16 1 conference, they shall report back to their respective House 2 in disagreement. 3 "(B) Notwithstanding any rule in either House of Con4 gress concerning the printing of conference reports in the 5 Congressional Record or concerning any delay in the consid6 eration of such reports, such report, including a report filed 7 or returned in disagreement, shall be acted on in the House 8 of Representatives and the Senate not later than 2 session 9 days after the first House files the report or, in the case of 10 the Senate acting first, the report is first made available on 11 the desks of the Senators. Debate in a House of Congress on 12 a conference report or a report filed or returned in disagree13 ment on any such joint resolution shall be limited to 3 hours, 14 equally divided between, and controlled by, the Majority 15 Leader and the Minority Leader, and their designees. 16 "(2) If a joint resolution is vetoed by the President, the 17 time for debate in consideration of the veto message on such 18 measure shall be limited to 20 hours in each House of Con19 gress, equally divided between, and controlled by, the Majori20 ty Leader and the Minority Leader, and their designees. "(h) This section is enacted by the Congress "(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 17 procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution, and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and "(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.". (b) REPEAL.-Section 1013 of the Department of State 10 Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 U.S.C. 11 1546a), relating to expedited procedures for certain joint res12 olutions and bills, is repealed. PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PELL-JULY 13, 1988 Today the Foreign Relations Committee commences work on a project of considerable significance an effort to evaluate and improve the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Congress passed this law 15 years ago in hope of fostering constructive Executivelegislative interaction in the decision to employ U.S. forces abroad. Unfortunately, this intent has not been fulfilled. Indeed, from the moment of its enactment over President Nixon's veto, the Resolution has itself been an object of dispute rather than an instrumentality of cooperation. This past year's contentious debate over the Resolution's applicability to the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf has served to underscore the irony that now surrounds this crucial law. For the motive behind the War Powers Resolution was a determination to establish a procedure that would ensure national unity. The aim was to devise a mechanism, consistent with the Constitution, through which Congress and the President would act together in the momentous decision to commit U.S. forces to hostilities-so that, once committed, America would not again find itself rent internal division. Critics of the War Powers Resolution continue to characterize it as an idiosyncratic product of its time-an effort to prevent another Vietnam. But that involves a distortion. The War Powers Resolution was not intended to prevent the necessary use of American military power, but rather to prevent the commitment of power unaccompanied by careful analysis and the commitment of national will. The Framers of the Constitution intended that Congress be an active participant in the decision to commence hostilities. While the War Powers Resolution, in its current form, has failed, a way must be found to give modern meaning to constitutional intent. Pursuant to this purpose, the committee last December authorized the establishment of a Special Subcommittee on War Powers. Today the subcommittee begins hearings that will provide for a full airing of the constitutional dimensions of the question while considering practicalities as well as principles. The chairman of the subcommittee is Senator Biden, who is completing recuperation from surgery and for whom I will sit in until he returns in a few weeks. These hearings will extend through August and into September, and will involve former and present Government officials, including President Ford, and a number of eminent constitutional scholars. Upon completing its hearings, the subcommittee will render a report with legislative recommendations to the full committee. Let me emphasize that the committee's aims is not to satisfy some narrow sense of congressional prerogative, but to devise a war powers mechanism that works. Let me reiterate, too, that this is not an effort to resolve the present dispute over the applicability of the War Powers Resolution to the current situation in the Persian Gulf. While that dispute has helped to give rise to this effort, our endeavor will aim at a long-term solution to the war powers question, not a quick fix for current circumstances. In this effort, I urge the constructive participation of the administration. It will not be enough for the executive branch simply to adopt the position that the War Powers Resolution and any successor are unconstitutional. For what is constitutional beyond doubt is the intent of the Framers that Congress-the elected representatives of people-be centrally involved in any decision that commits this Nation to war. Our task must be to construct an executive-legislative mechanism that operates effectively; and to create that mechanism will require executive-legislative cooperation. Let us therefore view this effort not as an institutional struggle but as a constitutional duty. Indeed, having just celebrated our Constitution's 200th anniversary year, we could pay the Founders no greater honor than to approach this task with a spirit of judicious obligation to fulfill the Constitution's intent. The subcommittee is pleased to be able to commence its hearings with testimony from four people who played a role in the genesis of the law we have set ourselves to evaluate. Chairman Fascell and Congressman Broomfield have since assumed the leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Senators Eagleton and Mathias have graduated to new careers. All four have records of distinguished service to our country, and the subcommittee is honored by their presence today. 17 procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution, and it supersedes other rules only to "(2) with full recognition of the constitutional 5 6 7 8 case of any other rule of that House.". 9 (b) REPEAL.-Section 1013 of the Department of St 10 Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 U. mentauty of cooperation n. Otherwise, if American ngress, as contemplated by iccisionmaking. gress for a couple of years as Touse. It was: "In war the President alone macances to evaluate and improve thed, passed the Senate. A bill based on a 8 passed be 5 years ago in hope of fostermference, a "compromise" emerged-a totalinteraction the decision to employ US fondent could wage unilateral war for 90 days las nos geen fulfilled. Indeed, from the mom the 90 days, the war would terminate unless xon s veto, the Resolution has itself been under such time or other constraints as ConPersian Gulf has served to underscore tention had been stood on its head-the President s contentious debate over the Resoluta bitter debate as to what had happened in the : a procedure that would ensure nate President, for all practical purposes the die was For the motive behind the War Poweralateral war whenever and however he desired. 2. consistent with the Constitution, Younding Fathers had to be somersaulting in their act together in the momentous de once come here ... vers Resou in effor Ts desert 4 reed. day that the bastardized War Powers Act of the War Powers Act-in a sense I voted bill. To me, it was untenable and perhaps even give the President the sole power to wage war. AR POWERS ACT IN PRACTICE en a total failure. It has in no way established a sharedmaking. It has in no way established any sense of consenoriginal Senate bill provided for the shared decision and the consensus-building that went with such a the resident and the Congress. arred the War Powers Act, all have danced around it, nblatantly ignored it-for example, Lebanon and Persian grouses, but just stands and watches the passing parade lone patches troops into hostilities. The courts refuse to resolve labeling the question as "a nonjusticiable political dispute." tato-too hot to handle. BYRD-NUNN-MITCHELL-WARNER fore you the Byrd-Nunn-Mitchell-Warner bill. • respect for these fine men, their bill is a figleaf irrelevancy. rest of time, let me comment on Senator Nunn's statement when the .ounced. Senator Nunn found eight shortcomings in the existing law. ybe it has even more than eight. Then he wrote this. remember that, under the Constitution, the Founding Fathers gave the power to declare war. We need a war powers act that applies that the modern threats that our Nation faces. bill will assure that the congressional leadership and the President will lt on matters of national security. It also assures that in the event the sident deploys American forces, the leadership will meet and recommend apropriate action to the rest of the Congress. It guarantees that the recommendation of the leadership will be given prompt consideration on the floor of both the House and the Senate. Finally, it requires that if the Congress passes a law, no funds may be spent by the President in contradiction of that law. -nator Nunn cannot really believe that "The bill will assure that the congrestial leadership and the President will consult on matters of national security." On matters that are perceived as touching the turf of the Commander in Chief, Presidents will consult with Congress only on a nominal, superficial basis. Presidents don't trust or respect Congress. Presidents do not view Congress as a partner in a governmental alliance, but as a nuisance or peril to be avoided. Thirty days into office, President Bush or President Dukakis will hold the same view. Senator Nunn concludes the paragraph with "Finally, it requires that if the Congress passes a law, no funds may be spent by the President in contradiction of that |