position, must know the direction which public engagements require to be given to the means of satisfying them. The power, which either danger or the public credit makes necessary, is one that does not admit of delay, whether Congress be in session or not. The action required, to be effectual, must be in some cases instantaneous. The grant or reservation of such a power to the Secretary of the Treasury, was necessary and proper. But if the public monies were to be made an instrument for effecting an ulterior object, no reason can be imagined why the power of using them should be given to the Secretary rather than to the President, or why it should be given to either, instead of being left to the action of Congress. That, nothing but the safety and distribution of the national treasure were the lawful objects of the Secretary's power, is conclusively shown by the circumstance that the Act to establish the Treasury Department,' the very moment that the Secretary gave the order not to make the deposits in the Bank of the United States, placed them in the hands of the Treasurer, who could lawfully make no disposition of them, but to keep them securely, to be disbursed according to law. A removal of the deposits for any purpose, except to place them in this custody, would be not only a violation of the rights of the Bank, but of the functions of the Treasurer, as created by law."

418. IV. The claim of the Secretary, of right, to select the depositaries of the public treasure, when withheld from the Bank of the United States, falls with his pretension to withhold it. But no portion of this great case requires more consideration, than the employment of substitutes for the Bank of the United States. It may be regarded as to the right and the result.

419. Of the practice on which the claim of right is based, we have already spoken. In proof that it is unwarrantably claimed, we adduce some additional remarks.

"The proper duty of the Secretary is to superintend the collection of the revenue. That of the Treasurer is "to receive and keep the monies of the United States, and to disburse them on warrants drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, countersigned by the proper officers, and recorded according to law. He is required to give bond, in the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, and for the fidelity of the persons to be by him employed. It is the Treasurer, therefore, who is to choose the place of deposit; and he is the

best officer, in theory, as well as the only officer, by the law, to perform the act; because the doctrines of general convenience and interest are not so like to reach him. His object will be security, and his bond is the motive for obtaining it. If there be a treasury practice, which has displaced the Treasurer, the practice should be made to conform to the law, or the law to the practice. As the case now stands, the money of the United States is not deposited, where it is, by direction, and under the sanction, of the law. It is placed in the deposit Banks by an officer who has not the authority so to place it; and in case of controversy, it may possibly be found, not only that the bond of the Treasurer is of no avail, but that, remedies for the loss or detention of the deposits, are not to be obtained in the name of the United States, or in the courts of the United States; but in private names, and in State courts, with all the contingencies incident to litigation in this form. Whatever may be the practice, it is not becoming, that the Treasury of the United States should be in any predicament, but that, precisely, in which the law has given its direction to place it."

420. But where did the Secretary get authority to contract with the State Banks? It would seem as if every step of this officer was over some broken pillar of the law. He was authorized by no law to make, such contracts; nay, he was expressly forbidden by the Act of 1st May, 1820, for the regulation of the departments, which provides, Section 6, that no contract shall thereafter be made by the Secretary of State, or of the Treasury, or of the Department of War, or of the Navy, except under a law authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adéquate to its fulfilment; and excepting, also, contracts for the subsistence and clothing of the army or navy, and contracts by the Quarter Master's Department, which may be made by the Secretaries of those Departments.

421. We are now to consider the result of the substitution of the Executive of other depositaries of the public funds for those provided by law; which leads us, immediately, to the inquiry into the actual condition of the State Banks.

422. It appears, from the best information attainable, that there are in the States, districts and territories, in round numbers, four hundred and fifty Banks; with an aggregate capital of one hundred and forty-six millions of dollars; circulation of nearly one hundred millions; deposits fifty millions; specie about ten millions. The total amount of discounted paper is about two hundred and thirty-three millions.

Thus it is apparent, that, the circulation of the State Banks is about ten times greater than their specie, and that, conse- quently, they would be unable to withstand any run which might drain them, and would be compelled to contract their issues, diminish greatly the circulation, and throw the business operations of the whole country into utter confusion, depreciating the value of property, in proportion to the reduction of the currency. This weakness of the State Banks is apparent from their own exhibitions; but their statements, the most favourable their circumstances will admit, are not entitled to implicit confidence, as may be gathered from the late failures of some, and the notorious shifts of others, to make up accounts for settling or reporting days.

This weakness has a constant tendency to increase, from the disposition of the State Banks to over issues. This inclination is repressible, only by a power perpetually and uniformly active, which, like gravity in the solar system, shall keep each planet in its orbit. This power is found in the Bank of the United States, which is not only sound in itself, having less than two dollars of outstanding notes for one dollar of specie at command, but is the cause that utter rottenness does not pervade a large majority of the State Banks. This important fact was admitted by Mr. Taney himself, in a letter to the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. But with a logic as perverse as the case in which it is employed, he argues, that if the Bank of the United States produces soundness in the State Banks, the object of its creation has been attained; and that, therefore, it may be dismissed as useless;-and that if it have not rendered the circulating medium safe, it has failed in its purpose. With equal propriety, it may be said, that the power of gravity having, for thousands of years, preserved the order of the universe, may be annihilated, and the order be preserved. The presence of both, in their respective places, is indispensa-" ble. Whilst the Bank of the United States is preserved, all other Banks, claiming to be solvent, must keep their paper at par with specie. When that Bank shall be extinguished, the mutual indulgence of the monied institutions will remove this restraint, and a drain of specie from the country will result in the suspension of specie payments.

The Secretary admits the necessity of preserving the Bank, if the present currency be in a sound state; but he denies the soundness of the currency. On this subject he may be safely left at issue, with all the political economists of the country,

the Committees of both Houses of Congress, and, what is quite as much to the purpose, with every individual of the community, who, having the note of any Bank in credit, can obtain specie therefor, in all the markets of the Union, at a rate less than the transportation of specie would cost.

423. But if the currency were not perfect, if the abundance of paper of small denominations limited the use of silver; if mistaken legislation had expelled gold from circulation; these were evils which the good sense of the country, before the attack upon the Bank, had engaged to remedy. Already, without the promptings of the General Government, had the States commenced the suppression of small notes; and so fast as the sense of the true interests of the people prevails over the interests of the Banks, this suppression will be extended. Beyond this, no effort of the General Government, as proposed by the Secretary, can avail. For though it may possibly force the State Banks, in its service, say, one hundred, to disuse notes, under a designated amount, it will have no influence over the remaining three hundred and fifty Banks, whose pernicious issues, unchecked by the regulating power, would be enlarged. with the decrease of competition. Already had the commercial community called for the interference of the Legislature; and had the President and his Secretary of the Treasury been with the pre-adamites, the measures which have been lately adopted, for retaining gold in the country, would have been pursued.

But suppose the mean offered to improve the currency be made efficient, by the co-operation of the States; a measure extremely problematical; would it not be more efficient if applied through the United States Bank? As that institution acts simultaneously and uniformly in all parts of the Union, can we doubt, the effect would be more prompt and universal. But suppose the Government can restrain the issue of the Banks in its employ; what shall compensate for the unrestrained issues of all other Banks which must ensure the dissolution of the United States Bank?

Does not the onward course of things tend, directly, to the state of 1816? Of late, new Banks have been established, in the several States, with aggregate capitals amounting to 43 millions of dollars, and multitudes of applications are daily presented to the State Legislatures for new charters. Each of these Banks will strive to extend its circulation, and will endeavour to avoid specie payments. The more rotten, and

worthless they may be, the more strenuous will be their efforts for this purpose.

424. But whence, does the Executive derive the right, so boldly assumed, of providing the country with a currency whether paper or metalic? The assumption was in every point of view illegal-so palpably illegal, that the partisans of the administration did not venture to support it before Congress.

It is an imputation upon the Congress of 1816, to suppose, that, they intended to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to use any means for changing the currency. Yet he avows this intention; to change it too, in opposition to the provision made by Congress in regard to it. He proposed to > effect this by compelling the Bank of the United States to cease lending, and by enabling the deposit Banks to lend; by circumscribing the circulation of the notes of the one, and enlarging the circulation of the notes of the other; by compelling them all to give him, indirectly, the management of the Banks, without the warrant of law, and to surrender it themselves, contrary to the laws, by which they are, exclusively, entitled to it. No Congress could, and, therefore, no Congress, should be presumed to, have given the Secretary such powers. It would have been a delegation of the highest powers of legislation under the form of ministerial agency. No power requires more circumspection in its use than that for regulating the currency. The currency is the measure of value of every man's property, of his contracts, of the indemnity for the breach of them, and of the revenue of the country; and without a due adjustment of it, it is impossible to distribuțe in equal proportion among the citizens, either the burdens or advantages of civil society. A deranged currency deranges every institution of the country that has relation to property. It gives a premium to fraud, and strips honest labour of its scanty earnings, by paying to it half of its just recompense, in the false and counterfeit name of the whole. Yet this power the Secretary claimed by delegation from the representatives of the people, and exercised it with consequences which spread in a wave of destruction over the whole country.

$425. But suppose a league of the Treasury Banks should succeed in establishing their credit, so as to give general currency to the paper, which past experience and sound reason, utterly, forbid us to expect, will not they, by loans and exchanges, gain the same power over the business of the coun