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the Republican party, felt, and suppressed no qualms in saying, that the party had not redeemed the promises made in the platform of 1908. The " iniquitous Schedule K"-the woolen section which, with the cotton schedule, was supposed to keep up high prices on clothingboth subjected to a galling fire; while as for the rubber robbery," Senator Bristow, a leading Insurgent, laid the responsibility for its extortionate rates directly at the door of Senator Aldrich himself. The opponents of the tariff charged that the 1909 tariff, from which so much had been expected, was simply a new and aggravated example of log-rolling and inter-bargaining of special interests. Newspapers and magazines reiterated the question whether that could be considered a "reasonable " profit to American industries which increased the duties on cotton, for instance, by amounts ranging from 40 to 85 per cent. And Senator Dolliver, another Insurgent, related how the Diamond Rubber Company of Ohio had in ten years declared stock dividends in creasing its capital from $50,000 to $10,000,000. Indeed this same Senator declared, shortly before the fall elections, that "the public has asked and asked again, in vain, for some one to point out a single reduction on any article ready to enter into consumption which has a commercial significance of any sort." This phase touched the public at a tender spot, for it seemed to indicate one source,

at least, of undeniable increases in the rates of many important articles of general consumption. The President, however, asserted that the general average duty was less nder the PayneAldrich Act than under those preceding, as it embraced "decreases on 654 items, involving a consumption value of $5,000,000,000.' value of $5,000,000,000." There being this radical difference of opinion, all parties agreed to 1ave the tariff question in statu quo until the electorate had expressed its opinion by the ballot. Certain it was that the new customs duties produced a revenue of $15,000,000 over that of 1909, and the new corporation tax produced $25,000,000 more, the latter item being a clear gain. Proclamations were issued and the entire machinery of the "maximum and minimum" rate clause put in operation, so that the entire import trade of the country was brought to the basis of the minimum rates.

The tariff board, it may be remembered, was created for the primary purpose of assisting to adjust the "maximum and minimum "rates, but the President, who had from the first been alive to the advantages of an expert tariff commission for wide researches on which to base future tariff legislation, asked and obtained from Congress an appropriation of $250,000 to continue the board for another year. The scope of its field was not officially enlarged, but there seemed to be an understanding that a general quest for information should be carried on which should further the " ad

ministration of the tariff law." The next year another appropriation, nearly as large, was voted, and Congress instructed the new board, now increased to five members,* to report on the wool schedule by December 1, 1911.

The policy of a permanent tariff commission seemed thus to be practically established, and has raised hopes in the public mind that tariff revision may yet be based upon a nonpartisan, business-like, scientific investigation rather than being the plaything of selfish interests.

The tariff agitation throughout the Taft Administration was a leading occasion, though not the only one, of the remarkable, almost spontaneous, development of" progressivism," which early manifested itself in a spirit of revolt against the rules under which the House of Representatives conducted its business. There had long been a Committee on Rules, consisting of four members appointed by the Speaker who was, ex officio, the fifth member of the committee and its chairman. This committee had entire charge of legislative procedure and was well-nigh able to dictate the bills which should, or should not, come before the House for action. But one day in the early spring of 1910, twenty Republican Insurgents joined with the Democrats in changing the rules, with

The President appointed, as the two new members, Thomas W. Page, professor of economics at the University of Virginia, and William M. Howard, former Congressman from Georgia, both Democrats.

the startling result that the Committee on Rules found itself a body of ten men, not including the Speaker, whose selection was delegated to the House itself.* Mr. Cannon at once offered to resign the Speakership but was not allowed to do so; it was considered sufficient that the protest against Cannonism, the system, not Cannon, the man, should be registered.

Progressivism in the Senate, with which the forces of Insurgency soon united, found its special occasion for revolt in the tariff question. It was not so much the tariff itself — whether the schedules had been pushed upward or downward- as the methods

by which it had been constructed, the Progressives believing that the Republican party was dominated by pri

vate interests. The Democrats, of course, were not slow to take advan

tage of this and other disaffection, and added their weight to the unmistakable swing of the pendulum, with such effect that the previous Republican majority of 40 in the House of Representatives was replaced by a Democratic majority of 70 for the Legislatures Sixty-second Congress. were also chosen that would send 8

* The Republicans selected as their quota on the new Committee on Rules: Walter I. Smith, of Iowa, John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, George P. Lawrence, of Massachusetts, J. Sloat Fassett, of New York, Sylvester C. Smith, of California, and Henry S. Boutell, of Illinois. The Democrats assigned as their choice: Champ Clark, of Missouri, Oscar Underwood, of Alabama, Lincoln Dixon, of Indiana, and John J. Fitzgerald, of New York. The committee itself elected John Dalzell as chairman.

Democratic Senators to take the places of as many Republicans, and 15 Democratic governors were elected, 7 of them to succeed governors of the opposing party.

The elections of 1910, nevertheless, widened the cleavage not so much between the two great parties as between the reactionary and progressive elements in the Republican party. In the Democratic party a similar but far less apparent division of opinion existed, which was destined to have its influence in shaping a course on the tariff in channels quite divergent from the party's traditional attitude. The views of President Taft toward the new movement were also somewhat modified, at least to the extent of publicly announcing a restoration of the patronage perquisites which he had formerly felt compelled to withdraw from those who gave indications of deserting the "Old Guard.”

The Progressives continued to gain strength throughout the year following the Congressional elections, winning many adherents, especially in the Middle and Far West; while there were not wanting signs that, more slowly to be sure, but none the less irresistibly, the revolt against former procedures in framing public policies and against the control which special privilege and interests were claimed to be exercising over legislation, was extending to the more conservative East. Concrete evidence of this numerical gain, as well as of the ever widening scope of the new movement

of protest, was furnished early in the year by the formation of a National Progressive Republican League for "the promotion of popular government and progressive legislation " through five specific reforms. These were: Popular election of United States Senators; direct primaries for all elective offices; Presidential primaries for choosing delegates to National conventions; amendments to State constitutions providing for the initiative, referendum and recall; and an effective corrupt practices act. Nearly all the "Progressive " Senators, now far outnumbering the original seven, and many well known leaders in the Republican party, were included in the membership. They were loyal party men who, nevertheless, demanding that party pledges should be fulfilled, regarded a failure to do so sufficient reason for protest; while, as for the advanced ground which they took on new policies, their hope at this stage was to bring the party into alignment. This turning point was President Taft's second great opportunity. How he met it in his third year remains to be seen.

The general criticism of the PayneAldrich bill was now being directed against specific schedules, even the President admitting that some features of the wool schedule were "indefensible"; and, as an extra session of Congress had been called to deal with Canadian reciprocity, the Democrats seized the opportunity to strike at the root of reciprocity, the tariff.

They first attacked the wool problem and succeeded by midsummer, with the help of the Progressives, in compiling a bill that reduced the former average duty on wools from 44 per cent. to 29 per cent. This and the free list bill, which took the duty off many articles used by farmers, especially agricultural implements, were vetoed by the President on August 11, 1911, on the ground that both measures were loosely drawn, and that neither himself nor Congress had as yet adequate information as a guide to the real merits of any tariff measure. The only trustworthy data, he asserted, regarding the "difference in cost of production at home and abroad" and other necessary items, were being prepared by the tariff board, and he requested Congress to await with patience the report ordered to be made in December. Then, to prevent log-rolling, revision was to be taken up systematically, scientifically, schedule by schedule.

Whatever else may be said about these vetoes and their effect, the large fact seems to be that Mr. Taft had shut his eyes to the verdict of the country the previous year, which demanded, if it demanded anything, a general downward revision of tariff rates by a Democratic Congress, and could not see that the present mood of the public was one of quick impatience with a slow, "scientific "treatment of the subject by an academic board under Republican direction. Theoretically this was an ideal pro

cedure, and, in the lapse of years, might prove to be the only just and equitable basis for tariff building; but what the people demanded just at that moment was relief from burdens that added to the "higher cost of living." This phrase touched a very sore and painful spot not only in social and individual life but in the issues of the day.

On the same day that the two vetoes were written, another bill was completed and sent to the President, who promptly vetoed it on the same grounds as the previous bills, adding that experts had discovered ludicrous discrepancies which made the bill, as he afterward declared," impossible." This was the This was the "cotton schedule " bill, which proposed much lower rates in cotton duties and included amendments reducing the iron and steel schedule, the chemical schedule, and the duties on all machinery used in cotton manufacture. This bill may have justified, more than the others had done, President Taft's insistence. on a tariff board; but no one had claimed for any of these bills perfection or finality. All they were designed for was to meet a persistent public demand, although it cannot be denied that there was in them also an element of political play.

In December of 1911 the tariff board had made its report on the wool schedule, which was exhaustive and voluminous, going even into the details of sheep-raising and the manufacture of wools of all variety. The President

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claimed that the report proved conclusively that the previous revision had been founded on insufficient data and, in particular, had not made accurate discriminations between grades of wool the "washed" and "unwashed," for instance; and he strongly recommended a new revision of this schedule as also of cotton, on which the board made a report early in 1912. The Democrats, assisted by many "Progressives," accordingly essayed revision on wool, cotton, chemicals, iron and steel, sending a wool bill and an iron and steel bill to the President who promptly vetoed them on the ground that their low rates would bring disaster to, or at least insufficiently protect, home industries. The House passed both these tariff-revision bills over the President's veto, but the Senate refused to do so.

Other important events of the year were on the plane of statesmanship rather than of politics- -the reciprocity negotiations with Canada and an effort to arrange arbitration treaties with Great Britain and France. Both failed of direct results, but were moves in the right direction, and it is not improbable that the way has been paved for more successful attempts later.

Since the termination of the Canadian treaty in 1866,* several overtures looking to new tariff arrangements have come to us from Canada, but accomplished nothing, and the later effort to establish closer relations

For the history of this and other reciprocity treaties see that title in index.

may be said to have received its first impulse from the visit of Mr. Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, to Ottawa. The next step was taken at the "Albany Conference" of March 30, 1910, when President Taft, Earl Grey, Governer-General of Canada, and the Canadian Minister of Finance, Mr. W. S. Fielding, entered into a "gentleman's agreement " to open negotiations for the drafting of a reciprocity treaty. Duplicate drafts were sent to the Senate and Parliament in January of 1911. The failure of the Senate to pass the bill at the regular session was made an occasion by the President to call Congress in special session on April 4 of that year. The measure was pushed to a conclusion and was signed by the President in August, and the country waited with much interest and curiosity for the action of the Canadian Parliament.

Bitter as was the opposition in the United States, that aroused on the other side of the border was still more intense. In the United States the objections, though inherently political, were nominally economic, the claim being the betrayal of the principles of protection and the injury done the farmers by having to meet the competition of fertile farms worked by relatively cheaper labor, and, in New England and the States of the Northwest bordering on Canada, the chief opposition was against the free admission of Canadian wheat and grain. The admission of paper and wood pulp, which was not dependent upon

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