"The approach to Santiago and the attack upon it was to be made from the east over a narrow road, in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla toward Santiago. This seemed the only feasible plan.

"On the morning of the twentysecond the army commenced to disembark at Daiquiri."

The above plans were carried out with more or less success. If the Spaniards had fired upon the Americans from above as they neared the landing in the small launches, they would have had the American troops at a great disadvantage, but no such thing was done, the troops landing with no molestation beyond a few scattered shots. Four days after the arrival, the troops were all safely on shore, and nothing remained but the slow and tedious work of unloading the supply-ships. This was much retarded by the loss of the tug and lighters referred to in Shafter's account of the voyage.

Daiquiri (Baiquiri) had been selected as the landing place instead of Guantanamo. It was not only near Santiago, but also the center of operations for the Cuban army, whose assistance was relied upon to keep the Spanish forces in check during disembarkation. General Lawton's division was the first to land, and to the surprise of all no resistance was experienced at Daiquiri, the enemy vanishing in the hills and thick growth

of chaparral as the Americans advanced against them. Demajayabo and Juragua were occupied, the Spanish endeavoring to burn the latter as they retreated. Juragua was used as temporary headquarters by General Lawton. Falling back in front of Lawton, the enemy finally made a stand at Siboney, but this was also taken by him without difficulty. The capture of this point gave Shafter a landing-place as good as that at Daiquiri, and eight miles nearer Santiago. The rest of the army was accordingly disembarked at that place.

The first collision of importance occurred at the plantation of Las Guasimas, near Sevilla, where the Spanish forces had a strongly entrenched position. General Young's brigade during the night of June 23 had advanced beyond Lawton's position, after an arduous march through a tropical tangle. "Gen. Young's force consisted of one squadron of the 1st Cavalry, one of the 10th Cavalry, two of the 1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, in all 964 officers and men." (Shafter, Report to Adjutant-General.) The 1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry was a unique organization, the conception of Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who resigned from that important position in order to become lieutenant-colonel of the regiment. This had been raised in 50 days, and was composed of young men from every section of the country. Many of its troopers were ranchmen

and cowboys, whence came its nickname, the Rough Riders, but with them, mingling on a basis of social equality, were scions of ancient families, sons of multi-millionaires, football heroes; in fact, a most astonishing conglomeration, who had only two elements in common: patriotism and a thirst for adventure. Leonard Wood, to whom the command of this regiment was given, had been a surgeon in the regular army, and gained a medal of honor for bravery in Apache wars, having contributed largely to the capture of Geronimo.

These were the men ordered to lead the advance towards Las Guasimas at daybreak. Both Wheeler and Young knew that the point towards which their forces were moving would probably be strongly defended, as it was in a sense the key to the valley that extended to Santiago. Therefore, guided by Cuban scouts, the brigade was formed into columns and began its advance along rough mountain trails. The column under General Young discovered the enemy first, and, after waiting for the Rough Riders to arrive, the attack was begun by the field guns. The reply that was received, however, was disconcerting; it was clear that the force defending the block-house and entrenchments was far stronger than was anticipated. So furious was the volleying that it was necessary for the men at the guns to get under cover for a while. General Wheeler, too, thought it wise to send a request for reinforcements; which, however, did not come until

after the Spanish had been driven from their positions. Both regulars and volunteers charged up the steep sides of the hills, undisturbed by the torrent of Mauser bullets that was tearing the bushes to shreds on all sides. The Rough Riders, indeed, covered themselves with with especial glory. Both officers and men were filled with the frenzy of battle and rushed on, ignoring both the obstacles of nature and the bullets. At the first volley, Captain Capron, who was leading the advance guard, was killed, but his men did not hesitate, only continuing the charge with additional grimness of purpose. "They kept pushing forward as though they were going to take us with their hands,' said a Spanish soldier after the battle. Those that were not fighting were dead, it seemed, for men seriously wounded were seen to wounded were seen to prop themselves against tree-trunks and coolly continue to load and fire.

The battle of Las Guasimas has been cited as nothing more than a skirmish, but in its results it had a very great influence upon the development of the campaign. In the first place the moral effect of a victory, gained by less than a thousand men against a strongly entrenched force of nearly three thousand, was alone a distinct advantage to the invading forces. The army had received its first test, and had come through the ordeal gloriously. From that time on the American soldier knew that he was going to win; the Spanish soldier was afraid that he wouldn't, and an attitude of mind

is important in critical situations. Again, by falling back from Las Guasimas, the Spanish army lost an important strategical point, and by so doing, made it easy for the American forces to advance without serious opposition almost to the inner defenses of Santiago. Had Las Guasimas and

Sevilla been held, the siege of Santiago would have been protracted; Cervera's squadron would, it may be, have remained longer in the harbor, and the tropical summer would have claimed a toll of strong men far more terrible than the one the records already show.

The attack on

The moment Cervera's fleet found sanctuary within the harbor of Santiago the whole plan of the war as proposed by the administration underwent a transformation. At one stroke, the scene of activities was transferred from Havana to Santiago, resulting in the creation of entirely new strategical problems. If Havana had remained the center of operations, the result would have been a long and arduous siege arduous siege directed against a place defended by strong fortifications and occupied by an army of approximately 60,000 men; with a far-lengthened death roll from wounds and disease, and all the horrors attendant upon the siege of a great city. With Cervera at Santiago, however, the problems of the war became greatly simplified. Both land and sea operations were directed towards one point: the destruction of

the Spanish fleet. The theory was entertained that its elimination would mean the end of the war, which proved to be correct in the end. The establishment of American naval supremacy meant the isolation of the entire army of Spain in Cuba, rendering the situation of a force that numbered 200,000 men wholly untenable.*

The disorderly retreat of the Spanish before the army at Las Guasimas gave the American soldiers an erro

* Spanish forces in Cuba: Infantry, 127,649; marines, 3,030; cavalry, 8,535; artillery, 5,619; engineers, 5,460; civil guard, 5,009; irregular infantry, 29,131; volunteers and guerillas, 12.387; total, 189.526. Spanish forces in the Province of Santiago de Cuba: City of Santiago, 9,430; Guantanamo. 6,082; Baracoa, 732; Sagua de Tanamo, 720: Holguin, 8,364; Manzanillo, 8,668; total, 33,996. These figures, however, are extremely conservative, as the United States Evacuation Commission estimates that there were 220,000 Spanish regulars and volunteers under arms in Cuba; while the Anuario de Espana for 1898 places the total at 278,457.

The

neous idea of the enemy's fighting abilities. They thought that all they would have to do would be to advance boldly, and the foe would flee before them. The Spanish, however, while displaying a feline tendency to take flight in the open, when cornered and entrenched could fight with a tenacity and ferocity equally cat-like. officers who planned to storm and capture El Caney before breakfast, take San Juan in passing, and eat luncheon in Santiago, were destined to a surprise, and ran upon sheathed claws they little dreamed of. In the first place El Caney, the first position to be attacked was far better fortified and defended than was anticipated, and as orders had been given to envelop the city with the whole army, it was impossible to send reinforcements in sufficient quantity to carry the point quickly. Indeed, the extension of a force of less than 16,000 over a territory of 20 miles or more was a serious error, resulting in the necessity of fighting two battles at the same time (El Caney and San Juan) and in a division of the army that might have been fatal. Had the Spanish been possessed of the daring and the initiative of the American the story of Santiago would have been something quite different.*

The Spanish, after being driven from their position at Guasimas, slowly retreated towards Santiago, leaving the village of Sevilla unguarded. This was occupied by Gen

* See Sargent, The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba, vol. ii., pp. 134–166.

men

eral Wheeler's cavalry the day after the battle (June 24), the whole army (to which was added Garcia's Cubans) being concentrated at this point by July 1. Here activities were suspended for a while (from June 24– 29) in order to give the men a breathing spell, and to complete the landing of supplies and guns. The rest was purely theoretical, however, for the were undergoing experiences nearly as distressing as that of actual fighting. Many were toiling to get the field guns from the landing-places, and all were subject to the rigors of a tropical climate in its unkindest moods. The rainy season was beginning to set in with all of its horrors. To the unacclimated soldiers, the sudden changes from icy showers to periods of prostrating heat were something almost beyond endurance, and soon the effects of the tropical fevers were shown in the decreased efficiency of the army. The men shivered from cold during the rains, and from fever during the heat, in many cases without the relief of medicines, as many of the regimental medicinechests had been left on the transWhile their clothes were dry

ports.*

"At the disembarkation, I supposed that each regimental surgeon would take his medical chest in the boat with him; a few did, but the majority left them behind, and there was considerable trouble to get them ashore and to their owners. I directed that the first three wagons set up should be devoted to carrying these medicine-chests of the regiments to the front. The chief surgeon reported to me that at no time did he have a full supply of medicines as he required, and on four separate occasions he reported that the medicines were virtually exhausted.". Shafter, The Capture of Santiago de Cuba, in Century Magazine (February, 1899).

ing, they hovered over the halfextinguished camp-fires, begging and borrowing quinine. Mingled with these distresses were the minor discomforts of the tenacious mud, the nauseating odors of decaying vegetation, tormenting insects and land crabs, and, intensifying all the other discomforts, the tedium of an enforced delay. Sickness was prevalent throughout the whole camp. General Wheeler for a while was too ill to perform his duties, and General Shafter's health, throughout the entire campaign, was so precarious that on several occasions it was thought that he would be forced to relinquish the command. But retire he would not, despite his dislike of a land beneath whose noon-day sun he dared not venture. Taking food for the first time in four days," he cabled at one time to Washington, yet during that time he was giving orders and planning his campaign with characteristic caution. Throughout the correspondence of General Shafter runs the note of humanity. To spare the over-taxed soldiers, to look to the safety of the aged, the women and children in besieged Santiago, all of this he urged, and more, on the authorities at Washington. To add to the difficulties of his position, Shafter was well aware of the imperative necessity for immediate action. Every

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"In the latter days of the siege [Santiago] I was feeding 20,000 of our soldiers, 5,000 Cuban soldiers, and 15,000 to 18,000 refugees, issuing about 40,000 rations daily."-Shafter, The Capture of Santiago de Cuba, in Century Magazine (February, 1899).

hour was precious, for a large reinforcement of Linares' army by General Pando was expected at any time. He counted upon the halting of this force by the Cubans, but as the days passed he grew more and more hopeless regarding the trustworthy nature of the native allies. Indeed, after the battles of El Caney and San Juan, Escario's little body of men found no difficulty in reaching Santiago.

The city of Santiago was guarded by a strong line of outer defenses, which followed a long ridge running from Aguadores, two miles east of the mouth of the harbor, to El Caney, a village four miles to the northeast of the city. Closer in to the city, and between these points was the hill of San Juan, strongly protected by a blockhouse and well-constructed trenches. This fortification was unquestionably the key to Santiago, and its capture forced Cervera's squadron from Santiago harbor. Under General Linares, at Santiago and its environs, were approximately 13,000 men, of which number fully a quarter were incapacitated by wounds or sickness. The situation within the doomed city was daily becoming more and more terrible. "Horses, dogs, and other animals were dying from hunger in the streets and public places, and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I saw a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. If there

had been flour and bacon, the soldiers might not have become weakened and sick, and yet they fought as the Span