In any case, institutional action would clearly fulfill such a requirement. Congress, by concurrent resolution, could authorize suit to resolve any controversy arising under the War Powers Resolution. A single house resolution could authorize suit to bed brought in the name of that House. In either case I think it clear that standing to raise the issue would be present. I believe the same would be true if, by legislation, an appropriate group or committee of members were empowered to authorize suit on behalf of the Congress. The permanent consultative group established in Section 3 (c) (1) of Senator Byrd's draft resolution would be such a group. In Burke v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C.Cir. 198_), for example, 33 individual congressmen sued to challenge an asserted exercise of the pocket veto power. The Senate was allowed to intervene under a resolution authorizing the Senate Legal Counsel to take the necessary steps. The Speaker of the House and the House Bipartisan Leadership Group, made up of the majority and minority leaders and whips intervened successfully to "assert the rights and privileges of the House of Representatives." In that case, the court suggested, as I have here, that the usual judicial prescription to let the two branches fight it out between them might be worse than the disease. Id. at 29. to If the War Powers Resolution were amended So as establish standing to raise constitutional and interpreta tive issues arising under it and to indicate generally that Congress (and the President by approving the amendment) invited judicial resolution of these issues, I believe the courts would be prepared to adjudicate. With the courts available to settle these otherwise irreconcilable issues, the executive and legislative branches would be free to move forward and actually operate under the War Powers Resolution to secure the necessary commonality of purpose in those grave and difficult situations where U.S. military action is a possible response to foreign policy problems. PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR. MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, IT IS A DISTINCT PLEASURE FOR ME TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU THIS MORNING IN RESPONSE TO YOUR INTEREST IN REEVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF THE WAR POWERS I MUST BEGIN BY CHARACTERIZING MY VIEWS AS THOSE OF A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MAN, AND NOT THOSE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLAR OR LAWYER. I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER THE BENEFIT OF MY OWN EXPERIENCES AND OBSERVATIONS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE I 1 HAVE GAINED OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. AT THE OUTSET, I WANT TO STATE FOR THE RECORD THAT I AGREE WITH SECRETARY CARLUCCI'S STATEMENT AND HAVE CONSCIOUSLY ATTEMPTED TO AVOID A DUPLICATION OF HIS COMMENTS. I STRONGLY SHARE THE DESIRE FOR CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES AND POLICIES--ESPECIALLY DECISIONS TO COMMIT OUR ARMED FORCES. AS A RESULT OF MY OWN EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM I INITIALLY SUPPORTED THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, BECAUSE I BELIEVED IT WOULD NOT ONLY FACILITATE CONSULTATION BUT ASSIST IN BUILDING SUPPORT FOR OUR FIGHTING MEN WHENEVER THEY WERE COMMITTED IN DANGEROUS SITUATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, I HAVE FOLLOWED THE USE OF THE |