etween 1981-1984 the United States became deeply involved in an effort to resolve the Lebanon crisis. The policy ended in failure. The political goals that the Administration sought to accomplish in Lebanon were never met. These included the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the establishment of a strong central government with control over all Lebanese territory and good relations with Israel, and the reform of the Lebanese political system.

The Administration's efforts collapsed in the spring of 1984 when U.S. marines were "redeployed" from Beirut International airport to U.S. navy ships, thereby ending an eighteen month presence on shore as part of a U.S.European multinational force (MNF).

The reasons for failure included divisive leadership and bureaucratic conflict, strategic misjudgment, poorly executed military operations, ambiguous signals to allies and adversaries alike, and bad luck. The experience was a personal defeat for the secretary of state, George Shultz, and was to influence in a negative way his views on Middle East policy for the next three years. The consequences of

Geoffrey Kemp is a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Between 1981-84 he was Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the NSC Staff and Special Assistant to President Reagan for National Security Affairs.

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the Lebanon encounter may not have been as disastrous as some thought at the time but there are lessons to be learned from the experience which a new Administration should take into account when venturing into the dangerous waters of Middle East diplomacy.

Background

When the Reagan Administration came into office in January 1981, the Middle East did not rank high on the White House agenda; and the problems of Lebanon were on few advisor's minds. The priorities were to rebuild the U.S. economy and strengthen U.S. military forces. In order to delay a procession of Mideast leaders to Washington, Secretary of State Alexander Haig decided to visit the region in April. His itinerary included Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, but not Lebanon or Syria. Syria was left off the agenda primarily for logistical reasons, but Haig's failure to visit Damascus was seen by many, including Syria's leader, Hafez el-Assad, as a deliberate snub

While Haig was in the region, on April 1. 1981, the Syrians launched a massive bombardment of the Christian town of Zahle in the Bekaa Valley which Phalangist forces under Bashir Gemayel had infiltrated. The -Syrians feared that Israel, in cahoots with Bashir Gemayel, would be able to threaten Damascus from Lebanon as well as across the Golan Heights if they established a "presence"

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in Zahle. Haig denounced the Syrian shelling while he was in Jerusalem. In addition, Haig asked U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, John Gunther Dean, to confer with Lebanese President Sarkis and to inform him that the U.S. was intent on helping the country. In Europe, Haig expressed his support for a French proposal to send French troops to Lebanon under the cover of a multinational force in order to separate the Phalange and Syrian forces. Concrete steps by the U.S. Administration were not taken until a Syrian-Israeli military confrontation became imminent. On

April 28, Israel shot down two Syrian helicopters and Syria responded by deploying Soviet surface-to-air missiles near Zahle. The United States made urgent appeals to Israel to show restraint and to allow for diplomatic means to resolve the so-called "missile crisis." President Reagan appointed Philip Habib as a special U.S. envoy to try to prevent an IsraeliSyrian war.

The United States had two concerns regarding the Syrian-Israeli crisis. First, the Administration desired a peaceful settlement of the crisis, and secondly, it sought to reinstate the status-quo-ante in the region. A cease fire between Gemayel and the Syrians was reached on June 8 and the siege of Zahle ended three weeks later. However, this was followed by escalating encounters between Israeli forces and PLO positions in southern Lebanon. On July 17, Israel conducted a major raid against PLO headquarters in Beirut. Alarmed by the urgency of the situation, Habib's mandate was changed. He now had to arrange a cease fire between the PLO and Israel. This was done quickly and Habib received important help from Saudi Arabia. The cease fire took effect on July 24.

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The lull in fighting lasted nearly a year. Then, on June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon following a resumption of hostilities between the PLO and Israeli forces along Israel's northern border. The magnitude and extent of the Israeli invasion took everyone by surprise. The immediate U.S. concern was to stop the war. This was not easy. The Israeli advance continued and there was fear that the war would fatefully damage U.S. relations with the Arab world. During the first days of the war, Israeli aircraft swept the Syrians from the skies in one of the most stunning air victories of modern times. Habib was dispatched to Damascus to arrange a cease fire but his arrival coincided with Israel's decision to move beyond the 30 kilometer line towards Beirut. Hafez el-Assad was convinced Habib had misled him as to Israel's intentions and from then on he was persona non grata in Syria, even though he remained Mideast envoy for another year.

In August 1982 the United States, in cooperation with France and Italy, dispatched a peacekeeping force to Lebanon to assist in the evacuation of the PLO and their leader Yasir Arafat from Beirut and thereby forestall an Israeli invasion of the city. This mission was successfully accomplished and all the multinational forces had departed Beirut by early September. This action coincided with the launching, on September 1, 1982, of the Reagan Mid-East peace initiative on the ArabIsraeli conflict, and the election of Bashir Gemayel to the Lebanese presidency. In the early days of September there was cautious optimism in the White House that the crisis might be coming to an end and would be replaced by a more constructive phase in MidEast politics.

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This was not to be. On September 14, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. The next day, September 15, Israel's Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon, ordered his troops to enter West Beirut to "prevent chaos." Under the cover of Israel's military presence Christian gunmen entered the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut and massacred men, women and children. Television cameras brought the pictures to a global audience and because of the appearance of Israeli complicity, the outrage was particularly intense, including in Israel itself.

After a series of meetings in the White House over the weekend of September 18 and 19 it was decided to send the MNF back into Beirut. There was little argument about this decision. It was an immediate and reactive response to a tragic event and was strongly influenced by the belief that the United States had assumed responsibility for the safety of the Palestinians and that our friends, the Israelis, had allowed the worst to happen.

Anger against the Israeli government in general, and General Sharon in particular, was shared by all senior Administration officials. Sending back the MNF was the least the United States could do.

Thus began the second, and ultimately disastrous mission of the MNF in Lebanon. The period of the second MNF deployment, from September 1982 to March 1984, can be broken down into five distinct time frames

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during which key decisions or events occurred:

1. September 19, 1982 - October 1982
2. November 1982 - May 17, 1983
3. May 17, 1983 August 29, 1983
4. August 30, 1983 October 23, 1983
5. October 23, 1983 - March 1984

September 19, 1982 - October 1982

In the immediate aftermath of SabraShatila three conditions were present which might have led to a different outcome to the Lebanon tragedy if the United States had responded in a different way. First, the Lebanese were extremely weak and vulnerable; the election of Bashir's brother Amin to the presidency as his successor was more an act of desperation than resolve. Because of the traumas of the past six years and the special horrors of the past summer, Lebanese politicians of all confessions seemed prepared to give Amin a chance, at least for a few months or so. Amin, however, was weak and inexperienced and was strongly influenced by his Christian advisors and, most especially, by the United States.

Second, Syria, which had the greatest stakes in Lebanon, was also in a very weak position. It had lost a high percentage of its air force during the fighting with Israel and was in no position to launch a strong counteroffensive against the forward Israeli positions Third, Israel's morale and leadership was

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