within West Beirut itself mounted. By this time, U.S. warships were openly firing into Syrian-controlled territory leading Secretary of the Navy John Lehman to say that the ships were firing in support of the Lebanese army. This was denied by the White House and other Pentagon officials. The White House was still insisting that "whatever we do is in support of the marines" and the Pentagon spokesman Michael Busch said "we are not providing fire in support of the Lebanese armed forces." Such misunderstanding and confusion between the services and the offi

cials in the Pentagon and the White House as to what we really were doing in Lebanon was now common. The fact of the matter was that the rules of engagement had been changed and the net effect was to support the Lebanese army.

The collapse of the Lebanese army positions in West Beirut meant that the marines were now surrounded on three sides and on February 16 it was announced by the White House that they would begin redeploying in two or three days to ships at sea. While the Administration still claimed that there was a role for them to play in Beirut and that they might indeed go back, the reality was that the change in the military situation on the ground had forced the Administration to advance its timetable for withdrawal, in face of imminent collapse of the position.

As the marines withdrew, the USS New Jersey opened up massively in the largest barrage yet. The New York Times reported on February 25 that military officers had found that shelling by 16-inch guns of the battleship New Jersey was far less effective than hoped.* The biggest problem according to them was that the political leaders did not clearly enough define the military mission.

Summer 1988

By the middle of March the United States was, in effect, out of Lebanon and the Administration policy had collapsed. The reasons were not only because of the collapse of the Lebanese army, but because, in the last resort, the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon were not prepared to outwait the Syrians and increase military pressure to the point where Syria would withdraw its forces.

The Six Lessons of
Lebanon

The list of things that went wrong with the U.S. operation in Lebanon is long. Stra

tegic and tactical mistakes have been well documented in Congressional hearings and the Long Commission Report (the official investigation into the bombing of the Marine barracks). Though most of the mistakes are by now of interest primarily to historians, six lessons can be identified that have relevance for future American policy.

The first lesson concerns basic military strategy. If the United States contemplates the use of force in a hostile environment, military commanders must be given clear. specific military objectives and provided with enough resources to win any likely encounters with the enemy. They must feel confident in the political judgement of the President and his advisors. In the case of Lebanon the military commanders and the Secretary of Defense were convinced that the operation was flawed. Their cooperation was not whole-hearted and put many obstacles in the way of extending or protracting the mandate of the MNF. U.S. military leaders have learned the lessons of Vietnam and are reluctant to endorse new commitments that involve open-ended deployments of U.S. ground forces.

Middle East Insight

earnest in the Gulf with Iranian attacks against commercial shipping. On May 23, in response to "an urgent request from Saudi King Fahd for military aid to defend against the Iranian threat to Saudi shipping", the United States notified Congress it would be asking for approval for the sale of Stinger surface-to-air missiles for the Kingdom.

It was clear that whatever humiliation the United States may have suffered in Lebanon, the Iranian threat to the Gulf Arab states was far too serious to allow the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to "distance themselves" from America's protective shield. The Gulf Arabs realized that the only country that had the capacity to protect them was the United States. Bemoaning the fate of the Gemayel regime might be understandable but when the chips were down one still had to rely on the Americans. The continued U.S. role in the Gulf suggests there has been no wish by the Arab regimes for the United States to go home.

• The third lesson is that Syria has the capacity to upset any U.S. initiatives in Lebanon or on the broader issue of an Israeli-Arab peace. Ignoring Syria from deliberations that have a vital impact on Syrian interests is bound to encourage Syrian intransigence and belligerence and assures that Syria will play a spoiler role in any negotiations that require its concurrence. The corollary-that no agreement on Lebanon, or for that matter the Arab-Israel conflict, is possible without Syrian approval—is not necessarily true, as Camp David bears witness. But unless there is an important Arab player such as Egypt or perhaps the Soviet Union who can block the more negative effects of a Syrian veto, dealing Damascus out of regional negotiations is poor policy.

The fourth lesson concerns U.S. relations with Israel. Between the summer of 1981 and late 1982 the Administration was at logger-heads with the government of Menachem Begin concerning many Mideast issues including arms sales to the Arabs, Lebanon, and the peace process. Within the executive branch there were different opinions as to how to handle the relationship and, as a result, mixed and ambiguous signals were sent to the Begin government as to

Summer 1988

what U.S. preferences and goals were. This resulted in a most divisive and acrimonious atmosphere and impinged on the entire range of Mideast policy.

The lesson is that the more united the U.S. government's own position on policy questions that concern Israel, the less chance for misunderstanding and lengthy political squabbles over the relationship. The most healthy situation is one when both parties know exactly where the other stands and can adjust policy accordingly. Ambiguity creates its own demons and has never served either side well.

• The fifth lesson concerns domestic politics and crisis management. Once a risky but important policy initiative reaches a point when the egos and prestige of senior advisors are on the line, it is difficult to change direction irrespective of what the intelligence community and common sense may say, unless the president himself plays a strong role. In the case of Lebanon the President never once ordered the Secretary of Defense to play a more assertive role in supporting U.S. policy in Lebanon. Indeed, at the height of the debate within the White House over whether or not the marines should be redeployed to ships in February 1984, Reagan's own viewpoint was difficult to discern. The decision in favor of withdrawal was made by a simple majority within the inner circle of advisors. Once it became clear that the only way for the United States to stay in Lebanon was to embark on an agonizing public debate, the president had the wisdom to cut losses and not be swayed by apocalyptic visions of the collapse of American power and prestige throughout the Arab world.

Lebanon has left its mark on the White House in other ways. The experience convinced some senior NSC staff that because George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger had such basic disagreements on how to use American power, especially military power, there would always be gridlock if risky policy initiatives were to be considered. It was this concern that helped to create the conditions for the Iran-Contra scandal and the reported conversations between Oliver North and William Casey about creating an organization for conducting covert operations "outside the system".

Middle East Insight

• The sixth lesson relates to future U.S. relations with Lebanon itself. Both countries have presidential elections this year. Lebanon's president is chosen by the sitting members of parliament, not by popular ballot. By tradition the president is always a Maronite Christian.

If a strong president were to be elected in Lebanon, the United States should recommit itself to help rebuild Lebanon's institutions. A new American effort should capitalize on one of the few benefits to have emerged from George Shultz' recent visits to the region, namely the beginnings of a better U.S.-Syrian dialogue on Lebanon. So long as the United States and Syria have sought opposite goals in Lebanon, no progress has been possible. But if Syria and the United States can work to end Lebanon's divisions, the Lebanese economy could be revived which, in turn, would be a great benefit to Syria, whose own economy is in deep trouble.

There remains the problem of Israel's continued military occupation of an enclave in Southern Lebanon. Israel, too, has elections this year, but it is doubtful if any new government will withdraw forces until the authority and power of the legitimate leaders of the various Lebanese communities is enhanced.

The tragic experience of 1981-84 is that no outside power-Syria, Israel or the United States-has been able to impose its will on Lebanon. What is equally true is that no one group within Lebanon is capable of using paramilitary force or terrorism to dominate the country. Unless one's goal is the partition of Lebanon or the promotion of another SyrianIsraeli war-goals the United States, Syria, and Israel should strongly resist-reconciliation must be given another chance. Whether this can happen may well depend on how the new governments in Lebanon, the United States, and Israel manage relations with Syria in the early months of 1989.