"positive morality," and this morality was deemed to derive its obligatory force from super-human sources. A divine sanction or prohibition was attached to nearly every act of which the social group took any direct cognizance. The family group had its gods and its divinely ordered rules of conduct, as did the larger social groups of which the families were the constituent units. A "consciousness of kind" and common material interests may, in reality, have furnished the cement that kept the groups together, but all the historical evidence that we have indicates that, to the individuals themselves, the uniting bond was conceived to be a religious one, and community of worship the one objective evidence of their unity. Thus, whatever may have been the actual origin or utilitarian basis of any recognized rule of conduct or principle of authority, the source was conceived to be in the will of the gods, and its compelling force derived from the evil which it was believed the gods would inflict upon those who should fail to conform to it.

Regarding the probable historical steps by which political as distinguished from merely social institutions arose among men, and by which a corresponding distinction in thought between a political, a social or religious sense of obligation was created, varying theories or conclusions have been reached by anthropologists and other scholars.

The Patriarchal Theory. According to the so-called Patriarchal theory, to which Sir Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer have given the support of their names, the primitive type of society among all early peoples, or at any rate, among the Aryans and Semites, was one in which all individuals were grouped into families or households, united by bonds of kinship (real or fictitious), marriage, or domestic service, and ruled over in a practically absolute manner by the chief male or patriarch.

As long as this stage persisted, the family, according to this theory, remained the sole social unit and the patria potestas the only political authority. By a natural process of growth, as this theory goes on to hold, these families or households grew into clans, the clans into tribes, and the tribes, by conquests and alliances, into nations. At the same time, corresponding to this increase in communal life, the political powers of the heads of the families developed into those of the chiefs of the clans, and these, in turn, into the authority of the King of the tribe or of the nation.

The simplicity and apparent reasonableness of this explanation of early social and political development immediately secured for it a wide acceptance. Later years, however, witnessed a destructive criticism of it, especially by such writers as L. H. Morgan 2, and J. F. McClennan 3. According to these critics, social life in its earliest forms, exhibited a horde condition in which there was an almost complete promiscuity in sexual relations, and out of which, only as a later historical development, did patriarchal or family life, headed by the male, emerge.

Whether or not the patriarchal type of family life was the original form of social organization, either generally or for particular races, is, after all, not a matter of considerable importance to the political scientist. But what is of importance to him is the fact that a better reading of history shows that the patriarch's authority was not the germ out of which developed, by a natural process of growth, first the powers of the chiefs of the clans and tribes, and then those of the State. In addition, and what is of still more significance to the political scientist, is the fact that a careful analysis of patriarchal power shows that it is so different, in its very nature, from

2

Ancient Society, 1907.

3

Studies in Ancient History, 1874; second series 1896.

political authority, that, as an a priori proposition, it is difficult to see how it could have developed into that authority.

The Tribe. Viewed historically, it is probably true that, founded as it is upon the physical facts of parentage, there existed among all races of men some sort of family life before any other social units were formed. But it is equally probable, that, before the family grew into patriarchal form, a grouping into tribes had taken place. In truth, aside from the temporary association of mother and child, which the helpless condition of the latter necessitates, the tribal form of association is the simplest conceivable type of social and political organization. For its establishment and maintenance nothing more is needed than a slight feeling of friendship between its constituent members, and a recognition of its offensive or defensive value in war-a recognition which stern experience must, at a very early time, have almost universally brought about. For the maintenance of tribal authority, no more elaborate form of government is needed than a chieftain whose right to direct and command is founded upon a personal prowess, and whose sphere of authority, in war, is that of a military, commander, and, in peace, that of an arbitrator of private disputes. As savagery gave way by degrees to civilization, a double development undoubtedly went on. Upon the one hand, the authority of the tribe increased and its sphere of authority over its individual members widened; while, upon the other hand, within the tribe, family life increased in its integrity and control until it assumed, in many communities at least, the patriarchal form. Thus, instead of the family developing into the tribe, the likelihood is that there was a synchronous or parallel development of both social units.

The Clan. The historical relation of the clan, gens, or

sept to the family upon the one side, and to the tribe or nation upon the other side, has been a point even more disputed than that of the family to the tribe. As stated above, a once generally accepted theory was that the clans were originally formed from families,—that several families united to form a clan, or that single families ultimately became so large as, in themselves, to constitute clans. Modern scholars, however, are now disposed to deny that this was the probable course of development. Morgan bases this denial upon the view that, in primitive societies, exogamy is the general rule.

It is not necessary, however, to rest the denial of a genetic relationship between the clan and the family upon the more or less uncertain matter of exogamy. A better proof is that which proceeds from the fact that the aims, functions, and basis of membership of the clan are different from those of the family. The family is founded upon kinship, actual or assumed, and, in it, the degree of relationship is fundamental. Its head is, as a rule, determined by birth and not by voluntary selection on the part of its members, and he rules rather as owner of the persons subject to his authority than as a leader or judge over them. In the clan, upon the other hand, although a certain degree of community of blood is usually present or assumed, degrees of relationship are not recognized, or, if recognized, are not deemed important. The real bond of union is a religious one. The clan possesses a certain amount of common property, it exercises certain important functions in the way of settlement of disputes between its members, and in furnishing mutual aid and protection; but its one essential, avowed end is the maintenance of a common worship.

In membership the clan resembles the tribe. That is to say, its constituent units are the individuals themselves and not groups of them. Its members are, of course,

grouped into families, just as are the citizens of the modern State, but the elementary cells are individuals, and whatever authority the clan possesses is exercised directly upon them.*

As to the historical relationship of the clan to the tribe, there is a dispute among scholars, some maintaining that the tribe results from a union of clans, others asserting that the tribe comes first in point of time, and later exhibits a differentiation into clans. It is not unlikely that, in some instances, clans united to form a tribe; in other cases, that the tribal relationship was first established, and the clans a later development.5

The question as to which came first in point of time, the clan or the tribe, is of importance to the historian. To the political scientist the significant point is that these two types of human groupings were generally alike as regards both their form of organization and their units of membership. Both were associations of individuals having common interests, and were ruled over by chiefs whose rights or rulership were based upon their personal qualifications. The tribe thus differed from the clan rather in size and scope of functions than in essential nature. There were, however, the following differences: the fact of a general kinship was more emphasized in the clan than in the tribe, and the maintenance of a common worship was deemed more essential. The tribe had its gods and spiritual religious rites, just as had the clan, but community of religion was rather one of the outward symbols

'F. Hearn, The Aryan Household, p. 138. Speaking of the Roman gentes Hearn says: "There were many familia of the Claudii and of the Cornelii, but there were Claudii and Cornelii before any of the familiæ came into existence. On the other hand there were gentes such as the Mantii and the Marii who never seemed to have branched into any familia." However, Fustel de Coulange (Ancient City, book II, chap. X, p. 3) says: "The Gens was not an association of families

it was a family itself. It might comprise only a single line, or produce several branches, it was always but one family."

* Jenks, History of Politics, p. 19.