them by other fortifications within three leagues of the city of Bâsle. By the treaty of 1856, between Russia, Turkey, and the allies, the former stipulated to relinquish her right to construct military-marine arsenals, and to maintain a naval force in the Black sea. All such compacts, when freely entered into, are binding, notwithstanding that they limit the natural rights of independent states. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2; Martens, Recueil des Traités, tome 2, p. 469; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 8, Appendix, pp. 828, et seq.; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, App., special; Heffter, Droit International, Appendice; De Cussy, Precis des Evenements, ch. 12.)

§ 21. These incidental rights may also be modified, or limited, by the equal and corresponding rights of other states. If, under the plea of self-defense, a nation makes extraordinary warlike preparations, inconsistent with pretended pacific intentions, and threatening to the peace and independence of others, such threatened states may very properly demand an explanation, and, if none of a satisfactory character is given, to require a discontinuance of such hostile demonstrations. Such hostile preparations, if not satisfactorily explained, may become a matter of serious complaint, but seldom, if ever, in themselves alone a just cause of war. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §212; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 118; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1, ch. 3.)

§ 22. A distinction, however, must be made between those means and preparations for self-defense, which are exclusively defensive, and those which, from their nature, may also be regarded as offensive. Thus an extraordinary increase of the military and naval forces of a state, may be calculated to alarm other nations whose peace and security they may appear to menace. It is, therefore, usual under such circumstances, to require and to receive amicable explanations of such warlike preparations. And if asked for in a proper tone and spirit, the explanation cannot be properly refused, without giving offense, or, at least, well-founded cause for suspicion. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 212-13; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens., §§ 117, 118; Pinhiero Ferreira,

Com. sur Martens, tome 1, Note 62; Moser, Versuch, etc., t. 6, pp. 409, 413; Gunther, Europ. Volkerrecht, b. 1, pp. 293–319 ;)

§ 23. Not so, however, with respect to the erection and arming of fortifications, which are essentially means of defense and self-preservation. That such works are of immense assistance in carrying on military and naval operations against others, cannot be doubted, but they cannot of themselves be injurious or dangerous to foreign powers. They, therefore, are not just causes of complaint by others. The same may be said of military schools, and a general diffusion of military education and military science among the subjects of a state. They are legitimate and proper means of self-preservation, which every sovereign state has a perfect right to use, and others have no right to require an account of its conduct in this respect. (Jomini, Precis de l'Art de la Guerre, ch. 2, sec. 1, §1; Halleck, Elm. Mil. Art and Science, ch. 3; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 211.)

§ 24. The means of self-preservation which we have hitherto considered as the right of a sovereign state to resort to, are such as are made within its own dominions, or on the high seas. It has been contended by some that, for the same reasons, a state may extend its precautionary measures without its own territorial limits and within the borders of a neighboring state. Mr. Phillimore describes a hypothetical case which would come under this pretended rule of international jurisprudence. "A rebellion, or a civil commotion, it may happen, agitates a nation; while the authorities are engaged in repressing it, bands of rebels pass the frontier, shelter themselves under the protection of the conterminous state, and from thence, with restored strength and fresh appliances, renew their invasions upon the state from which they have escaped. The invaded state remonstrates. The remonstrance, whether from favor to the rebels, or feebleness of the executive, is unheeded, or, at least, the evil complained of remains unredressed. In this state of things, the invaded state is warranted by international law, in crossing the frontier, and in taking the necessary means for her safety, whether these be the capture or dispersion of the rebels, or the destruction of their stronghold, as the exigencies of the case may fairly require." This is certainly a very extraordi

nary pretension; let us examine the reasons by which it has been attempted to sustain this right of extra-territorial jurisdiction. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §213: Phillimore, Letter to Lord Ashburton, p. 27, et seq.)

§ 25 Mr. Phillimore has himself pointed out what he conceives to be the principle of international law, from which he derives this pretended right of one state to transgress the borders of its neighbor's territory in time of peace, not as an act of hostility, but as a kind of pacifico-belligerent right of territorial violability; pacific with respect to the state whose territory is invaded, and belligerent with respect to the particular powers and places attacked or destroyed. "International law," he says, "considers the right of self-preservation as prior and paramount to that of territorial inviolability, and, where they conflict, justifies the maintenance of the former, at the expense of the latter right." The words of the same author, in another place, furnish a complete answer to his argument, viz: "The policy which seeks to establish one principle of international law upon the ruin of others, has been, and always must be, a policy as fatal to the lasting peace of the world as the attempt to promote one moral duty at the expense and by the sacrifice of others, is, and must be, fatal to the peace of an individual." (Phillimore, On International Law, vol. 1, §§ 213, 218, 398.)

§ 26. The defect of Mr. Phillimore's argument, consists in the assumption of a false principle for its basis, and his erroneous premises necessarily lead him to an erroneous conclusion. There can be no conflict of rights, stricti juris, between states in time of peace. No such principle is admitted in the code of public international law. It is a maxim of that law, that every right is followed by corresponding duties and obligations. If, therefore, one state has a right to violate the territory of a neighbor, in time of peace, for what it sees fit to consider the purposes of self-defense, that neighbor is bound to permit its territory to be so violated, as often as the other party may conceive that the necessity exists. But it is an established principle, that every sovereign state has a right to protect the inviolability of its own territory, and that any invasion of it is an act of hostility, which may be repelled by force. So, the other party may also enforce, with

arms, if need be, its own right of territorial transgression, incident to its paramount right of self-defense! Here, then, we have force repelling force in the pacific exercise of established public international rights! This is the legitimate and necessary consequence of Mr. Phillimore's argument. Its defects are too manifest to require any extended discussion. Webster, Off. and Dip. Papers, pp. 104–120, 140-222; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 213, 218; Wildman, International Law, vol. 1, ch. 2.)

§ 27. But it may be asked, shall the state, which is suffering from the piratical incursions organized in, and emanating from a neighboring state, do nothing in self-defense, and for self-preservation? Must she wait till the invading force crosses her own borders, before she can attack or destroy it? Not at all. If the neighboring state, from the want either of the will or of the ability, neglects to prevent such excursions, or to suppress such organizations, the threatened state may cross the frontier and attack or destroy the threatened danger. But the act is one of hostility, and she performs it in the exercise of her belligerent rights, not in the exercise of a pacific right of self-defense. It is not necessary that such act should be preceded by a declaration of war, nor, indeed, that it should be followed by a public and solemn war in form; nevertheless, it is a belligerent act, justifiable, perhaps, by the circumstances of the case and the culpable neglect of the other party, and, as such, belongs to that class of hostile operations known in international jurisprudence as imperfect war, and which will be more particularly discussed in another chapter. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 13; Grotius, de Jur. Bel ac Pac., lib 1, cap. 3, § 1; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 3; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 6, § 72.)

CHAPTER V.

RIGHTS OF EQUALITY.

CONTENTS.

1. Natural equality of sovereign states- 22. Consequences of this equality3. Titles of states and of their rulers-2 4. Effect of custom and treaty upon rights of equality-5. Case of the Pope and Emperor of Germany 6. Rights and precedents of rulers and representatives of states

7. Examples of disputes, and the mode of arranging them - 8. Royal honors-9. Emperors and kings- 10. Monarchical sovereigns- 11. Semi-sovereign and dependent monarchical states-12. Rank of republics-13. General rule of equality and precedence- 14. Usage of the alternat-15. Language of diplomatic intercourse and treaties-? 16. Military and maritime ceremonials -3 17. How regulated — 18. Maritime ceremonials in the narrow seas- 19. In foreign ports and on the high seas- 20. Treaties respecting salutes, etc.- 21. General rules established by text-writers- 22. Salutes between ships and forts-2 23. Ships in foreign ports- 24. Regulations as to salutes in the British navy25. French naval regulations- 26. Spanish regulations — ¿ 27. U. S. army and navy regulations - 28. Difficulties in the application of these rules-29. May be avoided by making all salutes international.

§1. "Nations," says Vattel, "composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living together in the state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom." In other words, all sovereign states, without respect to their relative power,