BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 7 both armies faced one another at the outskirts. Both corps of General Franklin's division, General Reynolds' and General Smith's, crossed below, and were in position by one o'clock in the afternoon; the former extending from the river towards the hills, the latter nearly parallel to the old Richmond road, with its right across Deep Run. General Hooker's division remained on the left bank of the river, held in readiness, if the movement succeeded, "to spring upon the enemy in their retreat." The crossing of the troops was made with comparatively little annoyance from the enemy's batteries, which, as the opinion was afterwards expressed by General Franklin, had the enemy so willed, might have defeated the movement. The main part of the force being now over the river, and under the enemy's fire, the Massachussetts men in the capture of a number of the Mississippi and Alabama sharp-shooters stationed in the town. The New York Volunteer Engineers at the third bridge, protected by the fire of the batteries, accomplished their task with little loss, while the fourth was constructed by the engineer corps of Sappers and Miners-the enemy offering no resistance. Such was the gallant work of the army in providing the means of passing the river in face of the enemy. The evening of the 11th saw Fredericksburg, that portion of the city, at least, fronting the river, in possession of an advance-guard of Sumner's right division, while a brigade of New England troops, of Franklin's division, were also encamped on the opposite shore at the lower crossing. A hundred men, it was reported, were killed and wounded while driving the enemy out of Fredericks-attack could not be long delayed. Early burg. The town had suffered less from the heavy bombardment than might have been expected. A number of the houses had been riddled, and some twenty burnt; the churches had been more or less damaged by the missiles the total injury being estimated by an intelligent observer at not exceeding two hundred thousand dollars. To this was to be added the loss from pillage, which the establishment of guards and other efforts did not altogether prevent. The inhabitants had generally left the city, though a number remained, who took refuge from the bombardment in the cellars. On early morning and forenoon of the next day, Friday, the 12th, under cover of a dense fog, the remainder of General Sumner's division crossed the river and occupied the town, being protected from the enemy's batteries in the rear by the shelter of the houses in the streets running parallel with the rebel works. The upper portion of the town was occupied by the skirmishers, while the pickets of * Special army correspondence New York Times, Freder icksburg, December 12, 1862. the next morning, accordingly, orders were given by General Burnside for the advance upon the rebel position. General Franklin, on the left, was instructed to hold his command in readiness for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, while he sent out a division, well supported, with the line of retreat open, to seize a position on the heights, which, with a similar movement by a column from General Sumner's command, farther to the westward, would, it was expected, compel the enemy to evacuate the ridge. The movement upon the heights in General Franklin's division was assigned to General Reynolds, and under him was carried out by General Meade. General Gibbon was to support it on the right, and General Doubleday was held in reserve. "As soon as General Meade," we quote the narrative of the operations of the day by General Franklin, "was in motion, a large force of the enemy was turned on our extreme left, and General Reynolds stopped Meade and sent Doubleday's division to drive them off. They were in such position that they could fire into Meade's rear as he advanced, so that it was absolutely necessary that he should be stopped until the enemy could be driven off. While he was stopped and Doubleday was advancing, I sent for one of General Stoneman's divisions, which was on the other side of the river at the bridges. This division-General Birney's division-I directed to be crossed, and before it reached the field I sent an aid-de-camp to direct General Birney to report to General Reynolds. General Birney did so report, but before he got up General Meade had advanced into the woods; had a severe fight with the enemy; had driven them, so he reported to me, so that his men were on the crown of the hill, when they were fallen upon by an immensely superior force of the enemy, and driven back. By this time two regiments of Birney's division had arrived on the field, and General Reynolds immediately put them in; but they were also driven back, and it was not until the main body of Birney's division came up that they were able to retrieve themselves at all so as to hold any part of the woods. While this was going on, General Gibbon had also advanced on Meade's right, as a support. He had become engaged with the enemy, was wounded about half-past two, and had to leave the field, and shortly afterwards his division retired. By this time the second division of General Stoneman, which I had also ordered up, came up and took the place of Gibbon's division, and those two divisions-Birney's and Sickles'-together held the line for the remainder of the day, it being now about three o'clock."* This closed the serious fighting on the left. There was skirmishing and cannonading on Sunday, the troops holding their position that and the following day, when the army was withdrawn across the river. The assault on the right in the rear of the town by General Sumner's division, * General Franklin's testimony before the War Committee, Washington, March 28, 1963, made with great heroism, utterly failed. "I selected for the attack," says that officer, "the corps of General French and General Hancock, two of the most gallant officers in our army, and two corps that had neither of them ever turned their backs to the enemy. They made repeated assaults, but were driven back in spite of all the efforts that could be made by their officers. The principal obstacle that they found was a long stone wall, which was the outwork of the enemy. That wall was some four hundred or five hundred yards in length, as represented to me, and had been raised and strengthened. The enemy had artillery that enfiladed that wall on both sides; they held their fire until our troops arrived at a certain point, when they rose up and poured a perfect volley over this wall, their artillery enfilading our column at the same time. No troops could stand such a fire as that. I do not think it a reproach to those two divisions that they did not carry that position; they did all that men could do. I had General Howard's division in readiness to support those two, and one strong division of Wilcox's corps-the 9th corps, General Burnside's old corps-detached to keep open communication with General Franklin's right. That division was not under fire during the day. Some of the other divisions of the 9th corps were more or less engaged. General Hooker had a part of his grand division in the town, and one of his corps under General Humphries was engaged. They made a gallant attack, but were driven back." A passage from General Hooker's testimony, describing this last attack, will sufficiently exhibit the desperate character of this conflict. "I brought up," said he, "every available battery in the city, with a view to break away the enemy's barriers by the use of artillery. I proceeded against the barriers as I would against a fortification, and endeavored to breach a hole sufficiently large for a forlorn hope' to enter. I had RETREAT FROM FREDERICKSBURG. two batteries posted on the left of the road, within four hundred yards of the position upon which the attack was to be made, and I had other parts of batteries posted on the right of the road at the distance of five or six hundred yards. I had all these batteries playing with great vigor until sunset upon that point, but with no apparent effect upon the rebels or upon their works. During the last part of the cannonading I had given directions to General Humphrey's division to form, under the shelter which a small hill afforded, in column for assault. When the fire of the artillery ceased I gave directions for the enemy's works to be assaulted. General Humphrey's men took off their knapsacks, overcoats and haversacks. They were directed to make the assault with empty muskets, for there was no time there to load and fire. When the word was given the men moved forward with great impetuosity. They ran and hurrahed, and I was encouraged by the great good feeling that pervaded them. The head of General Humphrey's column advanced to within, perhaps, fifteen or twenty yards of the stone wall, which was the advanced position which the rebels held, and then they were thrown back as quickly as they had advanced. Probably the whole of the advance and the retiring did not occupy fifteen minutes. They left behind, as it was reported to me, 1,760 of their number, out of about 4,000."* The grand movement of the day-for the contest was continued till night-had failed. The forces of Jackson, who held the Confederate right, had repulsed the insufficient force with which Meade had advanced to the attack, and Longstreet, on the enemy's left, with the aid of his batteries and defences, held his formidable line untouched. "The repulse," as General Sumner said, "was what frequently happens in campaigns the * Testimony before the War Committee, December 20, 1862. 9 works were stronger than we believed them to be. They were tier upon tier for two or three tiers. If we had carried the first tier, we could not have held it, because their next tier was a much more formidable row of fortifications, only a mile distant and on a higher position still; and no doubt large masses of infantry were between the two crests: and having got on the top of one crest, we would have been compelled to contend with large masses of fresh troops, over whom their own batteries could fire."* Disheartening as was the situation at the close of the day, General Burnside did not despair of yet retrieving the fortunes of battle by one gigantic effort. After passing the night with the officers and men on the field on the right, he returned to his headquarters across the river, and directed General Sumner to order the 9th army corps, which he had originally commanded, and which now consisted of eighteen old regiments and some new ones, to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. "I thought," says General Burnside, "that these regiments, by coming quickly -up after each other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and by going in with them they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent." The column of attack was actually formed, when, just before the time appointed for its starting, General Sumner interposed and recommended that this new assault be abandoned. A council of the division and corps commanders was called, when they were found unanimously of the same opinion. The attack was therefore relinquished. On the afternoon of the same day General Burnside ordered the return across the river of all the forces except enough to hold the town and the bridge-heads, intending to retain the bridges for recrossing should it be * Testimony of General Sumner before the War Committee, Washington, December 19, 1862. thought advisable. That night, supported by the advice of General Hooker, who thought the town untenable, Genhral Burnside resolved to withdraw the whole command, which he justly considered "a perilous operation." The order was sent over after midnight, when it had commenced raining, which, "to some extent," says General Burnside, was an assistance to us, but a very bad thing in the moving of troops." The difficult undertaking-a proof of the excellent discipline of the army-was successfully accomplished. "I consider the crossing of the river, under the circumstances," said General Sumner, "a very creditable thing; and I also consider the retreat, under the circumstances, as very creditable. There was not a gun or anything else lost. The entire army returned without an accident." The movement was assisted by the wind blowing from the enemy's lines, and by the darkness of the night. The sound of the moving artillery was deadened on the bridges by a covering of earth. In a brief dispatch to General Halleck, General Burnside announced the termination of the movement from which so much had been expected. The Army of the Potomac was withdrawn to this side of the Rappahannock River, because I felt fully convinced that the position in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack the enemy or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us under existing circumstances." on which Fredericksburg stands is so completely commanded by the hills of Stafford, in possession of the enemy, that no effectual opposition could be offered to the construction of the bridges on the passage of the river without exposing our troops to the destructive fire of his numerous batteries. Positions were therefore selected to oppose his advance after crossing. The narrowness of the Rappahannock, its winding course and dẹep bed, afforded opportunity for the construction of bridges at points beyond the reach of our artillery, and the banks had to be watched by skirmishers. The latter, sheltering themselves behind the houses, drove back the working parties of the enemy at the bridges opposite the city; but at the lowest point of crossing, where no shelter could be had, our sharp-shooters were themselves driven off, and the completion of the bridge was effected about noon on the 11th. In the afternoon of that day the enemy's batteries opened upon the city, and by dark had so demolished the houses on the river bank as to deprive our skirmishers of shelter, and, under cover of his guns, he effected a lodgment in the town. The troops which had so gallantly held their position in the city under the severe cannonade during the day, resisting the advance of the enemy at every step, were withdrawn during the night, as were also those who, with equal tenacity, had maintained their post at the lowest bridge. Under cover of darkness and a dense fog, on the 12th, a large force passed the On the day previous to the withdraw- river, and took position on the right withdraw-river, al of the troops, a report was made by bank, protected by their heavy guns on General Lee to the Secretary of War at the left. On the morning of the 13th, Richmond, in which in few words and an his arrangements for attack being comutter absence of pretence he narrated, as pleted about nine o'clock, the movement follows, the stirring incidents of the late veiled by a fog, he advanced boldly in engagement: "On the night of the 10th large force against our right wing. Geninstant the enemy commenced to throw eral Jackson's corps occupied the right three bridges over the Rappahannock-of our line, which rested on the railroad; two at Fredericksburg, and the third about a mile and a quarter below, near the mouth of the Deep Run. The plain General Longstreet's the left, extending along the heights to the Rappahannock, above Fredericksburg; General Stuart, GENERAL LEE'S REPORT. 11 bank of the river, as well as by the numerous heavy batteries on the Stafford Heights. Our loss during the operations, since the movements of the enemy began, amounts to about eighteen hundred killed and wounded. Among the former, I regret to report the death of the patriotic soldier and statesman, with two brigades of cavalry, was posted in the extensive plain on our extreme right. As soon as the advance of the enemy was discovered through the fog, General Stuart, with his accustomed promptness, moved up a section of his horse artillery, which opened with effect upon his flank, and drew upon the gallant Pelham a heavy fire, which he Brigadier-General Thomas R. R. Cobb, sustained unflinchingly for about two hours. who fell upon our left; and among the 'In the mean time the enemy was fiercely encountered by General A. P. Hill's division, forming General Jackson's right, and after an obstinate combat repulsed. During this attack, which was protracted and hotly contested, two of General Hill's brigades were driven back upon our second line. General Early, with part of his division, being ordered to his support, drove the enemy back from the point of woods he had seized and pursued him into the plain until arrested by his artillery. The right of the enemy's column, extending General Maxcy Gregg, alluded to in beyond Hill's front, encountered the this dispatch, presently died of his right of General Hood, of Longstreet's wound in the battle. He was a promicorps. The enemy took possession of a nent politician in South Carolina, his nasmall copse in front of Hood, but were tive State, and had long advocated the quickly dispossessed and repulsed with principles leading to the rebellion, havloss. During the attack on our right ing, as a young man, taken an active the enemy was crossing troops over his part in the disunion measures of 1832. bridges at Fredericksburg, and massing Leaving his profession of the law, at the them in front of Longstreet's line. Soon outbreak of the war, he participated in after his repulse on our right he com- the attack on Sumter, and afterwards menced a series of attacks on our left, carried his regiment the first from with a view of obtaining possession of South Carolina-into Virginia, and from the heights immediately overlooking the that time to the present had been contown. These repeated attacks were re-spicuous in the field. He had a high pulsed in gallant style by the Washing- reputation for bravery and self-posseston Artillery, under Colonel Walton, sion in battle. and a portion of McLaw's division, which occupied these heights. The last assault was made after dark, when Colonel Alexander's battalion had relieved the Washington Artillery, whose ammunition had been exhausted, and ended the contest for the day. The enemy was supported in his attacks by the fire of strong batteries of artillery on the right The peculiar circumstances under which General Burnside had reluctantly accepted the command, with the expectation necessarily excited in the public mind by the course which he had chosen, acting upon his sensitive character, induced him to address a letter to General Halleck, in which, after candidly reviewing the campaign so unhappily interrupted |