"I ordered," he wrote, in his official report, "General Pierce, who is in command of Camp Hamilton, at Hampton, to send Duryea's regiment of Zouaves June to be ferried over Hampton Creek 10. at one o'clock this morning, and to march by the road up to Newmarket Bridge, then crossing the bridge, to go by a by-road, and thus put the regiment in the rear of the enemy and between Big Bethel and Little Bethel, in part for the purpose of cutting him off, and then to make an attack upon Little Bethel. I directed General Pierce to support him (Colonel Duryea) from Hampton with Colonel Townsend's regiment, with two mounted howitzers, and to march about an hour later. At the same time I directed Colonel Phelps, commanding at Newport News, to send out a battalion, composed of such companies of the regiments under his command as he thought best, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn, in time to make a demonstration upon Little Bethel in front, and to have him supported by Colonel Bendix's regiment, with two field-pieces."

From this not very perspicuous statement of General Butler, it may be inferred that Colonel Duryea's regiment from Hampton, and Lieutenant-Colonel Washburn's force from Newport News, were to move in advance, the former to the rear and the latter to the front of Little Bethel, while Colonel Townsend's regiment from Hampton, and Colonel Bendix's regiment from New

as a reserve.

The two latter were to form a junction at a fork of the road leading from Hampton to Newport News, the two points from which they were separately to march, about a mile and a half from Little Bethel. "I directed," continues Butler, in his official report, "the march to be so timed that the attack should be made just at daybreak, and that after the attack was made upon Little Bethel, Duryea's regiment and a regiment from Newport News should follow immediately upon the heels of the fugitives, if they were enabled to cut them off, and attack the battery on the road to Big Bethel, while covered by the fugitives; or if it was thought expedient by General Pierce, failing to surprise the camp at Little Bethel, they should attempt to take the work near Big Bethel."

This Big Bethel is some four miles farther from Fortress Monroe than Little Bethel, on the road from the town of Hampton to Yorktown, of revolutionary renown. Its exact locality, the character of the surrounding country, the force of the enemy, the strength of their fortifications, or even the fact of their existence, was a mystery probably not only to the General-in-chief, but to all his subordinate officers. It was, however, soon to be solved with a fatal result.

Colonel Duryea having formed his regiment of Zouaves, seven hundred and forty strong, and sent skirmishers forward in advance, began his march from

Every one was naturally anxious to free himself from the blame of what the General has termed an "almost criminal blunder." He in his own justification declared, that "to prevent the possibility of mistake in the darkness, I directed that no attack should be made until the watchword-Boston-should be shouted by the attacking regiment, and, in case that by any mistake in the march the regiments that were to make the junction should unexpectedly meet and be unknown to each other, also directed that the members of Colonel Townsend's regiment should be known, if in daylight, by something white worn on their arm." The General seemed to impute the fault to Colonel Bendix's Germans, who, he declared, were the first to open fire. They, however, strenuously defended themselves, asserting that the mistake was mutual, and the attack on both sides simultaneous. The adjutant of the German regiment came to the rescue of its fame with the following declaration:

"Colonel Bendix had not received any order or intimation that our troops

should wear white badges around the arm for the purpose of mutual recognition, and if he had, he would not have been able to distinguish such badge at the distance and in the dusk of the morning. Colonel Bendix's command did not wear such badges. The uniform of the Albany regiment was very similar to the uniform of the secession troops. It is doubtful which side opened fire. Many of the Albany boys admit that they fired first, mistaking the Steuben regiment for enemies, probably for the reason that the latter wore no white badges.

"When Colonel Townsend's troops approached the junction over a slight ridge, they appeared to be a troop of cavalry, because General Pierce and staff, and Colonel Townsend and staff, in a body, rode in advance of their troops, and without any advance guard thrown out, as customary, to reconnoitre and protect the head of the column. If the latter precaution had been taken, the unfortunate mistake would not have happened. It was known that our side had no cavalry."

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GRIEVOUS as had been the blunder at Little Bethel, and fatal as it was to our own men destroyed by their com1861. rades, it was still more serious in its effects upon the subsequent fate of the expedition. The inexperienced leader, counselled by those who were no more skilled in the art of war than himself, and piqued into an indiscreet activity by disappointment, determined to make an effort to redeem the unsuccessful beginning of the enterprise. accordingly ordered his troops again to the advance. The enemy, in the mean time, were on the alert, and had fallen back from Little to Big Bethel, where the main body was posted under the cover of a strong battery of several heavy guns. General Pierce, without having made any reconnoissance, and entirely ignorant of the force of his antagonists or the nature of their position or defences, did not hesitate to push on his troops, against this concealed and unnumbered foe, at Great Bethel. He,

| however, had the prudence, as he advanced, to send back to General Butler for reinforcements, who sent forward Colonel Allen, with his New York city regiment, and Colonel Carr, with that of Troy (N. Y.)

Colonel Duryea, with his Zouaves, again assumed the advance, supported by Colonel Bendix and his Germans, and Colonel Townsend, with the Albany regiment. On reaching Little Bethel, from which a stray shot was fired by a retreating troop of cavalry, the camp was found deserted, and this being destroyed, our troops pushed on toward Big Bethel. Here the main body arJune rived at about ten o'clock in the

10. morning, and halted in consequence of the intelligence brought back by those who had been sent forward to skirmish in advance. Captain Kilpatrick, who commanded these skirmishers, had evidently not underrated the strength of the enemy, for he reported that he had found them "with about from three

thousand to five thousand men, posted in a strong position on the opposite side of the bridge-three earth-works and a masked battery on the right and left; in advance of the stream, thirty pieces of artillery and a large force of cavalry."

In face of this portentous report of the numbers and strength of position of the enemy, the troops were drawn up in line of battle, and prepared to give fight. The soldiers, though previously fatigued by their long and rapid march, and dispirited by the fatal mistake of the previous night, were at once reanimated by the prospect of a struggle. "It put a new spirit into the men, as the word passed down the line. They were no longer tired and sleepy. Each freshened up to his place in the ranks and closed up in column."

The skirmishers, now led by Lieutenant-Colonel Warren, were again thrown forward on the right and left, supported by the advance guard of Duryea's Zouaves and three pieces of United States artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Greble. The enemy at once opened fire from their batteries directly facing the road, but our men answered with a shout, and continued to press forward.

The enemy's fire was so heavy that it was found useless to attempt to meet it directly by discharges of musketry, and accordingly the Federal forces were deployed. Lieutenant Greble, with his three howitzers, being posted in the road toward the front, was left alone to face the batteries, while the rest as

sumed positions toward the enemy's right and left, with the view of flanking.

Colonel Duryea's Zouaves and Colonel Townsend's Albany regiment crossed from the road on the left through some cultivated farm-ground and orchards, to an open field on the enemy's right, with their skirmishers in advance, and the Germans, the Massachusetts men, and Vermonters passed into a forest on the right of the road, and toward the left of the enemy.

As the Zouaves advanced, the enemy opened their batteries upon them. Colonel Duryea, however, urged them forward at the double-quick step, until, finding the fire very "destructive," he thought it prudent to seek refuge in a neighboring wood, where he halted to rest his men, and to complete his preparations for charging the batteries in flank. After remaining two hours and a half in this imperfect cover, where they were still within range of the enemy's guns, the Zouaves returned to the open field and spiritedly advanced toward the rebel batteries, with the intention of making an attempt to carry them by storm. They had not proceeded far, however, before they discovered lying across their path an almost impassable swamp, with a small stream running through it. These proved to be insurmountable obstacles. They persevered, however, with great spirit till the order came from General Pierce to retreat. Colonel Duryea, now collecting such of his killed and wounded as he could find, withdrew his men and took to the road in the rear.

The Germans, at the same time, were