was any certainly established rule of international law requiring the assumption by a conquering and annexing State of the liabilities of an annexed State, but that, so far as such a rule could be said to be favored by international law writers, it was inconsistent with the law as recognized for many years by the English courts.

The case involved an alleged contractual liability. In the latter part of his opinion the Lord Chief Justice implied that had the interest been one based upon perfected title, especially to land, and therefore, an interest for the divesting of which affirmative state action would be required, the doctrine might have been a different one. He said: "It must not be forgotten that the obligations of conquering States with regard to private property of private individuals, particularly land as to which the title had already been perfected before the conquest or annexation, are altogether different from the obligations which arise in respect of personal rights by contract. As is said in more cases than one, cession of territory does not mean the confiscation of the property of individuals in that territory. If a particular piece of property has been conveyed to a private owner or has been pledged, or a lien has been created upon it, considerations

arise which are different from those which have to be considered when the question is whether the contractual obligation of the conquered State towards individuals is to be undertaken by the conquering State."

As to the American cases cited by counsel for the West Rand Co., the Chief Justice observed that they all related to landed property in annexed areas, and that, in all of them, the treaties of cession or subsequent statutes of the United States had declared that the rights of private property were to be respected, and that no question had been involved of the duty of the United States to fulfil the obligations of the former sovereignties.

Recognition of States. The same sovereign power which enables each sovereign State to determine for itself the extent of its territorial dominion, enables it to determine, in a manner conclusively binding upon its own courts, what other States it will recognize as sovereign, and the extent of their several territorial dominions. Those legally conclusive determinations are reached by the socalled political departments of government, namely, those having constitutional authority to deal with the relations of the State to other States. Furthermore, international law and practice, in agreement with national or municipal law, declares that such sovereign State must, and of a right should, determine for itself, in each particular case, whether or not recognition shall be accorded."

8 United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51; Mitchell v. United States, 9 Pet. 711; Smith v. United States, 10 Pet. 326; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410.

"No new State has by International Law a right to demand recognition, although practically such recognition cannot in the long run be withheld, because without it there is no possibility of entering into intercourse with the new State. History nevertheless records many cases of deferred recognition, and, apart from other proof, it becomes thereby apparent that the granting or denial of recognition is not a matter of International Law but of international practice." Oppenheim, International Law, vol. I, sec. 72 (2d ed.).