says: "This building was taken down many years since. It stood not far from the other buildings of the college." These references furnish practically all the information we can gather concerning this building. It was a simple brick structure, having oiled paper in the sashes in place of glass. That this substitution was only partial would appear probable from the fact that the commissioners in 1653 distinctly foreshadow the intention of providing glass for the windows. We have no other testimony as to the site of the building than that furnished by Thomas, who could never have seen it. It is probable, however, that he knew approximately where it stood.

Thus the little brick building, intended to be plain but strong and dur able, came into possession of the college. Chauncy, Dunster's successor, had reaped the reward of Dunster's pertinacity. The accommodation for six hopeful Indians had become adequate for twenty. The cost of the building, which it was announced to the corporation would be one hundred pounds, and which in the authorization given the commissioners of Massachusetts was fixed at one hundred and twenty pounds, exclusive of glass, had risen, according to Gookin, to nearly four hundred pounds. The twenty Indian students who were to occupy it, or at any rate the greater part of them, were still in the future. The college was short of dormitories and here were vacant rooms. In 1656 Chauncy petitioned for the privilege of using the vacant rooms as dormitories for white students. The commissioners replied as follows:

"The commissioners are willing that the president, with the advice of the commissioners of the Massachusetts and Mr. Eliot, may for one year next ensuing improve the building to accommodate some English students, provided the said building be by the corporation secured from any damage that may befall the same through the use thereof."

This petition was renewed the next year, and the privilege of occupancy was again granted for one year on the same terms. Apparently the building became thereafter one of the regular dormitories of the college without the necessity of renewed applications to the commissioners, and was thus used so long as it remained habitable, except that the printing-press was subsequently set up in one of the rooms. Special appropriations made for Chauncy in 1664 and 1667 for services in behalf of Indians may perhaps indicate that the building was at those dates used to some extent for its original purpose.

The record is preserved of a meeting of the commissioners at which consent was given that the "bricks belonging to the Indian college, which is going to decay and become altogether useless," should be re

moved and used for an additional building to Harvard college, provided studies should be furnished rent free in the new building for any Indian student who might thereafter be sent to college." It was in pursuance of this consent that in 1698 the bricks were sold to John Willis, and the proceeds applied in payment for the cellar under the southerly end of the first Stoughton Hall, a building which shared the fate of the first college building and the Indian college. It was so poorly constructed that in 1780 it was found necessary to pull it down.

The interest which attaches to the history of the Indian college is greatly increased by the fact that the building was evidently used as a dormitory for white students during the greater part of its existence. This is not a mere inference from the fact that specific consent was given in 1656 and 1657 for the use of the building for that purpose, but can be positively stated upon the authority of Gookin, who says that when he wrote it had "hitherto been principally improved for to accommodate English scholars and for placing and using a printing press belonging to the college." The site of the building is conjecturally placed on the plan in Eliot's history of the college in the southern part of the quadrangle, near Gray's Hall.

BURGOYNE'S DEFEAT AND SURRENDER

AN INQUIRY FROM AN ENGLISH STANDPOINT

I think there is no more interesting page in the history of this country than the record of the operations carried on in the year 1777, which ended in the capitulation of Major-General Burgoyne and his forces to the army of the United States commanded by General Gates. It is an old story, and has been often told from various standpoints; but my object in the present paper is to inquire into the causes of this surrender, and the circumstances preceding it.

The winter of 1776-77 was spent by Washington's little army at Valley Forge, where the nature of the country afforded it excellent defense. The English general, Howe, spent the corresponding period "snugly at Philadelphia," twenty-five miles distant, "enjoying his wine and his cards." But far different was the aspect of affairs in the northern colonies. There the command of the British forces had been transferred by an imbecile ministry from General Sir Guy Carleton to General Burgoyne. Carleton had now served several campaigns in that region, and consequently had an extensive knowledge of the country and its people, and was thoroughly well versed in the tactics and mode of fighting of the latter. On the other hand, Burgoyne, albeit a gallant soldier and one who had seen much service in Spain and elsewhere in Europe, was quite fresh to American warfare. Sir Guy not unnaturally felt nettled at being superseded by such a man at a time when offensive operations on a large scale were meditated. He accordingly threw up his appointment as governor of Canada, but consented to remain until the arrival of his successor.

The plan of attack, which Burgoyne was deputed to carry out, had been "hatched" by the king of England,-whose knowledge of the art of war was certainly as peculiar, if not as extensive, as the immortal Sam Weller's knowledge of public-houses,-Lord George Germaine, who, though secretary of state for the colonies, had not much wit for anything, and Burgoyne himself. This plan appears to have been, for the army to capture Ticonderoga and then march against Albany; the fleet meanwhile to ascend the River Hudson with another strong body of troops, under General Howe, on board, and join hands with Burgoyne. In this manner the English would obtain complete control of the river, and the state

The

of New England, "the hot-bed of rebellion," would be reduced. scheme was good enough, but unhappily its execution lacked co-operation from the start, whilst the "strong body" of troops mentioned so vaguely was not nearly strong enough. In point of fact, the force placed under General Burgoyne's immediate command consisted of about seven thousand regular infantry and cavalry-some three thousand of whom were German mercenaries, hired by the English government at forty pounds per man; a corps of artillery; nearly three thousand French Canadians, equipped as scouts, pioneers and baggage guards, and the usual crowd of Indians. His division and brigade commanders were mostly good officers-Major-Generals Philips and Riedesel, Brigadier-Generals Powell, Frazer, Hamilton, and Specht.

One of Burgoyne's first proceedings was to hold a confab with his Indian allies, whom he adjured to renounce their scalping propensities and adhere to the Christian method of fighting. Of course the redskins promised all sorts of things, but not long afterward occurred the brutal murder of Miss Jenny McCrea. At the same time Burgoyne took care to mention to the colonists, in a proclamation which he issued, the many brutalities practiced by the Indians.

But

At first all went well with the expedition. Being conveyed by water to St. John, the English general marched thence toward Crown Point on June 16, 1777. At Ticonderoga, where General St. Clair-the same, I believe, who was defeated by the Indians in 1791-was commandant of only a weak garrison, the Americans retreated. Skenesboro' was the next point to fall into the hands of the British. Well might John Adams exclaim with emphasis: "We shall never be able to defend a post till we shoot a general!" General Schuyler, recognizing the importance of delaying Burgoyne's march by all the means in his power, broke down the bridges, obstructed the roads, and interrupted the navigation of Wood creek. congress would take no heed of Washington, who had a firm belief in the soldierly qualities of Schuyler; the latter was superseded by General Gates. Brigadier-Generals Lincoln and Benedict Arnold were appointed to command under Gates, and he was reinforced by Morgan's rifle corps and two brigades from the highlands. Congress clearly meant "business." Meanwhile Burgoyne reached the Hudson; but alas! no General Howe was there to co-operate with him-indeed, that extraordinary man seemed utterly incapable of observing the movements of Washington and assisting his confrère at one and the same time. And now it was that Burgoyne began to appreciate the difficulties of his enterprise, the difficult nature of the country, and the peculiar tactics adopted by the enemy. These

last perfectly astounded the British and Hessian troops, who failed to see the fun in fighting a hidden foe armed with a deadly rifle.

Still, General Burgoyne is open to much criticism in that he was foolish enough to further weaken his weak army by detaching small parties to threaten the enemy at various places. One such detachment, under Colonel Baum, was fallen upon at St. Corick's Mill by the husband of "Molly Stark," and routed with the loss of 500 men, including Baum himself; while another, commanded by Colonel St. Leger, after meeting with some success, was very nearly cut off, and rejoined the main body with difficulty. So far the English advance. The woods were by this time swarming with militia flocking to Gates' standard.

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With the passage of the Hudson by Burgoyne (which he effected on September 13-14, 1777, by means of a bridge of boats), the second phase of the campaign may be said to have commenced. Burgoyne was now in a position which demanded all the talents of a great general," says a truthful English historian. "His forces were greatly reduced, those of the enemy were greatly increased, and he was precisely in that situation, amidst bogs and wildernesses, which Lord Barrington and Colonel Barré had from the first declared would be fatal to any army." The United States forces of Gates and Schuyler had been increased to 8,000, whilst death and disease had correspondingly reduced the English to little more than 4,000 fighting men. Moreover, Gates intrenched himself very skillfully on Bemus's Heights, protected by redoubts, swamps, woods, and ravines. On September 19 Burgoyne took up ground in front of the American left, himself commanding his own right wing, and Generals Riedesel and Philips the left. About the middle of the afternoon Arnold's division assailed the English right with great impetuosity, covered by a cloud of sharpshooters who picked off the red-coats whenever they showed themselves. General Gates adopted the simple but effective plan of reinforcing Arnold each time he was repulsed, and sending him forward again. At length darkness ended the struggle; each side had lost some five or six hundred killed or wounded, but the British kept the field and claimed the victory.

It may well be asked, why in the name of wonder did not Burgoyne follow up any success he may have gained? "If ever a general needed to push on his advantage it was now. Every day was consuming Burgoyne's stores; every day was augmenting the forces of the enemy. The country was closed to Burgoyne: it was open with all its resources to the Americans." In truth, the British commander had received a despatch from Sir Henry Clinton, advising him not to count upon any help from General