a mile, when it was attacked by a large body of the enemy lying in ambush in the woods, and driven back across the river with considerable loss. This reconnoissance showed that the ene my was still in force on the Virginia bank of the Potomac, prepared to resist our further advance. Tabular Report of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Antietam, on the 16th and 17th of September, 1862. It was reported to me on the nineteenth that | eral Couch made a prompt and rapid march to General Stuart had made his appearance at Wil- Williamsport, and attacked the enemy vigorousliamsport with some four thousand cavalry and ly, but they made their escape across the river. six pieces of artillery, and that ten thousand in- I despatched the following telegraphic report fantry were marching on the same point from to the General-in-Chief: the direction of Winchester. I ordered General Couch to march at once with his division, and a part of Pleasanton's cavalry, with Franklin's I have the honor to report that Maryland is corps, within supporting distance, for the pur- entirely freed from the presence of the enemy. pose of endeavoring to capture this force. Gen- who has been driven across the Potomac. No SUP. Doc. 41 HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TITEL POTOMAC, fears need now be entertained, for the safety of Major-General H. W. HALLECK, It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the command of the forces for the de fence of the national capital, on the second day of September, 1862, the greater part of all the available troops were suffering under the disheartening influences of the serious defeat they On the following day I received this telegram: had encountered during the brief and unfortu WASHINGTON, September 20, 1862-2 P.M. We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so.. You should keep me advised of both, so far as you know them. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General G. B. MCCLELLAN. To which I answered as follows:: General-in-Chief. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, nate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers were greatly reduced by casualties, their confidence was much shaken, and they had lost something of that "esprit du corps." which is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. Moreover, they had left behind, lost, or worn out, the greatest part of their clothing and camp equipage, which required renewal before they could be in proper condition to take the field again. The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Maryland was received in Washington on the fourth of September, and the army of the Potomac was again put in motion, under my direction, on the following day, so that but a very brief interval of time was allowed to reōrganize or procure supplies. Antietam fought by this army a few days afterThe sanguinary battles of South-Mountain and ward, with the recconnoissances immediately fol Your telegram of to-day is received. I telegraphed you yesterday all I knew, and had nothing more to inform you of until this evening. Williams's corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland Heights at one P.M. to day. The rest of the army is near here, except Couch's division, which is at this moment engaged with the enemy in front of Williamsport; the enemy is retiring via Charles-lowing, resulted in a loss to us of ten general town and Martinsburgh, on Winchester. He last and a large number of enlisted men, amounting officers, many regimental and company officers, night reoccupied Williamsport by a small force, in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two hundred but will be out of it by morning. I think he and twenty, (15,220.) Two army corps had has a force of infantry near Shepherdstown. I regret that you find it necessary to couch every despatch I have the honor to receive from you in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, or even to allude to them. I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, etc., captur ed, until I could do so with some accuracy. I hope by to-morrow evening to be able to give at least an approximate statement. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington, On the same day I telegraphed as follows: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, September 20, 1862. As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of the Potomac, must in a great measure be dependent for supplies of ammunition and provisions upon Richmond, I would respectfully suggest that General Banks be directed to send out a cavalry force to cut their supply communication opposite Washington. This would seriously embarrass their operations, and will aid this army materially. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding. Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Commanding United States Army. Maryland Heights were occupied by General Wiliams's corps on this day, and on the twentysecond General Sumner took possession of Harper's Ferry been sadly cut up, scattered, and somewhat de moralized in the action on the seventeenth. hundred and eight (3708) enlisted men had been In General Hooker's corps the casualties of the same engagement amounted to two thousand six hundred and nineteen, (2619.) The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous to the last battle. When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia the means of transportation at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single day's supply of subsistence in advance. Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had fought like veterans, but the morale of others had been a good deal impaired in those severely, contested actions, and they required time to recover as well as to acquire the necessary drill and discipline.. Under these circumstances I did not feel authorized to cross the river with the main army over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a ford ing stage, between my army and its base of supply. I telegraphed on the twenty-second to the General-in-Chief as follows: "As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are commanding regiments, and companies are without a single commissioned officer." On the twenty-third the following was telegraphed to the General-in-Chief: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, NEAR SHEPHERDSTOWN, September 28, 1862-9.80 A.M. From several different sources I learn that General R. E. Lee is still opposite to my position at Leestown, between Shepherdstown and Martinsburgh, and that General Jackson is on the Opequan Creek, about three miles above its mouth, both with large forces. There are also indications of heavy reenforcements moving to ward them from Winchester and Charlestown. I have therefore ordered General Franklin to take position with his corps at the cross-roads about one mile north-east of Bakersville, on the Bakersville and Williamsport Road, and General Couch to establish his division near Downsville, leaving sufficient force at Williamsport to watch and guard the ford at that place. The fact of the enemy's remaining so long in our front, and the indications of an advance of reënforcements, seem to indicate that he will give us another battle with all his available force. As I mentioned to you before, our army has been very much reduced by casualties in the recent battles, and in my judgment all the reënforcements of old troops that can possibly be dispensed with around Washington and other places should be instantly pushed forward by rail to this army. A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to our cause. I cannot think it possible that the enemy will bring any forces to bear upon Washington till after the question is decided here; but if he should, troops can soon be sent back from this army by rail to reenforce the garrison there. The evidence I have that reenforcements are coming to the rebel army consists in the fact that long columns of dust extending from Winchester to Charlestown and from Charlestown in this direction, and also troops moving this way, were seen last evening. This is corroborated by citizens. General Sumner with his corps and Williams's (Banks's) occupies Harper's Ferry and the surrounding heights. I think he will be able to hold his position till reënforcements arrive. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General. Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief, Washington. On the twenty-seventh I made the following report: All the information in my possession goes to prove that the main body of the enemy is concentrated not far from Martinsburgh, with some troops at Charlestown; not many in Winchester. Their movements of late have been an extension toward our right and beyond it. They are receiving reenforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts-perhaps entirely so. This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign, nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regiments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the old regiments- our main dependence-and in supplying vacancies among the officers by promotion. My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche, but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army some where near Harper's Ferry, and then acting according to circumstances, namely, moving on Winchester, if from the position and attitude of the enemy we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruc tion of the new troops, preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps, for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at once. I have no fears as to an attack on Washington by the line of Manassas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they will not run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear while they have the garrison of Washington in their front. I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt in Maryland should the river remain low for a great length of time, and should they receive considerable addition to their force. I would be glad to have Peck's division as soon as possible. I am surprised that Sigel's men should have been sent to Western Virginia without my knowledge. The last I heard from you on the subject was that they were at my disposition. In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in number, and it was only by very hard fighting that we gained the advantage we did. As it was, the result was at one period very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day. If the enemy receives considerable re enforcements and we none, it is possible that I may have too much on my hands in the next battle. My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send every thing else available to reenforce this army. The railways give us the means of promptly reënforcing Washington should it become necessary. If I am reenforced, as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington. Several persons recently from Richmond say that there are no troops there except conscripts, and they few in number. I hope to give you details as to late battles by this evening. I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding. Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington. him the operations of the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac. On the fifth of October, the division of General Cox (about five thousand men) was ordered from my command to Western Virginia. On the seventh of October I received the following telegram: WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6, 1862. I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potosouth. Your army must move now, while the mac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reënforced with thirty thousand men. If you move up the val ley of the Shenandoah, not more than twelve The work of reorganizing, drilling, and sup- or fifteen thousand can be sent you. The Presi plying the army I began at the earliest moment. dent advises the interior line between WashingThe different corps were stationed along the river ton and the enemy, but does not order it. He in the best positions to cover and guard the fords. is very desirous that your army move as soon as The great extent of the river-front from near possible. You will immediately report what line Washington to Cumberland, (some one hundred you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river; and fifty miles,) together with the line of the Bal-also to what point the reenforcements are to be timore and Ohio Railroad, was to be carefully watched and guarded, to prevent, if possible, the enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon the Virginia side of the river, for the purpose of learning the enemy's positions and movements, were made frequently, so that our cavalry, which from the time we left Washington had performed the most laborious service, and had from the commencement been deficient in numbers, was found totally inadequate to the requirements of the army. This overwork has broken down the greater part of the horses; disease had appeared among them, and but a very small portion of our original cavalry force was fit for service. To such an extent had this arm become reduced, that when General Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania on the eleventh of October with two thousand men, I could only mount eight hundred men to follow him. Harper's Ferry was occcupied on the twentysecond, and in order to prevent a catastrophe similar to the one which had happened to Colonel Miles, I immediately ordered Maryland, Bolivar, and Loudon Heights to be strongly fortified. This was done as far as the time and means at our disposal permitted. sent. It is necessary that the plan of your op- On the tenth of October, Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's Ferry, with two thousand cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary to use our cavalry against him. This exhausting service completely broke down nearly all of our cavalry horses, and rendered a remount absolutely indispensable before we could advance on the enemy. The main army of the enemy, during this time, remained in the vicinity of Martinsburgh and The following were the dispositions of troops Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid: coërcing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, General Averill, then at Green Spring, on the forcibly taking their property, where it was not Upper Potomac, was ordered to move rapidly voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroy-down upon the north side of the river, with all ing railroads. his disposable cavalry, using every exertion to get upon the trail of the enemy, and follow it up vigorously. On the first day of October, His Excellency the President honored the army of the Potomac with a visit and remained several days, during which he went through the different encampments, reviewed the troops, and went over the battlefields of South-Mountain and Antietam. I had the opportunity during this visit to describe to General Pleasanton, with the remaining cav alry force, was ordered to take the road by Cavetown, Harmon's Gap, and Mechanicsville, and cut off the retreat of the enemy should he make for any of the fords below the position of the main army. His orders were to pursue them with the utmost rapidity, not to spare his men or horses, and to destroy or capture them if possible. General Crook, at that time commanding Cox's division, at Hancock, en route for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cars, and remain in readiness to move to any point above should the enemy return in that direction, keeping his scouts well out on all the roads leading from the direction of Chambersburgh to the Upper Potomac. with his instructions, he gave all necessary orders for intercepting the return of the rebels, and Colonel Staples, commanding one of his brigades, states that he sent two regiments of infantry to the mouth of the Monocacy, and one regiment to White's Ford; that on the morning of the twelfth, about ten o'clock, he, by General Stoneman's order, marched the remaining three regiments of his command from Poolesville toward the mouth of the Monocacy; that before getting into action he was relieved by General Ward, who states that he reported to General PleasanThe other commanders between Hancock and ton with his command, while the enemy was Harper's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigilant crossing the river, and was informed by him watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to pre-(General Pleasanton) that he was too late, and vent the escape of the rebels within these limits. nothing could be done then. General Burnside was ordered to send two brigades to the Monocacy Crossing, there to remain in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any point on the railroad to which Stuart might be aiming, while Colonel Rush, at Frederick, was directed to keep his lancers scouting on the approaches from Chambersburgh, so as to give timely notice to the commander of the two brigades at the Monocacy Crossing. General Pleasanton, in his report of this affair, says: "It was at this time that Colonel Ward reported to me from General Stoneman's division, with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a section of artillery. I told him that his command could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed the river. These are the only troops, that I knew of, that were in that vicinity, and this was the first intimation I received that any troops were endeavoring to assist me in capturing the rebels. I succeeded in preventing the enemy from crossing at the mouth of the Mono General Stoneman, whose headquarters were then at Poolesville, occupying with his division the different fords on the river below the mouth of the Monocacy, was directed to keep his cav-cacy, and drove him to White's Ford, three miles alry well out on the approaches from the direction of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any point where the enemy might attempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. He was informed of General Pleasanton's movements. After the orders were given for covering all the fords upon the river, I did not think it possible for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the capture or destruction of his entire force was perfectly certain; but owing to the fact that my orders were not in all cases carried out as I expected, he effected his escape into Virginia without much loss. The troops sent by General Burnside to the Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not giving the necessary orders to the commander, instead of remaining at the railroad crossing, as I directed, marched four miles into Frederick, and there remained until after Stuart had passed the railroad, only six miles below, near which point it was said he halted for breakfast. General Pleasanton ascertained, after his arrival at Mechanicsville, that the enemy were only about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty retreat toward the mouth of the Monocacy. He pushed on vigorously, and, near its mouth, overtook them with a part of his force, having marched seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, and having left many of his horses broken down upon the road. He at once attacked with his artillery, and the firing continued for several hours, during which time he states that he received the support of a small portion of General Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict any material damage upon the enemy. General Stoneman reports that, in accordance below. Had White's Ford been occupied by any force of ours previous to the time of the occupation by the enemy, the capture of Stuart's whole force would have been certain and inevitable. With my small force, which did not exceed one fourth of the enemy's, it was not practicable for me to occupy that ford while the enemy was in front." It would seem from the report of General Stoneman, that the disposition he made of his troops, previous to the arrival of Stuart, was a good one. He stationed two regiments at the mouth of the Monocacy, and two regiments at White's Ford, the latter in the very place where the crossing was made, and the former only three miles off, with a reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, some six miles distant. General Pleasanton's report shows that from the time the firing commenced until the enemy were across the river was about four and a half hours. General Stoneman states that he started the reserve from Poolesville at about nine o'clock, but it appears, from the report of General Pleasanton, that it did not reach him until half-past one. At the time I received the order of October sixth, to cross the river and attack the enemy, the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made since the battle of Antictam, and even prior to that date, to refit the army with clothing, as well as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster, who believed that the necessary articles could be supplied in about three days. Orders were immediately issued to the different commanders who had not already |