These reports soon aroused the fury of the American people who demanded that some definite action be taken to suppress the awful spectacle and to protect the rights, property and the lives of American citizens in Cuba. On May 17, 1897, President McKinley asked Congress for an appropriation of $50,000 to relieve destitute and suffering American citizens in Cuba,* and both Houses of Congress granted his request, the bill being signed by the President May 24. The food, clothing and medicine distributed by Consul-General Lee and other American consuls for a time greatly alleviated the distress existing among the Americans, but during the summer the state of affairs gradually became worse and the United States government felt called upon to insist that the Spanish authorities increase their efforts or pursue some method by which normal conditions might be restored.

The American minister to Spain at Madrid was instructed in September, 1897, to inform the Spanish government that the situation in Cuba had become so dreadful that the United States authorities could not promise. to maintain strict neutrality permanently and that something must be done to stop the enormous injury to American industrial and commercial interests which the war in Cuba was inflicting. But this communication received scant notice by the Conservative ministry then holding the reins of

government in Spain, and it was not until a Liberal ministry headed by Señor Sagasta came into power in October, 1897, that the Cuban situation received the attention it deserved. Shortly after assuming the premiership Sagasta announced that a law had been signed by the Queen Regent granting autonomy to Cuba under Spanish suzerainty.* As an indication of good faith, Captain-General Weyler was recalled on October 9 and Marshal Blanco sent in his place, reaching Havana October 30.

But this did not suit either party in Cuba, for the Spanish people there thought the measures were too lenient and granted too much, while on the other hand the Cubans would not be satisfied with anything less than complete independence, and so opposed the measures as granting too little.†

President McKinley was inclined to give Spain every possible chance to redeem her promises of reforms and still adhered to the policy outlined in his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1897, when he said that Spain" should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed."

Blanco's administration, however, was no improvement upon that of his Callahan, Cuba and International Relations,

p. 476.

† Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 478 et seq.

Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. x., pp. 127-136; Lee and Wheeler, Cuba's Struggle, pp. 177-188.

predecessor, and reports from American consuls only confirmed the newspaper publications that the reconcentrados were dying by the thousand. Opposition to Blanco on the part of the Spanish party in Cuba resulted in serious military riots in Havana in January, 1898, and thereupon some of the most formidable ships of the navy were dispatched to Cuban waters to be prepared for any emergency. But the riots continued and in order to protect the interests and lives of American citizens the battleship Maine, under Captain Sigsbee, was sent to Havana.

"

About this time (December 25, 1897) the Spanish minister at Washington, Señor Dupuy de Lome, wrote a letter to Señor Canalejas (published February 9, 1898) in which he alluded to President McKinley as "a low politician," and intimated that he catered to the jingo" mobs in order to increase his popularity.* Because of this indiscretion the minister's recall was demanded and the Spanish government at once complied, appointing Señor Polo y Bernabé to the post. Spain, also, at the time of the Maine's procedure to Havana, sent one of her most powerful cruisers the Vizcaya, under Captain Eulate, on a visit to New York with the permission of the United States authorities.

Upon the arrival of the Maine at Havana she was assigned an anchorage by the Spanish officials, but her presence greatly offended them and

For text see Marrion Wilcox, The War with Spain, pp. 31-34.

the fact that she completely dominated the city from her anchorage was regarded as a threat. President McKinley had received an enormous number of consular reports giving all the details of the Cuban situation from every standpoint and was on the point of submitting them to Congress for consideration when the world was startled and horrified by the news that the Maine, while peacefully lying at anchor, had been destroyed by an explosion on the night of February 15, 1898, and that two of her officers and 264 of her crew had been killed.

The destruction of the Maine was naturally considered by the American public to be the work of the Spanish, and the excitement and indignation aroused by this catastrophe, combined with the previous distrust of and illfeeling for the Spaniards, made war only a matter of applying the match to the powder.* Sensational journals called for swift vengeance and feeling was at high tension. The President therefore determined to withhold the transmission of the consular reports to Congress until the excitement among the public had subsided sufficiently to allow them to receive the

* 66

Superficial reasoners have wished to treat the destruction of the Maine as the justification and the cause of the intervention of the United States. The government of the United States, however, did not itself take that ground. It is true that the case of the Maine is mentioned in the preamble to the joint resolution of Congress, by which the intervention of the United States was authorized; but it is recited merely as the culmination of abhorent conditions,' which had existed for more than three years. The government of the United States never charged that the catastrophe was to be at