Spanish merchantman Buena Ventura; a significant name for it may be rendered into our English phrase "Good luck." At the outbreak of the war, the army of the United States was far inferior to that of Spain in number; its maximum strength being 28,000, at which time it fell short by approximately 5,000 men. These were trained and seasoned soldiers, but totally unprepared to meet the 80,000 men Spain was known to have sent to Cuba. In the matter of war vessels, Spain was thought to have slightly the advantage. While she possessed only one battleship, of the first class, the Pelayo, as against the four American battle ships, the Massachusetts, Indiana, Iowa, and the Oregon, and one secondclass, the Texas, nevertheless Spain was known to have a powerful fleet of fast armored cruisers, of which six were considered superior to the vessels of the same class in the American navy. In addition, Spain had a fleet of 27 torpedo boats, and six torpedo boat destroyers, the latter an instrument of war comparatively untried and vastly dreaded. The Spanish navy, on paper, at least, totaled 88 to 86 in the American fleet, manned by 23,460 to 16,441 officers and men in the Spanish and American fleets, respectively. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH NAVIES. 2 15-in. smooth bores. 4 13-in.; 8 8-in.; 4 6-in. 4 10-in. 4 10-in.; 2 4-in. q. f. 2 15-in. smooth bores. 2 12-in.; 2 10-in. 2 15-in. smooth bores. 2 15-in. smooth bores. 6 8-in.; 12 4-in. q. f. 4 13-in.; 8 8-in.; 4 6-in. * The battleships in the new United States navy are named after the States; the cruisers after cities 6 16.2 10.5 12 5.5 13.6 6 5.6 21 16.7 6 2 15-in. smooth bores. *The battleships in the new United States navy are named after the States; the cruisers after cities. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH NAVIES — Continued. 20.25 2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. (Hontoria). 2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. q. f. 2 10-in.; 10 6-in. q. f.; 6 4.7-in. 2 11-in.; 8 5.5 in. q. f.; 4 3.9-in. 2 11-in.; 10 5.5 in. 8 10-in. (Armstrong); 6 6.2-in. q. f.; 6 4.7-in. 2 10-in.; 10 6-in. q. f.; 6 4.7-in. 2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. q. f. 1 6.2-in.; 2 4.7-in. smooth bore 2 11-in.; 10 5.5-in. q. f. 8 9-in.; 3 8-in. Total.. 13 *Names of ships given in italics were destroyed or captured by the American fleet. = *Names of ships given in italics were destroyed or captured by the American fleet. To offset any disparity that might exist between the two fleets, the administration at Washington sought to purchase ships in whatever market was available. Two auxiliary vessels were secured for Commodore Dewey in Asiatic waters; three ships were purchased from Brazil, and two torpedo boats obtained in Germany. In addition the merchant marine was levied upon, and eleven ocean liners were transformed into swift, light armed cruisers. Of these the American line supplied four: the St. Louis, St. Paul, New York and Paris, the latter two being rechristened the Yale and Harvard respectively. Four others were supplied by the Morgan line, and were renamed the Yankee, Dixie, Prairie, and Yosemite. A number of private yachts were also chartered and transformed into gunboats; one of them, J. P. Morgan's splendid yacht, the Corsair, proving very efficient in the batle of Santiago, under its new name, the Gloucester. From the outset, the problem of providing for the purchase of ships, the mobilizing of an army, and all the extraordinary expenses connected with a war became the concern of Congress. It was estimated that the monthly expenses would amount to $50,000,000, and the means of raising this additional revenue was the issue before the House of Representatives and the Senate from the declaration of war, April 25, to the final passage of the war revenue act. on June 13. Already on March 8, the sum of $50,000,000 had been appropriated" for national "for national defence," which was for the exclusive purpose of strengthening shore defenses and the fortifications near great cities. Hence it was imperative to inaugurate legislation enabling the administration to carry on the war.* This was provided for in the War Revenue Act of July 13, 1898. "The bill as reported, provided for additional internal taxes, estimated to yield about $90,000,000 per annum, of which $33,000,000, it was estimated, would come from doubling the tax of $1 per barrel on fermented liquors, $15,000,000 from doubling the 6 cents. per pound tax on tobacco, and increasing the tax on cigars and cigarettes, $5,000,000 from the imposition of a special tax on dealers in tobacco and cigars, $2,000,000 from an increase in the tax on the tonnage in the foreign trade, and $38,000,000 from a documentary and proprietary stamp tax, based substantially on the stamptax acts enacted near the close of the War of the Rebellion.' The bill also carried a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow on the credit of the United States any sum, up to $500,000,000, to be secured by 3 per cent. bonds. Under the provisions of this act these bonds were placed on sale by popular subscription June 13 to July 14, and demand for them proved one of the startling episodes of the war. The fact that $1,400,000,000 worth of the bonds were subscribed for, seven times the amount of the subscription bonds offered, is one of the many evidences revealed during the stress of the conflict of the faith the average American has in his country. Thus after thirty years of peace the nation found itself in the throes of preparation for war. During these years the interests and energies of the people were concerned wholly with the problems of its own development; the victories were the victories of peace. The ancient policy of the nation with regard to entangling alliances or interference with international affairs was still so consistently observed that to the majority of the foreign powers the United States of America was an unknown quantity. Yet all at once, and as the result of * Nelson Dingley in The American-Spanish War, pp. 325–338. See also Lyman J. Gage in The American-Spanish War, pp. 367–391. |