1. That, the power is unlimited; that the subsequent clause, "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare, giving a substantive, independent power, cannot be restricted to purposes of revenue, merely; 2nd. That, the power is restrained by the subsequent clause, and is given, in order, to pay debts and provide for the common de- fence and general welfare; and 3d. That, the power is fur- ther restrained, to such specific objects as are contained in the other enumerated powers of the Constitution. It is unneces- sary to dwell upon the first two opinions. Either gives all that the advocates of the American System require. Since, by no rational construction, can the power for laying taxes for the public welfare, be restricted to the purpose of revenue, as the public welfare may, unquestionably, be promoted by taxes 62. But with regard to the third opinion, we may remark, that, if revenue be not the sole and exclusive mean of giving 63. If, then, the power to lay taxes be restricted to cases within the enumerated powers, still it is not confined to reve- nue, but extends to all other objects within the scope of such powers. Where the power is expressly given, we are not at liberty to say it is implied. Being given, it may certainly be used to effectuate all the powers to which it is appropriate; not because it may be implied in the grant of such powers, but because it is expressly granted as a substantive power, and may be used, of course, as auxiliary to them. Thus, whatever construction be given to the power of laying taxes, we attain the conclusion, that such power is not confined to purposes of revenue, but that it is, at the discretion of Con- 64. The expediency of exercising this power, depends upon many and various considerations. Whilst all must admit the wisdom of its exercise in the protection of the general in- terests of the country, as commerce and agriculture, and such branches of manufacture, as are indispensable in war; all must recognize the impolicy of its use, when it subserves the in- terests of the few, but oppresses the many. In the case of manufactures, there seems to exist a tolerable safe rule. the manufacturer can now, or at a proximate time, supply the demand of the country in competent quantity and quality, and at a price as advantageous as the foreigner, there can be no substantial reason opposed to protecting him, by discriminating duties, against the foreign artist. In such case, domestic com- petition will soon remove the evil of monopoly. But if the manufacturer cannot comply with these requisites, it would be an act of oppression upon the community, to tax them for his benefit. He would have a monopoly as odious as unjust. In the application of the foregoing rule, some latitude may be allowable in determining what proximation to the qualities above stated as pre-requisite, may warrant the protection. This is a case solely for the wisdom of Congress; and if it were the only one, the subject would possess little difficulty. 65. But a small minority of the Union have, or think they have, interests in relation to it, irreconcilable with those of must, in the spirit of compromise, ever essential to our safety, yield a portion of the general advantages, or, in other words, submit to the evil of insufficient restriction, or we must en- force obedience to the law. If the Union be not worth pre- serving, the refractory State must fall from our brilliant galaxy, and be converted, like other fallen stars, into a loath- some mass; and its citizens, as the citizens of every other foreign State, be enemies in war, in peace, friends. But Cain was not so accursed, as will he be, who shall consummate this work, The brand of infamy burnt not so brightly upon the brow of him who mocked his Saviour, as it will upon the front of him who shall thus impair a Union, in which centres the world's hope of political happiness. 66. III. The right of the General Government to appropriate monies raised by taxation or otherwise, would seem to be as clear as the right to levy taxes for the common defence and general welfare. Both depend upon the same clause of the Constitution; the second part giving the right to appropriate the public money. If it be not given by it, it is not given at. all; there being no other grant in the Contitution which gives it directly, or which bears upon the subject, even by implica- tion, unless it be the prohibition to appropriate money for the support of armies for a longer term than two years, or the pro- hibition to draw inoney from the treasury, without an appropria- tion made by law. This part of the grant gives no distinct and original power. It is manifestly incidental to the objects of the first part, giving the power to lay taxes. If both parts be taken together, it seems impossible to give to the latter any other construction than that contended for; inasmuch as that enumerates the objects to which the public money may be ap- 67. If such be not the true construction of the words, to pro- vide for the common defence and general welfare, they have ei- the militia, or even to lay and collect taxes. An unqualified power "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare," if a distinct and separate grant, would extend to every object of public interest. The power to provide for the common defence would give to Congress the command of the whole force, with all the resources of the Union; but an unqualified right to provide for the general welfare would go much further; would break down the barriers between the States and the General Government, and consolidate the whole under the latter. 68. But, if the clause be construed to mean nothing more than a grant of power to appropriate the public money, every word has an important meaning and effect; and all grants of power by the Constitution have full operation. The great scheme is consistent in all its parts. We have a government instituted for national purposes, vested with adequate powers, commencing with the most important, that of revenue, and proceeding in order to all the others-all formed with the utmost care and circumspection. How much more consistent is this inference with the great objects of the institution, and with the wisdom of those who framed and those who ratified it, than one which subverts every sound principle of construction, and throws all things into confusion! 69. The power being settled, as in the General Government, it becomes necessary to determine what is its extent. It is contended, on one side, that the National Government, being one of limited powers, has no right to expend money, except in cases authorized by specific grants, according to a strict construction of them. That the clause relied on does not, in either of its branches, give to Congress discretionary power of any kind; but is merely an auxiliary to effect the other grants. But the power to raise, and the power to appropriate monies, flowing from the clause, is alike general and unqualified. Each branch was, obviously, drawn with a view to the other; the import of each illustrates that of the other: and all the powers given by the Constitution without qualification, must be exercised without other check than the responsibility of the representative to his constituents, 70. So intimately connected with, and dependent upon, each other are the two branches of this clause, that the limitation of one would have been a limitation of the other. Had the power to raise money been restricted to special purposes, so would have been the power of appropriation. So, if the power of appropriation had been restricted to definite objects, it would have been useless and improper to raise more funds than would be adequate to those purposes. 71. It cannot be doubted that this correspondence and dependence was the result of design. For it would have been impossible to have subjected the grant in either branch to restriction, without serious embarrassment to the Government. Thus, had the exercise of the grant depended on the States it would have been in the helpless, hopeless condition of the confederation: Had the assent of the Supreme Court, or other tribunal, been réquisite, the operations of the Govern ment might have been suspended, and the system disorganized. 72. Many weighty considerations support the construction which has been adopted: Under it, the words "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," have a definite, safe and useful meaning: The idea of their giving unlimited power, superceding every other, is abandoned: They will be considered as granting a right of appropriation indispensable to that of raising revenue, and necessary to every species of expenditure: By it, no new power will be taken from the States; the money to be appropriated being raised under a power already granted: By it, too, the motive for strained construction to other and specific grants, will be greatly diminished; an effect which cannot be too highly ap preciated, when we consider that to whatever extent any specific power may be carried, the right of jurisdiction pursues it in all its, incidents. The important agency of this grant in effecting every other, is a powerful argument in favour of our construction. All other grants are limited by the nature of the offices they respectively perform; each conveying a special power only; this is co-extensive with the scheme of the Government itself. 73. If, then, the right to raise and appropriate the public money, be not restricted to the expenditures under the other specific grants, according to a strict construction of their powers, respectively, is there no limitation to it? The answer is affirmative: That, the limitation is in the purposes for which the nation was organized, and those purposes only. Congress cannot apply money for the exclusive benefit of a State or district: But, any measure which has an aspect of national benefit, however small in itself, as a pier in a river, the improvement of the navigation of a petty, stream pertaining to some general system, is within their power. It may be that the office of discriminating between local and general im |