"Until Congress shall direct otherwise, it will be the duty of the executive to possess and hold the Philippines.

That the inhabitants of the Philippines will be benefited is my unshaken belief.

"No imperial designs lurk in the American mind. They are alien to American sentiment."

The first Philippine Commission* consisted of President Jacob Gould Schurman, of Cornell University; Major-General E. S. Otis; Rear-Admiral George Dewey; Hon. Charles Denby, of Evansville, Ind., formerly minister to China; and Professor Dean C. Worcester, of the University of Michigan. It thus contained representatives from widely different classes of American citizens, yet each for some reason had peculiar fitness for the task assigned him. Upon the civilian members of the Commission would of necessity fall the burden of the investigation, yet throughout the sessions they had the advice and coöperation of the others. The report of the Commission, issued in 1900, contains in its four volumes a most exhaustive study of the social, economic, and political conditions of the islands.

The result of this careful investigation only served to corroborate the impression held by the administration that the Filipinos as yet were incapable of controlling their own destinies. The civilian commissioners went to the Philippines carrying with them the President's personal sug*Appointed, January 18, 1899; first session, March 20, 1899; report delivered, November 2, 1899.

VOL. X 13

gestions as to the policy to be pursued, and possessed more or less by his idealistic enthusiasm regarding the duty of the United States to the natives. Their experiences in Manila had a decidedly cooling effect upon their enthusiasm, but increased their sense of America's duty. In their preliminary report to the President the results of their investigation are summed up:

"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the indispensable need from the Filipino point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos can not stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of government which our eignty entails; and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands."

sover

From the purely abstract point of view, the disappointment and indignation of the Filipino leaders at their treatment by the United States was entirely justified. The last revolt against the Spanish, to their mind, was not far from the goal of attainment when Dewey's ships appeared upon the scene; the Spanish army apparently controlled little more than

Manila itself.* Aguinaldo, too, from the treatment of his envoy, Agoncillo, at Washington, saw clearly that there was no hope from that quarter, and when the treaty of Paris finally settled the questions of the war, the question of the right of the Filipinos was wholly ignored. The result was the transformation of the Filipinos from quasi allies to avowed enemies, and again Manila was practically in a state of siege; this time with the American forces instead of the Spaniards defending the inner lines and the Filipinos surrounding. It was a menacing situation and so pregnant with evil possibilities that Gen. Otis entered into an agreement with Aguinaldo to the effect that the soldiers of neither side should enter the lines of the other.

It was at this time that Aguinaldo learned that the authorities of the United States stood irrevocably in the way of all despoiling of the inhabitants, Spanish or other. The attitude of the Filipino leader, too, had much to do with the condition of affairs for it became more and more arrogant, his real purpose being revealed in his proclamation of June 18, 1898, in which he styled himself dictator. Encouraged by the hope that the strong anti-annexation movement in the States would develop power enough to tie the hands of the Executive and the army, he persisted

Aguinaldo was offered $800,000 by Spain to suppress the revolt, certain reforms, in addition being promised. $400,000 of this was paid, which Aguinaldo used in preparation for renewed hostilities. He was transported to the Philippines on one of Dewey's ships, soon after the battle of Manila Bay.

in a course that could have but one result-armed hostilities.

It was clear that the insurrectos had decided to force the conflict, and members of Aguinaldo's forces were continually passing the American lines in spite of the agreement to the contrary. United States pickets were often shot at in the dark, and one narrowly escaped assassination by knife. No American was safe from molestation, and so audacious did they finally become that a party of engineers engaged in a topographical survey was captured and imprisoned at Malolos on no pretext whatsoever. For months the inhabitants of Manila were beset with the specter of rapine and murder, and the greatest vigilance on the part of the army was necessary to check the malicious contrivings of a cunning foe. The climax came on February 4, when a strong force of the insurrectos, headed by one of Aguinaldo's officers, endeavored to force a passage into the city across the Santa Mesa Bridge. Bridge.

The sentry, Private Gray

son, of the Nebraska Volunteers, ordered the party to halt, and upon their refusal fired, killing the officer. That the Filipinos had planned to precipitate a crisis is shown by the fact that immediately there was an attack on the entire American lines. The firing was continued throughout the entire night but the American ships took no part, lest they do injury to their own men. The Filipinos did not advance, trusting that the attack would cause an uprising of sympathizers in Manila, for it was proved by proclamations to the natives after

wards found in the streets that there was a widespread plot to massacre all foreigners and others opposed to the plans of the insurrectos. On the same day Aguinaldo had issued a vindictive proclamation to his followers declaring war against the Americans, which he followed up by others in a similar strain. Another complication was the attitude of the Spaniards, who encouraged Aguinaldo, and did much harm to the American cause by sending false reports regarding the acts of the army, and many, indeed, were reported to have entered the Filipino army.

The effort to create an uprising in Manila was a failure, although numerous incendiary fires occurred, the greatest damage being done in the Tonga district, the native quarters. The fires were extinguished with great difficulty as the work of the firemen was interfered with as much as possible by the natives cutting the hose and damaging the engines. At daybreak the attack was renewed, the army now being supported by the navy, which did much execution with shells hurled into the trenches of the enemy. Against this double attack the insurgents could make no headway, and during the course of the day (February 5) their firing degenerated into intermittent skirmishes. Step by step their line was driven back until it occupied a position four to six miles further from the city. One of the objective points of the enemy was apparently the pumping station on Santolan hill, which was damaged by them but later repaired. The desperate nature of their enterprise is

indicated by this effort to destroy the water supply of a city of 500,000 inhabitants, with the untold suffering that would have followed. Fortunately, however, they were frustrated in this attempt.

As the result of the three days' fighting around Manila, San Juan del Monte, Santa Ana, San Pedro Macati, Santa Mesa, Lomia, and the Santolan pumping station fell into the hands of the American forces.

For nearly a fortnight there were no new developments, the Americans contenting themselves with strengthening their positions, and the insurgents busying themselves in attempting to foment a general uprising. Aguinaldo issued a "most barbarous order given inhabitants of city by insurgent government to rise en masse on night of 15th; the scheme defeated by activity of provost marshal who had city well in hand."*

In the meantime General Miller had been ordered to Iloilo, the second important city in the islands and a stronghold of the insurgents, and had been stationed there since January 1, 1899, with two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery (18th United States Infantry; 51st Iowa Volunteers and Battery G, 6th Artillery). By specific command of President McKinley, who did not desire to precipitate a rupture with the Filipinos, no active measures were taken, the men remaining on board board the transports under the guns of their convoy, the Baltimore, until the outbreak at Manila. Reinforced by the

*Gen. Otis's report to Adjutant-General, February 18.

1st Tennessee Volunteers, a landing was made February 7, and the town captured four days later. The native portion of the town was burned, but no damage done to foreign residents.

The logic of events thus conspired to verify the President's cautious attitude. Already by these acts the Filipino leaders had revealed their true characteristics, and it became clear to the President that the uprising must be suppressed with no uncertain hand, or the Philippine Islands for an indefinite period would prove a curse to their people and to the people of the United States. In spite of the fact, therefore, that he was bitterly assailed in the press and on the platform as a military despot, the President called upon Congress to enact legislation increasing the regular army to 65,000 men, and to permit the calling for 35,000 volunteers for service in the Philippines. This request was granted in the act of March 2, 1899, and the administration was free to plan for the suppression of the Tagalog revolt, and for the future welfare of the islands.

That the uprising was both powerful and widespread was evident from the developments at Manila, and General Otis began preparations for a campaign planned to suppress the revolt in the entire island of Luzon. The defenses of Manila were strengthened so that they could be held by a smaller force, thus permitting the organization of a strong army for the field operations. The main body of the Filipinos was massed to the north of Manila, their headquarters being at Malolos, the capital of the Filipino

government, 30 miles away on the line of the Manila and Dagupan Railway. It was planned to direct two columns against this place. It was reported that Malolos, and its near neighbors, Calumpit and Baliuag, were being strongly fortified, and made depots for munitions of war, in readiness for a movement against Manila. The Filipinos numbered some 10,000 men, and were under the leadership of the one really able general in the army, General Luna. It was planned to advance against these points by the way of Novaliches, a stronghold of the enemy a few miles nearer Manila. In pursuance of this plan, the American forces were divided into two divisions: one under General Lawton, who had recently arrived with reinforcements; the other, under General MacArthur. General Lawton's division was formed of the brigades of Generals Ovenshine, King and Wheaton; that of General MacArthur, the brigades of Generals Hall, H. G. Otis, and Hale.

The movement was initiated on March 25, the advance of the 2d division under General MacArthur being hampered not only by the constant attacks of the enemy, but also by the natural difficulties of the region. The land was elevated only a few feet above the level of the sea, which extended many tidal rivers and estuaries into the district occupied by the soldiers. In many cases these were very deep, and as the Filipinos made it a point to destroy all the bridges they could on the line of retreat, it

was often necessary for the soldiers to swim the streams. Flooded rice fields and dense jungles added to the dangers and discomforts of the campaign. Every inch of the advance was stubbornly contested by the Filipinos. In these operations against Malolos, MacArthur had, in addition to his regularly assigned brigades, that of General Wheaton, who was directed to advance along the railway and join the main force at Novaliches. A strong force of the enemy was met by him at Malinta, which was captured March 25-26, and heavy losses were experienced at the bridge crossing the Tuliahan river, the gallant Colonel Egbert of the 22d Infantry being one of the victims. On March 26, Wheaton's brigade united with the main body, and the combined forces attacked Polo, capturing the same and driving the enemy back with heavy losses. The twelve or more miles from Polo to Malolos was a continuous battle, collisions occurring at Mariloa, Bocave, and a last desperate stand was made by the Filipinos about a a mile from their capital. Their works, however, were carried, and the American forces entered Malolos on March 31, only to find a deserted and burning town, with the enemy in full retreat towards Calumpit and Quingua. Aguinaldo then established his headquarters and capital at San Fernando, some 40 miles north of Malolos.

To gain Malolos, however, was one thing, but to hold it was quite another. The enemy had been driven back on

every occasion, yet at a fearful cost, the dead and wounded for the campaign being 534. The attempt to surround the Filipino forces by a combined flank and frontal attack had been a failure, the enemy retreating to safety before the movement was well under way. Nevertheless, the territory along the coast and the line of the railway for 50 miles was cleared of the enemy, so that future operations towards the north would be unhampered. The campaign had been an arduous one both on officers and men, and so, after the capture of Malolos, MacArthur's division remained inactive at that point until April 25.

But the position was far from a secure one, and should the enemy succeed in establishing themselves between Malolos and Manila, MacArthur's entire force would be endangered. To prevent such a movement, Generals Hale and Wheaton were directed to advance against Calumpit and San Fernando. The enemy, under General Luna, were strongly entrenched at the former place, and as they had destroyed the bridge, it was impossible to drive them from their position. The problem was solved, nevertheless, by the Kansas regiment under command of Colonel Funston, which attained the opposite bank by swimming in spite of a fierce musketry fire. By the means of boats found on the other side the entire force was transferred. The advance against San Fernando was begun. May 4, General Hale's brigade march