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HAVE exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs at our doors." The absolute sincerity of these words in the message of President McKinley to Congress cannot be questioned.* The President was essentially a man of peace; and, in addition, his experience as a young private in the Civil War had been of such a nature as to discourage any activity on his part that would hasten or produce the terrible fact of war. It may have been, that if the Maine had been allowed to swing unscathed at her anchor in the harbor

* For the text of the message see Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. x., pp. 139-150. See also messages to 55th Congress, 3d session, in Messages and Documents, 1898-9, 6-10.

of Havana, his counsels for peace would have prevailed, and the Spanish régime in Cuba would have persisted. But the destiny of a nation is controlled by forces outside of the will of one man or group of men, and it was ordained that the story of the last revolt of the Cubans was to be other than a repetition of previous attempts toward Cuban independence. From the moment that the news of the destruction of the American battleship was flashed over the world, it was clear in the minds of the President and the people of the United States that the end of an intolerable situation had come indeed. Whether or not the guilty persons who set off the

mine would be apprehended was a point of minor importance; the crime was the result of a condition that had long existed as a menace to the peace and welfare of American republics, and it was now the imperative duty of the nation so signally wronged to take steps necessary to prevent the recurrence of such injuries. The monstrous stroke in the dark that hurled 266 American sailors to death was likewise the death blow to the forces that had so long conspired against any endeavors toward releasing Cuba from the grip of Spain. The opposition of the centres of finance, the hysterical fears of the sea-coast cities, and the pleas of those who desired peace at any cost, were drowned in the tremendous wave of indignation that swept over the land. As President McKinley had voiced it, all methods of solving the problem had been tried save the one that now appeared inevitable: the fearful expedient of war.

It is not strange that at first the policy of the administration was one of delay and of caution. For a period of 50 years the United States had been at peace with other nations. The treaty of Guadalupe, ratified in 1848, marked the close of the struggle with Mexico, the last collision with a foreign foe. It is true that relations with European powers, notably France and England, had been somewhat strained at times during the interim, but in general the United States had been looked upon by other powers as an unknown but not very menacing factor in world politics. Even the tremen

dous conflict between the States had failed to impress Europe with a sense of the inherent power of America. But now forces and conditions apparently beyond control were conspiring to destroy her isolation and force her in spite of herself to revise the policy regarding international affairs; in fact to negative some of the fundamental provisions of her organic law.

Notwithstanding the outcries of the sensational press, the members of Congress and the public in general took counsel from the executive and waited in patience for the report of the Naval Board of Inquiry, appointed by the President to determine the cause of the catastrophe. The pause that followed the destruction of the Maine was so remarkable that some foreign critics found in it evidence of national fear, and rashly prophesied the breakdown of the Republic. Those, however, who knew the true temper of the American people were not deceived by this appearance of calm. To them the situation was ominous to a degree; they saw in it the sullen moment that presaged the breaking of the storm, and to the more prophetic souls it meant the beginning of a struggle between the Old World and the New, the consequences of which but dimly could be surmised.

So from February 17, when the Naval Board of Inquiry was appointed, until March 28, when President McKinley submitted its report to Congress,* few and guarded were the

* Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. x., pp. 136-139.

references made in the halls of Congress or by the members of the administration to the question so sternly before the American public. Yet those who conceived that the result would be nothing more than a repetition of the Virginius affair, were destined, as was Spain herself, to be sadly disabused. As soon as the President's message and the accompanying report of the Naval Board of Inquiry were received by Congress, a parliamentary struggle ensued that clearly indicated to the Spanish government the desperate state of the relations between the two powers. The report, too, of the Spanish Court of Inquiry, which was also received by Congress on March 28, served as a further source of irritation, for in its findings, the suggestion was made, after a most casual examination of the wreck, that the explosion was due to the carelessness of its own officers.

The debate in Congress was well calculated to give Spain uneasiness.* In it the question of Spanish sovereignty was hardly considered at all, intervention being accepted as a foregone conclusion, and the whole discussion turned on the wisdom of recognizing the Cuban republic. When the Spanish authorities grasped the full significance of this attitude on the part of the two houses, they endeavored by every means possible to

Lodge, The War with Spain, contains full account of legislative proceedings. Chap. ii., pp. 31-44. See also: Congressional Record, vol. xxxi., 1898; War Legislation of the Senate by Senator John W. Daniel in American-Spanish War, pp. 297–325.

delay, or to avoid the rapidly approaching collision. Although they refused to consider President McKinley's note calling for a cessation of the war in Cuba, nevertheless the good offices of the Pope and the ambassadors of the greater European powers were influenced to appeal to the President for peace. General Blanco was ordered to organize Cuban administration according to the principles ciples set forth in the decree of autonomy signed by the Queen, November 26, 1897. In addition the sum of $600,000 was voted by the Cortes for the benefit of the starving reconcentrados. The offer of autonomy,* however, was a timeworn subterfuge of Spain, and the Cuban insurgents, learned in the school of bitter experience, simply ignored General Blanco's proclamation of an armistice and his proposals for constitutional reform. All of these hasty concessions were forgotten in the pressure of mighty events soon to follow.

Had there been any other means of solving the Cuban problem than that of armed intervention,† President McKinley would undoubtedly have seized upon it, and he believed up to the last minute that Spain would finally agree to the terms he proposed. It was doubtless with some such hope in mind that he delayed the message to Con

"The death blow to autonomy was given on March 9 in the appropriation by Congress, without a dissentient vote, of $50,000,000." Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain.

For an exhaustive discussion of intervention in Cuba from the standpoint of international law sec Moore's Digest of International Law, vol. vi., pp. 56-239.

gress in which he appealed for an act enabling him to meet the exigencies of the situation. The independence of the island of Cuba was the price that Spain must pay for her misdeeds, and it was impressed upon him at last that nothing short of war could persuade her to relinquish its sovereignty. Assured of this fact he commanded that the consulate at Havana be closed, and after Consul-General Lee and other Americans had departed, he issued his able message of April 11. In this he reviewed the story of Cuba's three generations of suffering; referred to the destruction of the Maine as an evidence of Spain's inability to preserve order, and finally based the right of the United States to intervene on the following specific grounds:

*

"First, In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties in the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. Second, We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection- and indefinitely for life and property which no government there can or will afford. Third, The right to intervene may be justified by the serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people. * Fourth, And which is of the utmost importance, the present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government enormous expense

*

*

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*

The aggressive element was strongly in the ascendency in Congress, and to the leaders of that group the wording of the message came as a distinct disappointment. They looked in vain for the recommendation that the Cuban republic be recognized, with the result that for six days there was a deadlock. The supporters of the Cuban insur

gents were determined that a clause recognizing the independence of Cuba should be incorporated. This failed, however, in the House (yeas, 150; nays, 191) and the resolution that finally passed merely declared in favor of intervention (yeas, 334; nays, 19), containing only the following clause regarding Cuban independence: "The people of the island of Cuba of right ought to be free and independent."

When the House resolutions were presented for adoption by the Senate, the latter saw fit to substitute for them a set of resolutions that had been formulated by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which was appended a special report from the minority members of the Committee favoring immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba. The debate on the question of Cuban recognition was even more bitter in the Senate than in the House, resulting finally in the passage of the minority, or co-called Foraker resolutions by a vote of 51 to 37. In addition, an amendment offered by Senator Teller of Colorado was adopted which, in effect, declared that the United States had no intention of asserting dominion over the island of Cuba. It was thought by many that the House would concur in these resolutions, but a motion was made to strike out all references to recognition, which was carried by a majority of 22. The effect of this amendment was to necessitate the appointment of a conference committee of both Houses with the result that on April 19, by a vote of 42 to 35 in the Senate, and 311 to 6

in the House of Representatives, the following resolution was adopted:

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Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

"First, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

"Second, That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the gov ernment of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several states, to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

The passage of this resolution was tantamount to a declaration of war, and was accepted as such by the Spanish nation. It was signed by the President on April 20, and on the 21st, the Spanish minister, Señor Polo y Bernarbé asked for his passports. General Stewart L. Woodford, United States minister at the court of Spain, was notified by Secretary of State Sherman of the passage of the resolution, and requested to deliver the ultimatum of the government of the United States to Premier Sagasta and the Spanish ministry. It was never destined to be delivered, however, for the Spanish authorities notified him of the rupture of relations before he could present the resolutions of Con

gress. He accordingly asked for his passports and departed for Paris, suffering no little molestation on the journey through Spain from the angry people of that country. Thus without actual declaration, a de facto state of war between the two nations was existent.*

As a result of these developments in the United States, the Spanish people were wrought up to an almost hysterical degree. The proclamations and pronouncements issued by officials in Porto Rico, the Philippines, and in the Spanish cities were in striking contrast with those that emanated from American sources. The temper of the people was reflected, too, in the action of the Spanish Cortes, which, after an impassioned address by the QueenRegent, Maria Christina, voted that they would go to any extreme to defend the honor of Spain.

On April 22 the President issued orders to Acting Rear-Admiral Sampson directing him to institute blockade of the Cuban ports. The existence of this blockade and of the state of war between the United States and Spain was also announced in a proclamation given forth on the same date. Neutral vessels lying at any of the Cuban ports were allowed thirty days for departure. The same day the blockade was instituted, the first shot of the war was fired by the gunboat Nashville, which captured the

Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vii., p. 171: "It is universally admitted that a formal declaration is not necessary to constitute a state of war." See also Sargent, Campaign of Santiago, vol. i., p. 34.