ministration of the oath, though apparent on the face of the magistrate's certificate indorsed on the execution. Ib. 7. (Satisfaction of an execution.) Where the brother of one of several judgment debtors advanced the amount of the execution to the officer, in order to obtain the control of it, and to satisfy it out of the property of another debtor which was done, the brother for whose relief the money was advanced being absent, but afterwards approving the act, and reimbursing the money; it was held, that by such payment the execution was satisfied and functus officio; and that therefore the subsequent levy was void. Stevens v. Morse, 7 Greenleaf, 36. 8. (As to assignment of an execution, in effect, by the mode of levying.) In this case the officer delivered up the execution, under taking thereby to assign it to the person advancing the money; and it was extended on land attached on the original writ; the creditor subsequently ratifying this arrangement. But it was held, the officer had no authority to make the assignment; and that this ratification, even if the execution had remained in force, could not so relate back as to defeat a bona fide conveyance made after the attachment. 9. (Notice of sale of equity of redemption in lands lying in different towns.) If a tract of land mortgaged is situated in more towns than one, it is necessary that the sheriff, in making sale of the mortgagor's right in equity of redemption, under Maine. stat. 1821, ch. 60, should post up two notifications in every town where any part of the land is situated. Grosvenor v. Little, 7 Greenleaf, 376. lb. 10. (Judgments of a superior court are considered valid.) The See ESTOPPEL; EXECUTORS, &c. 5; PLEAS AND PLEADING, 10. 1. (Judgments without jurisdiction.) Where courts of a special and limited jurisdiction exceed their powers, the whole proceedings are coram non judice, and all concerned in such void pro VOL. IX.-NO. XVIII. 53 ceedings are trespassers. 114. Walbridge v. Hall, 3 Vermont, 2. (Transfer of suits by statute.) The Vermont act of 1824, altering the jurisdiction of the county and supreme courts provides that certain cases be removed from the supreme to the county court, and that all suits in chancery, all writs of error, and suits and appeals, where matters of law are to be litigated, which shall be pending in, or returnable to, the supreme court,' shall be retained and tried by said court. It was held, that an action pending before the supreme court at the time the act went into operation on a case stated and agreed to by the parties, was not transferred by the act from the jurisdiction of said court. lb. 3. (Jurisdiction as to amount.) The sum actually appearing to be due from the record of a judgment, and not the amount for which the judgment was rendered, is the 'debt or matter in demand,' within the meaning of the statute defining the powers of justices of the peace. Southwick v. Merrill, 3 Vermont, 320. JURY. (Wrong instructions to the jury and right verdict.) If a question of law has been erroneously submitted to the decision of the jury, it seems that the court will not, for this cause alone disturb the verdict, if it appears that they have decided it correctly. Springer v. Bowdainham, 7 Greenleaf, 442. See ACTIONS REAL, 2. CONVEYANCE, 9. JURORS. CHARGE TO JURY. (Prejudiced.) A juror must have expressed, as well as formed, an opinion on the merits of the case, in order to disqualify him from sitting. Boardman v. Wood, 3 Vermont, 570. LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. (Allowance for repairs.) Where a landlord demised premises for one year at a specified rent, and agreed that if the tenant continued to occupy the premises for seven years at the same rent, he would pay him money expended in repairs, to the amount of $50, and a sub-tenant surrendered the premises to the landlord fourteen days before the expiration of the seven years, paying him the rent up to that day, it was held, that the landlord, for the residue of the term, must be considered quasi sub-tenant to the original tenant, and that, at the expiration of the seven years, he was liable to his tenant for the payment of the $50 expended in repairs. Benson v. Bolles, 8 Wend. 175. 2. (Sub-tenant.) A party entering into the possession of lands by the consent or permission of a tenant, will be considered, in respect to the rights of the landlord, as substituted in the place of the tenant by whose permission he enters. Ib. 3. (Party presumed to enter under right.) Where a party has a legal right to enter into the possession of land, and does in fact enter, the law presumes that he entered under such right, and not as a trespasser. Ib. 4. (Right to growing crops.) A lessee of the mortgagor, under a lease executed subsequent to the mortgage, is not entitled as against the mortgagee to crops growing on the mortgaged premises at the time of the foreclosure and sale of the same; and the mortgagee becoming the purchaser, may maintain trespass against the lessee for taking and carrying away the crops. Lane v. King, 8 Wend. 584. LEGACY. (All personal estate.') When a testator gives all his personal estate to his wife, and makes no provision for the payment of debts, the law makes the debts a lien upon the personal estate; and it operates like his giving her his personal estate, upon condition of her paying the debts. Dunbar v. Dunbar's ex'rs. 3 Vermont, 472. LEX LOCI. 1. (Applies to the essence of the contract, not to the remedy.) The lex loci applies only to the interpretation or validity of a contract; and not to the time, mode, or extent of the remedy. Judd v. Porter, 7 Greenleaf, 337. 2. (Insolvent laws only affect remedy.) Therefore a discharge under the insolvent laws of another state, of which both the parties were citizens, releasing the person from arrest, but not impairing the contract itself, cannot avail to effect any remedy pursued in Maine. LIEN. lb. 1. (By attachment, dissolved.) Where the parties, pending an action of assumpsit between them, made a settlement of all their accounts, by which a balance was found due to the plaintiff, for which judgment was entered in his favor by consent; and the settlement included some demands for which the writ contained no proper counts, and some which were not payable till after the action was commenced; it was held, that the lien created by the attachment was thereby dissolved in toto, so far as the rights of subsequent attaching creditors were concerned, Clarke v. Foxcroft, 7 Greenleaf, 348. 2. (Attorney's lien.) Where an attorney claims a lien on a judgment for his costs, it is not necessary he should give notice in person to the judgment debtor. Any notice to him which is of a character to obtain credit in ordinary circumstances, that the attorney will insist on his lien, will be sufficient and binding on the debtor, and he will not be protected by a discharge afterwards procured from the judgment creditor. Lake v. Ingham, 3 Vermont, 158. 3. (On sheep taken to pasture.) A man who keeps sheep for a certain period upon a written contract to have such a sum for each, has no lien upon the property for his payment. Cummings v. Harris, 3 Vermont, 244. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. 1. (Promise to settle' is such to pay.) A promise by the maker of a note, barred, by the statute of limitations, when called upon for payment, to settle the note, is equivalent to a promise to pay; and an indorsee may avail himself of such promise, although notice of the indorsement to the maker is not shown. Pinkerton v. Bailey, 8 Wend. 600. 2. (Statutes not retrospective.) The limitation to actions of ejectment for dower created by the revised statutes of New York, requiring a widow to demand her dower within twenty years after the death of her husband, does not apply where the hus band died previous to the revised statutes going into effect. Sayre v. Wisner, 8 Wend. 661. 3. (How a new statute of limitations applies to an existing right.) It seems, however, that the limitation will apply to cases of previous death, if the action be not brought within twenty years after the statute went into effect. lb. 4. (Statutes not retrospective.) A statute is never construed to operate retrospectively so as take away a vested right. 16. 5. (Witnessed note payable in specific articles.) A promissory note payable in specific articles is not within the meaning of the proviso in the statute of limitations of Maine, (1821, ch. 62,) by which promissory notes for the payment of money, if attested by a subscribing witness, are excepted from its operation. Gilman v. Wells, 7 Greenleaf, 25. 6. (Acknowledgement.) The acknowledgement of a debt by one of several joint defendants, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute of limitations as to them all. Getchell v. Heald 7 Greenleaf, 26. 7. (What is the commencement of an action.) The time of the actual making of a writ, with an intention of service, is the time when an action is commenced and sued' within the meaning Greenleaf, 370. See EVIDENCE, 34; EXECUTORS, &c. 7. 1. (Acknowledgement.) An acknowledgement of a debt, in terms 2. (Debt on judgment.) This principle applies to an action of debt on judgment. Ib. 3. (Fraud.) The statute of limitation does not run against an MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. See EVIDENCE, 24, 25. (Equivalent to money.) To support an action for money had and MASTER AND OWNER. See SHIPPING, 1, 2. MASTER AND SERVANT. (Action for apprentice's services.) Where an apprentice is employed by a third person, without the knowledge or consent of his master, the master is entitled to recover the value of his earnings against the employer, even though the latter did not. know that he was an apprentice. Bowes v. Tibbetts, 7 Greenleaf, 457. MILLS. 1. (Flowing roads.) The remedy by complaint, provided by |