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they clung, buffeted by the whirling vortex produced by the sinking ship. Only two of the men were wounded to any extent, although all were much bruised by contact with floating objects from the decks of the Merrimack. They were not discovered by the launches from the Spanish fleet, and remained in the freezing water until daybreak, when they were picked up by a launch that contained, as they soon learned, Admiral Cervera himself. He congratulated them on their bravery, and offered to report their capture and safety to the American fleet under flag of truce.

The prisoners were first immured in Morro Castle, which experienced, while they were there, a bombardment by the blockading fleet (June 6). Lieutenant Hobson thought that the placing of his men and himself in this position of great danger but another example of Spanish ideas of honorable warfare. Whether this was true or not, they were transferred June 7 to Santiago, where they were treated as kindly as conditions would permit. In Mr. Hobson's account of his experiences are grateful and enthusiastic references to Admiral Cervera, Captains Acosta and Bustamente, Lieutenant Müller y Tejeiro, the English Consul, Ramsden, and others. They remained as prisoners in Santiago until July 6, when they were exchanged and made a triumphant return to the American lines.

*

The sinking of the Merrimack may

*Hobson, Sinking of the Merrimack in Century Magazine, vol. lvii., (1898-99).

well be classed among the heroic deeds of America, or, in fact, of all history. Though unsuccessful, and, as events proved, perhaps fortunately so, nevertheless the bravery of the men who took part in the enterprise cannot be minimized. The chances against their coming through with their lives were immeasurably great, and every man on board the vessel was well aware of the fact when he volunteered. Their escape, indeed, was nearly miraculous, and has been cited by unsympathetic commentators as merely another example of Yankee luck. Yet, as has been seen, luck was allowed to enter into the plans as little as possible. The preparations for the enterprise were hastily but none the less carefully made, and though Cervera's fleet was not "bottled up," the moral effect of the feat was electric, and contributed powerfully towards the discouragement of the Spanish forces at Santiago.

In the meanwhile the blockade continued steadily. The semicircle of mighty ships, spread out fan-like on the horizon during the day, closing up to the distance of three or four miles during the night, held the Spanish ships securely as birds in a net. Day and night hundreds of keen eyes were turned on the narrow pass, which was illuminated at night by the rays of powerful search-lights. The tedium of four weeks of watchful inactivity in torrid seas proved a terrible strain on the men of the fleet, and stories are told of guns fired at imaginary torpedo-boats, at caverns on the rocky

coast, or the smoke from a distant train. The Spanish situation, too, was becoming more and more distressing; beleagured, after June 14, both by land and sea, the authorities saw at last the fatal error of permitting the fleet to remain in Santiago. Imperative orders came to Cervera from Madrid to leave for Cienfuegos, Havana, the Philippines, or anywhere, the Ministry little dreaming that he was as anxious as they for a solution to his problems. He saw clearly, however, one thing to which they were blind-that his fleet was doomed.

On June 6 the American ships bombarded Morro Castle and the near-by fortifications. It was during this attack that a new and terrific engine of war was first brought into play. This was the cruiser Vesuvius, carrying guns arranged to fire dynamite projectiles by the means of compressed air. While this vessel failed to be as efficient as its designers hoped, yet the effect of its enormous shells filled the

The

Spanish army with dismay.* guns when fired were almost noiseless, hence it was not until the mass of steel and nitro-glycerine forming the projectiles exploded with their impact that the presence of the Vesuvius was revealed. Where they struck great caverns were torn in the bluffs, and everything within fifty yards was ground to dust. The Vesuvius, however, had one crowning defect; its guns could not be aimed with any accuracy, hence the destination of its shells was more or less a matter of chance. But chance is an element that must be mercilessly eliminated from modern warfare, so the Vesuvius was the first and last of its kind.

* "One of the projectiles which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a distance of about 20 meters. From

a certain distance, as I could see the day I went to the Mercedes, it looked as though a road had been opened across the mountain." Muller y Pereira, Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba. (In Notes on the Spanish-American War. Pub. by Navy Dept. U. S. Govt. Printing Office.)

CHAPTER VII.

1898.

LANDING THE ARMY AND THE AFFAIR AT LAS GUASIMAS.

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countermarched at the training camps it seemed as if the opportunity would never come. The camps were but

For more than two months the army had been waiting for its chance to strike against the enemy, and to the men interminably marched and temporary arrangements at the best,

and had all the evils attendant upon the crowding of large numbers of men within limited space. The food was not seldom of a bad quality, often delayed in transit, and even when obtained was poorly prepared. In no case were the sanitary conditions perfect, and in many they were discreditable. This was due in part to the haste of preparation, in part to the fact that numbers of the medical officers had absolutely no experience in camp sanitation, and in part to the ignorance and negligence of the volunteers, who often refused to take the hygienic precautions enjoined upon them. "Officers and men in these camps were rife for war, and drill, parades, practice marches, and military camp duties occupied the whole of their time and energies. Considerations of domestic economy and sanitation in the companies and regiments. were not given proper attention, and men who were being taught to meet the enemy in battle succumbed to the hardships and insanitary conditions of life in their camps of instruction.""* Typhoid, malaria, and other endemic diseases were prevalent in the camps. at all times, but soon the horrors were intensified by the outbreak of yellow fever in the Mississippi camps. view of these facts it is therefore not surprising that up to September 30, 1898, the records of the Surgeon-General show that only 345 men had lost their lives from wounds, and 2,485 from disease. That a good share of

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In

Report of Surgeon-General Sternberg, October 17, 1898.

these deaths by disease could have been prevented, there is not the faintest shadow of doubt.

It was therefore with a sense of profound relief that the army learned of a general movement against Santiago. That Cervera was there was a certainty at last, for Lieutenant Victor Blue of the Suwanee, as the result of a daring journey into the Spanish lines, reported June 13 that he had gained an unobstructed view of Santiago Bay and the warships within. This, however, was but the verification of a theory that the administration had been acting upon since June 1. The entire Fifth Army Corps, under command of Major-General W. R. Shafter, had embarked for Cuba as early as June 8, but the transports were hardly under way before they were halted, upon the false rumor that Spanish cruisers had been seen in Nicholas Channel. The transports were turned back to Tampa, and for six days lay off the wharves, filled with fretting and uncomfortable men. At last, however, it was learned that the menacing Spanish fleet had been composed of American ships of war, so on June 14, the fleet again got under way, this time to proceed without interruption to the Cuban coast. This delay was doubtless justified under the circumstances, but would have been needless had the transports been adequately convoyed by battleships. The mistake, however, had been made beyond recall, and there was no remedy.

The question of a landing-place for

the troops had been under consideration from the beginning of the campaign, and the harbor of Guantanamo was selected, as it was the only large bay near Santiago, and in addition was known to be poorly defended. The difficult and perilous task of obtaining a foothold here was assigned to the First Marine Battalion Volunteers of New York (636 men), under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Huntington. The landing-place decided upon was the village of Caimanera, about 40 miles east of Santiago. The transport Panther, which carried the marines, was convoyed by the gunboats Marblehead and Yankee, whose guns drove the Spanish vessels into the inner harbor before the landing was made, which was then accomplished without opposition. Delighted with their relief from the crowded quarters of the transport, the marines were comfortably enjoying themselves, when, just before nightfall, came the information that a body of Spanish soldiers was advancing to attack their position. This was the This was the beginning of intermittent skirmishes that lasted from the day of the landing (June 10) until June 14. The men were forced to strike their tents, which proved too good a target for the sharpshooters, and to dig trenches, in which they lay firing at such of the enemy as they could discover in the jungle about them. During the second day of fighting they were reinforced by some Cuban scouts, and with their assistance finally drove the Spanish back to their defences at

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From General Shafter's account of the expedition the following excerpts are taken: The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful. The health of the command remained remarkably good, notwithstanding the fact that the conveniences on many of the transports, in the nature of sleeping and closet accommodations, space for exercise, etc., were not all that could have been desired.

"While passing along the north coast of Cuba one of the two barges we had in tow broke away during the night and was not recovered. The loss proved to be very serious, for it delayed and embarrassed the disem

*First division (Brigadier-General Kent): 6th Infantry; 16th Infantry; 7th N. Y. Volunteers; 2d Infantry; 10th Infantry; 21st Infantry; 9th Infantry; 13th Infantry; 24th Infantry; Second division (Brigadier-General Lawton): 8th Infantry; 22d Infantry; 2d Mass. Volunteers; 1st Infantry; 4th Infantry; 25th Infantry; 7th Infantry; 12th Infantry; 17th Infantry. Cavalry division (Major-General Wheeler): 3d Cavalry; 6th Cavalry; 9th Cavalry; 1st Cavalry; 10th Cavalry; 1st Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders). Independent brigade (Brigadier-General Bates): 3d Infantry; 20th Infantry; 2d Cavalry (1 squadron).

barkation of the army. On the morning of June the 20th we arrived off Guantanamo Bay and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where Admiral Sampson came on board the headquarters transport. It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban General, Garcia, at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles west of the Morro. During the interview General Garcia offered the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men in the vicinity of Aserraderos, and about 500 under General Castillo at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Daiquiri. I accepted this offer, telling him, however, that although no military control could be exercised over him except such as he would concede, yet as long as he served under me I would furnish his command rations and ammunition.

"From the time the orders were received every effort possible was made to become familiar with the surroundings of Santiago, both as to the terrain and climatic conditions with which we should have to contend.

The description given in the Journal of the Siege of Havana' of the experience of the English army during their siege of Havana in 1762 was re-read. Valuable information was also obtained from two natives of Cuba, who were on the Seguranca with me, one of them a civil engineer who had assisted in making surveys in the vicinity of Santiago. From General Garcia also additional information was received which was of

great value in planning the attack on Santiago.

66 *

**

With the assistance of

the small boats of the navy, the disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the twenty-second at Daiquiri. On the twenty-first, 500 insurgent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cujababo, increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This force under General Castillo was to attack the Spanish force at Daiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. (This movement was successfully made.) To mislead the enemy as to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General Garcia to send a small force, about 500 men, under General Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabanas, situated on the coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago harbor, and where it was reported that the enemy had several hundred men intrenched and from which a trail leads around the west side of the bay to Santiago. Admiral Sampson was requested to send several of his war ships, with a number of the transports, opposite this town, Aserraderos, for the purpose of making a show of disembarking there. In addition the Admiral was asked to cause a bombardment to be made at Cabanas, upon the forts around the Morro, and also at the towns of Aguadores, Siboney and Daiquiri. The troops under General Garcia, remaining at Aserraderos, were to be transferred to Daiquiri or Siboney on the twenty-fourth. This

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