ence, but, as did the heroes of Saratoga and Yorktown, we respect too deeply our cause to disgrace it with barbarism and cowardice."

There is much pathos in the position of this old hero of years of struggle for Cuban freedom, who when he thought that his long deferred dream of an independent Cuba was at last to be realized, should have that hope apparently snatched away by those who claimed to come as saviors.

Nor did he ever realize it on this earth, for long before America made good her pledge to Cuba, Calixto Garcia was in his grave.

A brighter phase of the end of the Santiago campaign resulted from the treatment of the Spanish prisoners of war by the American soldiers. Both armies had learned in their struggle to respect the prowess of the other. The wonderful defense of El Caney and San Juan and the equally heroic attack taught a lesson to each that could not be learned in any other way. The Spanish, also, learned that the American was far from being the pig " and money-grubber that the foreign prints had portrayed, and

when they found that they were cared for and fed and clothed as well as the American soldier himself, their gratitude was unbounded. The treatment, indeed, was so different from what they had been led to expect that the Spanish soldiers addressed a letter extraordinary later to the soldiers of the American army, the spirit of which is expressed in the following sentences:

"We would not be fulfilling our duty as wellborn men, in whose breasts there lives gratitude and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without sending to you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and farewell. We fought you with ardor, with all our strength, endeavor. ing to gain the victory, but without the slightest rancor or hate toward the American nation. * You have complied exactly with all the laws and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most civilized nations of the world, have given honorable burial to the dead of the vanquished, have cured their wounded with great humanity, have respected and cared for your prisoners and their comfort, and lastly, to us whose condition was terrible, you have given us freely of food, of your stock of medicines, and you have honored us with distinction and courtesy, for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost harmony.

From 11,000 Spanish soldiers.

PEDRO LOPEZ DE CASTILLO,
Soldier of Infantry."

the same

From the very beginning of the war with Spain, Major-General Miles desired the first aggressive movements of the American army to be directed against the enemy in Porto Rico, for he considered this island the key to Spanish power in the West Indies. The climate was more healthful than that of Cuba, and dangers to be encountered from fevers and malaria during a summer campaign were vastly less than in Cuba. The fact that more than twice as many men died of fevers as from Spanish bullets during the Santiago campaign is alone proof enough that it would have been a wise precaution to have considered the relative climates of the two islands in planning operations; and when the vast improvement this century has made in sanitation and medicine over a hundred years ago is considered, it is impossible not to marvel that out of an equal force of men, we lost by disease as many as the British army lost during their operations on the Island of Cuba in 1762. Aside from the humane consideration of the welfare of the soldiers, General

Miles offered other important reasons for selecting Porto Rico for the scene of the first activities. This island was Spain's supply station in the West Indies. With Porto Rico occupied, a strategical position of first importance would be gained, and the line of communication with Spain severed. An interesting letter to Senator Morgan of Alabama, written by Admiral Ammen from Washington, February 3, prior to the opening of the war, shows not only remarkable insight into the Spanish situation, but outlines a plan of operations which if carried out might have proved successful:

"If Spain chooses to make war, we should at once take Puerto Rico, which will leave her without a point except the island of Cuba. Then I would say we should knock all their defences down except those of Havana, for the comfort and in aid of the insurgents, but not land a man on the island, as we should do on Puerto Rico, which we should occupy with a considerable force. As for Havana, we might try our hand as between her guns and ours afloat. As for the Spanish Navy, I have the idea that it is in a very bad condition, and it would be a question of relative forces whether we should engage it."

About a month after Lieutenant Rowan performed his famous feat of

carrying "A message to Garcia." Lieutenant Henry Whitney sailed for Porto Rico on a similar errand, and under disguise managed to explore a great deal of the southern portion of the island, gathering information which proved of inestimable value later on, and, as did Rowan, daily risking his life in the undertaking. In his interesting account of General Miles' campaign in Porto Rico, Lieutenant Whitney does not mention that it was he who performed this valuable service, yet it is interesting to note that he had since been raised to the rank of not only captain but assistant adjutant-general, nor is it difficult to infer why.

It was General Miles' policy to do nothing by halves. From the minutest to the most important detail he was scrupulously exact. It is characteristic, then, that after receiving permission from Washington to proceed against Porto Rico, he delayed preparations until he had looked after the health of the fever-stricken men of the 5th Corps in Santiago. His last telegram, sent on shipboard before sailing, was one of caution and directions regarding the sanitation of the camps, and the prevention of the spread of the disease.

Now that fever was rife among Shafter's men, it would have been folly to have taken even those not yet infected from among them, and he therefore found himself obliged to fall back almost entirely upon the forces he had personally conducted thither to aid Shafter. From Wash

ington he was promised immediate reinforcements as well as necessary implements for disembarkation, and with these promises and the 3,314 men he had already, he set sail on July 21. A weary altercation with Admiral Sampson regarding the convoy of battleships had added to the delay, and as two of the ships accompanying bore troops, and could therefore be classed as part of the transports, it may be said the convoy consisted of only the battleship Massachusetts, the converted yachts Gloucester and Dixie. The cruisers Columbia and Yale were the two others of the convoy which bore troops. Of transports proper, there were the Lampasas, Neuces, City of Macon, Comanche, Unionist, Specialist, Rita and Stillwater.

It had been planned to land at Fajardo, on the northeast coast, but this intention had somehow been communicated to the world at large by the ever-vigilant and incautious American press, and when General Miles realized that his landing place had become known to the Spanish he decided to modify his plans without notice. Besides this, he was influenced by learning that troops were being concentrated at Fajardo. The water there was shallow, and as a result would probably make it difficult to get the troops ashore. In striking contrast to the undesirable Fajardo, Guanica, on the southern coast of the island, offered him every advantage, and more. It was of 42 fathoms of water; it had within its harbor sugar

lighters and launches which could be used in disembarking, and above all, it was unmined and undefended. Guanica was really a sea-port of the large city of Ponce, only a few miles distant, which he learned was also undefended and from which an excellent military road lead to the capital, San Juan. All of these reasons for changing the place of landing the Major-General made known to the commander-in-chief of the convoy, and received in return the latter's cheerful coöperation with the new plan.

Captain Whitney's reconnaissance of southern Porto Rico a month be

fore, gave ample information regard ing conditions there, and General Miles knew that in altering his plans he was doing nothing blindly. He understood that four miles from Guanica was a railroad leading into Ponce, and that at this city he would have cable and telegraph facilities, as well as the advantage of the splendid road to the capital.

The equipment for disembarkation promised by the authorities at Washington had never come. "He had very little more means for disembarking on a strange and hostile shore than did Columbus when he sailed westward on adjoining seas some four centuries before," writes Lieutenant Whitney. To have put into Fajardo without means of getting ashore would have been utmost folly, and realizing this, General Miles sent a vessel to Cape San Juan to direct the expected reinforcements southward,

and himself turned his transports and convoy toward Guanica. With lights out and silence prevailing, the vessels clung near the shore, and safely passed through the narrow channel that separates Porto Rico from Hayti. On the morning of July 25 they reached Guanica in safety.

Commander Wainwright desired to take his cruiser, the Gloucester, and ascertain if there were any danger from mines. Permission having been gained, he entered the harbor and traversed the waters again and again with little thought for his own safety, finally reporting all well and himself leading the way into port, firing upon the city as he went. Some of the Gloucester's shells fell among the Spanish troops, who were occupying the town, upon which they promptly retreated, offering no resistance. The marines were then put on shore and also two companies of the provisional engineer battalion and some companies of infantry. They formed outposts and a skirmish line, but the Spaniards were fleeing, and the inhabitants of the town, dazed and terrified, also began to take flight, leaving their little houses to seek shelter among the surrounding hills. This terror and flight were the results of stories circulated among the ignorant natives by the Spanish troops as they had done at Santiago de Cuba. They represented the Americans as cowards and bullies who would despoil the natives and destroy their homes. The relief and rejoicing were

just