United States Circuit Court forbidding its acts in constraint of trade. This injunction was declared permanent in February, 1903. An appeal was made to the Supreme Court and after two years of litigation a decision was rendered January 20, 1905, declaring the trust illegal.

It was the feeling of the public, however, that action directed merely at the trusts themselves would be unavailing unless the causes that tended to foster them were rendered inoperative. Two of these that recommended themselves strongly were the granting of rebates and secret freight rates to large shippers, and the pooling of railway interests, with the intention. of controlling the traffic of a region. The new century was barely begun. before it was clear that the railways of the country were rapidly passing into the control of a few individuals. One of the most dominating of these was J. J. Hill, whose wonderful enterprises had done so much toward building up the Northwest. Nevertheless when he and his associates endeavored to form a merger of three competing lines known as the Northern Securities Co., a halt was called under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce and the Sherman anti-trust laws. The decision, handed down April, 1903, was a victory for the people. The pool was dissolved and a precedent made for future activities against illegal operations of capital. Yet the victory on the whole was more apparent than real. The combinations hastened to establish

themselves on a basis of external legality, the laws being unable to prevent the formation of so-called " gentlemen's agreements," which effectually accomplished the object the corporate interests had in view. It was clear that the organization of capital was an assured fact, and one that could not be set aside by such indefinite legislation as the Sherman act. This is shown by the failure of all efforts made to destroy the trust principle by dissolving individual combinations. The Northern Securities, and numerous other decisions have been unavailing, and the trust, in its protean forms, controls the economic situation of America.

As the question of capital intimately involves that of labor it was to be expected that organization of the former along lines of such scope and comprehensiveness would produce a similar development with respect to the latter, and such has proved the case. The American laboring man had been organized for many years, but it was not until the last decade of the Nineteenth century that labor organization assumed the characteristics of a definite institution. The workingman saw the tremendous profits that arose from suppression of competition, and the economies of combined capital, and he saw in addition the possibilities inherent in such a system tending to limit his own freedom of action. To deal with many independ ent employers of labor was one thing; to deal with a few, or one group, was

quite another. Labor gained something in the industrial expansion inaugurated in 1899, but not, as it conceived, what it was entitled to. Hence the situation between the two primary elements of industrial life became more and more strained. The situation is best summed up by the statement that in 1881 there were 471 strikes and 6 lockouts; in 1903, 3,494 strikes and 154 lockouts. Some of the strikes of the latter period were of national importance and brought great loss and suffering, not only to the parties directly involved, but to the general public as well. Of these the most far-reaching was the strike in the anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania.

In 1899 there had been much unrest in the region, which finally resulted in the formation of an organization known as the United Mine Workers of America. This association in 1900 demanded a 10 per cent. increase in wages, and owing to the political pressure exerted upon the mine owners, was able to make an agreement with them obtaining such increase until April, 1902. At the expiration of this period the miners endeavored to arrange for a settlement of the wage scale and hours of labor for the forthcoming year, but the owners refused to consider any propositions whatsoever. The leader of the miners was John Mitchell, a self-educated man, who had worked in the mines, and whose abilities as an organizer made him the logical spokesman of the movement. Opposed to him was

George F. Baer, president of the Reading Coal and Iron Company, whose tactless management of the situation led to disastrous results. His reply to the request to arbitrate the difficulty was characteristic of the man. "Anthracite mining," he said, "is a business, not a religious, sentimental, or academic proposition, which accurately complements another statement he is reported to have made, that he and his kind were "Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom had entrusted the property interests of this country." The miners appealed to Senator Hanna, whose efforts to bring about an agreement were without avail, so on May 12 a general strike was declared in which 147,000 men were involved. The coal operators, trusting in their resources, adopted a waiting policy, hoping to tire the miners out, but this was rendered fruitless by the passage of a resolution at a National Convention of Mine Workers at Indianapolis to appropriate $2,000,000 a month to the support of the strikers. This startling testimonial of the faith the working men had in their cause had the effect of indefinitely extending the contest, and placed the owners at signal disadvantage. The strike dragged on into the summer, the situation becoming so serious that the President directed Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, to investigate and make a report with the view of remedying the same. Cases of violence against property and persons occurred, which resulted

finally in the dispatch of the state militia to the center of disturbance. On July 30 and on October 6 the entire national guard of Pennsylvania to the number of 10,000 were sent to the region.

The attitude of the laboring man is revealed by the following quotation from the Scranton Labor Herald:

"Yes, let us have more militia; let us have more and more military sent into the coal regions; let them come till every hill and vale is bristling with bayonets, and the 'tented cities' of our military power proclaim to the world that peace reigns, and no scenes of disorder mar the peaceful attitude of the mine workers now on strike.

"After this is done and the strike still goes on, let the representatives of the lawless coal trust get down from their exalted position, and meet the issues before them as men of intelli

gence, instead of continuing the chattering monkey act which they have been performing all these long months which have marked the progress of the strike.

"The calling out of the entire National Guard of Pennsylvania can not start the mines, as has been proved by the experience of the localities where the military has been stationed during the past few months.

"Some weeks ago THE LABOR HERALD stated that the coal strike was an educational contest. This has been demonstrated during the past few weeks. Labor has learned for the first time that the trust question is already beyond the control of our government officials. Here was a lesson worth the losses of the strike. The American people had been led to believe that there was some semblance of law which could be brought into force in curbing the trust evil when the necessity arose.

"The efforts of President Roosevelt to bring the coal strike to an end in the interest of the

public has disproved the suggestions that any law exists whereby the people may be protected against the monopolistic development of recent years

"Let the mine workers stand firm with due regard for law and order, and it is up to the coal trust to prove the blatant boasts of its representatives at Washington. The mines will not be started till the mine workers decide to accept concessions offered by the companies."

In the meanwhile the price of coal in the large cities was soaring to an unprecedented point, 20 to 30 dollars for a single ton, and little to be obtained at that. Winter was approaching, and already schools and hospitals had been closed for want of fuel, and much suffering was being experi-. enced. The mine-owners had declared that if protected by military force they would open the mines, but there was a Pennsylvania State law to the effect that no one could mine coal in the anthracite field without holding a certificate of experience, granted only after two years' apprenticeship and examination, and as all of these belonged to the United Mine Workers, the owners could get no men to do the work. The 40,000 holders of these certificates were all union men and the operators were helpless, and should have seen how untenable was their position, yet in spite of this fact, and in spite of tremendous pressure, financial, political, and above all, that of public opinion, which was brought to bear upon them, the operators became still more defiant, and refused to concede a single point. They assumed that the scarcity of coal would cause public opinion to react on the strikers, and hence would cause the dispatch of Federal troops to the region and the passage of legislation that would permit their cause to win. reckoned They however without their host, for public opinion took It quite the contrary side. universally conceded that some way must be discovered to make the

was

mine owners come to terms, even if it involved the taking over of the coal properties by the government. By September the problem had ceased to be local and assumed such national proportions that it could no longer be ignored. President Roosevelt accordingly called a conference of the warring factions, October 3, 1901. This he did in spite of the fact that the mine owners had threatened his political extinction if he intervened in the affair. The President recognized his lack of power to intervene in an official capacity, but appealed to their patriotism, pleading that they sacrifice all personal considerations for the good of the country. Mr. Mitchel agreed to the appointment of a board of arbitration, and pledged his organization to accept its terms. The others, however, denounced the government as a

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contemptible failure that was compromising itself with the instigators of violence and crime."

Their defiance and the arrogance of their attitude had but one result: the closing of the conference with nothing gained save injury to their cause. They had also made an enemy of a man who not only dearly loved a fight, but who had sufficient power back of him to carry the fight to a finish. In addition public indignation was rising to such a pitch that the President perceived that further temporizing would prove disastrous. The result was the immediate capitulation of the mine owners. What method was employed

by him in gaining his point is not wholly clear, the generally accepted theory being that he threatened to appoint a committee which would investigate the situation in the anthracite region, particular attention to be given to the relationship between the railways and the coal mining companies. Whether this is the explanation or not, suffice it to say that J. Pierpont Morgan, after a conference with President Baer, sought an interview with President Roosevelt and offered on the part of the coal operators to accept the arbitration of a commission to be appointed by him, the decision of the same to be binding for a period of three years. He endeavored to dictate the character of the personnel of this commission, but the miners refused to accept his proposal, declaring that the President should be free to appoint whom he pleased. The operators were forced to accept these terms, and accordingly, at a convention of the United Mine Workers at Wilkesbarre, October 20, the strike was declared at an end.

The President appointed on this commission Judge George Gray, of the United States Circuit Court; the Commissioner of Labor, Carroll D. Wright; Thomas H. Watkins; General John M. Wilson; E. E. Clark, and Archbishop John L. Spalding. This commission was not only representative, but it was thoroughly equipped for the task before it. Exhaustive hearings were held, each side of the controversy being given ample

opportunity to present its evidence. The result, however, was a sweeping victory for the strikers. A 10 per cent. increase in wages was awarded; an eight-hour day after April 1, 1903; an increase of 1 per cent. in wages to all employees for each 5 cents added to the price of coal f. o. b. at the New York harbor. Other findings were also made, among which was the establishment of a permanent board of conciliation for settling future disputes, the removal of all limitations placed on the output of miners; and the cessation of discriminatory acts against non-union miners. The agreement was to remain in force until March 31, 1906. The commission also recommended the discontinuance of the employment of a "coal and iron police, a stricter enforcement of the law regarding the employment of children, and State and Federal machinery for the investigation of difficulties similar to those referred to this commission." port rendered March 21, 1903.)*

(Re

One of the most important results of this arbitration was unquestionably the hastening of the passage of an act organizing the Department of Commerce and Labor, an important function of which is to perform the duties defined in the quotation from the report of the Anthracite Arbitration Commission. This new branch

* Another strike took place in the gold mining districts of Colorado in 1903-4. Though local in scope this also commanded public attention by the extremes to which the leaders on both sides permitted themselves to go. These disturbances lasted until the autumn of 1904.

of the Federal service was formed by a law passed by Congress, February 11, 1903. Bureaus from several departments, especially those relating to industries, commerce and transportation, statistics, immigration, and other kindred phases, were united under the direction of a new Cabinet officer. The first secretary under this act was George B. Cortelyou, appointed February 16, 1903; who was followed by Victor H. Metcalf in 1904, Oscar S. Straus in 1907, and Charles Nagel in 1909.

The prestige gained by the United States in international affairs as a result of the war with Spain soon began to bear fruitage. One result was the restoration of amicable relations with the German empire, which had been disturbed by the activities of the latter in the Philippines. The German Kaiser made a number of overtures of friendship, one of which was the sending of his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, in January, 1902, on a visit to America. The ostensible purpose of this was the launching of a yacht which was being built near New York City, and which Miss Alice Roosevelt was invited to christen, but the underlying reason was clearly to remove a suspicion cherished for a long time by the American people with regard to the unfriendly intentions of the Emperor William.

The restoration of an entente cordiale between the two nations stood in good stead during another one of the perennial endeavors of the European