The question of the Philippine Islands was even more difficult, because the Democratic platform of 1912 contained a plank declaring that 66 we favor an immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands." In September, 1913, Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes, who had been connected with the Philippine government since 1904, since 1904, was displaced by Francis Burton Harrison, who had instructions to give more authority to the Filipinos. He publicly announced that "every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence; and we hope to move toward that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of

the Islands will permit." President President Wilson appointed five of the nine commissioners from among the native citizens.

In 1914 the Jones bill was introduced into Congress "to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those islands." The bill seemed likely to go through easily, but in 1915 it was shelved by the Senate and the next year a strong opposition appeared to any pledge that the Filipinos should be allowed independence at a fixed date. Whatever was expected when the Islands

were annexed in 1898, they had not proved profitable to the capitalist nor alluring to settlers. Only a handful of Americans lived in the Islands outside the official and military circles. On the other hand, the question arose as to what would become of the Filipinos if left to themselves in the surging seas of Asiatic affairs. Would Japan or Germany or Great Britain allow them to keep independence if it were acquired?

The great question of conservation of the national resources which had been pushed to the front since 1905, came up in various hotly contested forms. The reclamation of arid lands by government irrigation works went forward without interruption; but serious issues arose regarding the water powers. In 1913 a large number of those powers on public lands were reserved, pending action by Congress. In 1915 bills were introduced by which the government was to grant fifty year leases of water-powers; but no formal measures were passed, down to May, 1916.

The government maintained its policy of setting aside scenic areas for national parks. In 1910 the Glacier National Park was reserved, with 1,500 square miles, covering the main divide of the Rockies for about 50 miles south of the Canadian boundary. In 1915, the equally magnificent area of the Rocky Mountain National Park was created. It contained nearly 400 square miles, including the

valley known as Estes Park, with Long's Peak and other snow mountains encircling it. A long controversy with regard to the desire of the city of San Francisco for a reservoir site in the Hetch Hetchy valley of the Sierra Nevadas was brought to a close by an act of 1913, granting the privilege.

General Foreign Relations.

At the end of the Taft administration, the United States was on terms of amity and concord with most of the nations of the earth except Mexico and some of the Central American states. Many arbitration treaties had been negotiated, and the influence of Taft's administration was strongly felt in favor of world peace." The new administration showed its adherence to that policy when Mr. Bryan became Secretary of State. He had a great hold on a considerable part of the people of the country, among whom he was accustomed to speak to large audiences on questions of public interest.

President Wilson reversed the policy of Roosevelt and Taft by making almost a clean sweep of the ministers of the United States to foreign countries. All the thirteen ambassadors except one were replaced, in some cases by very inexperienced men. Only three or four of the Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Resident remained. The consular service, however, was well protected * See page 292 et seq., ante.

by law and recent precedents, and remained an expert service in which the higher positions were filled by promotion from the lower.

Secretary Bryan at once began to negotiate another group of arbitration treaties, and between 1913 and 1915 had the satisfaction of seeing 28 of them ratified by the Senate. He also put forward a plan for international commissions of inquiry in case of disputes between the United States and other countries. In 1913, he sent a note to the conference then sitting in Bucharest, Rumania, for the settlement of the rivalries of the Balkan powers, asking that the conference formally announce that religious liberty was to be allowed in all the countries involved. Steps were taken by the administration in 1914 to secure a third Hague Conference to perfect the elaborate system of peace treaties and tribunals which was begun in the Conferences of 1899 and 1907.

Almost the only serious international question left unsettled by the Taft administration was that of the Panama Canal tolls.* The Canal Act (August 24, 1912), gave the use of the canal free to American vessels engaged in the coasting trade, and the Democratic platform of 1912 approved this principle. Great Britain protested that any discrimination was contrary to the treaties of the United States with England and with Panama. A bill was introduced and strongly backed by Senator Elihu *See page 297, ante.

Root and others, for the repeal of this discrimination; and President Wilson finally succeeded in compelling his party to agree to the bill, by an act of June 15, 1914.

Latin-American Affairs, 1909-1916. The new administration inherited troubles of various kinds with LatinAmerica. Under Roosevelt, Cuba became a protectorate of the United States in 1902; Panama was virtually a dependency from the time of the Canal Treaty of 1903; and a United States control of the custom houses was instituted in Santo Domingo in 1909. President Taft followed up this policy by sending a military force into Nicaragua in 1912, and in 1913 negotiated a treaty with that country by which the United States was to have the sole right to build a canal across Nicaragua and was to receive the Bay of Fonseca, against which it was to make a payment of $3,000,000.

President Wilson early committed himself in the same direction. Secretary Bryan negotiated a new treaty with Nicaragua in about the same terms, but included a section resembling the Cuban Platt Amendment of 1902, under which Nicaragua would become a dependency. President Wilson adhered to this policy of bringing a number of the weak Latin American neighbors under the control of the United States, although a strong party in Nicaragua protested with all its might, and for several years the treaty was not ratified by

the Senate. An American collector of taxes remained in that country without any authority from Congress, till in 1916 the treaty was at last accepted by the Senate.

For some time it had been clear that Haiti would follow the same road as its sister negro republic. It was equally involved in debt, and there was an equal danger that some foreign country might collect its debts by taking territory. To stop one of the usual bloody factional fights, President Wilson directed marines to land in Haiti in July, 1915, and a treaty was negotiated, by which not only the customs, but all the government finances, were put under the control of the American Federal government. This treaty also was ratified by the Senate (February 28, 1916), thus completing a block of five LatinAmerican states American states-Cuba, Panama, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Haiti -which had practically lost their independence and were protectorates of the United States.

This relation in the case of Panama brought the United States into difficulty with the United States of Colombia, which would never admit that the Republic of Panama was legally separated from Colombian territory in 1903. Under Secretary Knox, the American minister to Colombia, Mr. DuBois, in 1913, tried to negotiate a treaty by which Colombia was to receive a bonus of $10,000,000 for relinquishing all claims to Panama, and allowing the United States to build an

impossible canal on the Atrato route. This effort failed, but under the direction of Secretary Bryan another was negotiated in April, 1914, by which the United States was to express" sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of cordial friendship that had so long subsisted between the two nations" and was to pay $25,000,000 as a douceur. This treaty seemed like a direct censure of President Roosevelt for his action in annexing the Canal Zone, and no action was taken on it down to the middle of 1916.

Mexico, 1910-1916.

None of the difficulties just discussed seemed likely in any case to lead the United States to war. It was otherwise in Mexico, where a civil war was raging and the lives and property of the Americans were constantly in jeopardy. These troubles went back to 1910, when Francisco Madero headed an insurrection against the Diaz government. Apparently neither the aged President nor his rival realized that the so-called Republic was on the point of breaking up. In 1911 United States troops were sent down to the Texas frontier, because the Mexicans occasionally crossed the border and even attacked Americans on their own soil. The troops remained indefinitely, and from that time on there was a feeling among many Americans that the United States ought to intervene.

The Diaz government maintained itself only till May, 1911, when Diaz resigned and left the country. His government had been efficient but severe, and never deserved the name of a republican or representative government. Madero was at once "elected" as President and took up his residence in the capital city and the United States recognized him as head of the Mexican government. When insurrections broke out against him, Congress authorized the President to prohibit the shipment of arms and munitions of war, so as to avoid seeming to take part in the struggle.

At this juncture it was reported (1912) that the Japanese were nego. tiating with the Madero government for Magdalena Bay on the peninsula of southern California, to be used as a naval station. The Japanese government absolutely denied any official negotiations or intentions, although a private Japanese corporation undoubtedly made some effort to secure rights on the coast. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, introduced a resolution, which was duly passed by the Senate, to the effect that

“when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for national purposes."

Whatever the intentions of the Madero government, it was unable to

carry them out, for it was pressed by several local revolutions. General Victoriano Huerta, an old officer of Diaz, secured control of the army in the capital, and overthrew and imprisoned Madero. The President of the Republic was barbarously killed while in the custody of officials taking orders from Huerta (February, 1913). The Maderists grouped themselves around Carranza as the head of their party, which they called the Constitutional.

This was the situation that confronted President Wilson when he came into office. He sent John Lind as a special envoy to Mexico, instructing him to insist that Huerta should not be recognized as head of the state by the United States. A so-called election was held in October, 1913, as a result of which Huerta was declared officially elected President. A few hours later he arrested 110 of the deputies, the official representatives of the nation. Wilson steadily refused to recognize Huerta as head of the state, on the ground that he was a military despot who came to power by murdering his predecessor. Wilson adopted the phrase of "Watchful Waiting," as indicating his state of mind.

A new revolutionary centre developed around General Francisco Villa, who took the side of the Constitutionalists. For his benefit, President Wilson withdrew the embargo on arms (1914), but Villa proved to be a bandit of the worst character who

plundered and murdered Mexicans and foreigners right and left. In April, a difficulty arose because some of Huerta's officers at Tampico took several American sailors out of a boat in the harbor. They were released in a few minutes, but Admiral Mayo insisted that the American flag must be saluted. When the administration at Washington Washington showed fight, Huerta agreed to make this salute, but insisted that there should be a simultaneous salute of the Mexican flag.

Upon this punctilio, President Wilson (April 20, 1914), decided to send an armed force to Mexico. Of course he was influenced by the long course of the civil war and the sufferings of Americans in residence. A naval expedition of 5,000 men was therefore sent, which captured Vera Cruz with a small loss. Later a small military force was sent. The diplomatic representatives between Mexico and the United States were withdrawn. Meantime the governments of Argentine, Brazil and Chile, commonly called the A. B. C. powers, proposed a mediation. An armistice was secured with Huerta, and in May the A. B. C. diplomats met at Niagara Falls, and reported that if a provisional government could be formed in Mexico under the leadership of Carranza, it would be proper for the United States to withdraw. cordance with this plan, the American forces left Vera Cruz, November 23. Following out this plan of mediation, a Pan-American conference was

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