pt. 2, ch. 1, § 13; Garden, De la Diplomatie, tome 1, p. 436; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 44-46; Rayneval, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 22.)

§ 12. But suppose the award has been made without collusion, and has been confined to the terms of the submission, and that one of the parties should refuse to abide by the decision, although both agreed to do so, will such refusal justify the mediating power in employing force to compel obedience to its decision? To decide this question, it will be necessary to inquire into the particular circumstance of each case. The arbitrator's right to use force, in order to carry his decision into effect, if it exist at all, must be deduced from the terms of the agreement entered into by the contracting parties to the submission. It does not result, as a necessary consequence of his undertaking the office of arbitrator. But this question will be more particularly discussed under the head of wars of intervention; we are here considering only the general right of pacific interference, or pacific mediation, in the internal affairs of a state. (Vide Post, chapter xiv, § 12; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 395; Heffter, Droit International, § 45; Rayneval, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens. liv. 3, ch. 22.)

Such

§ 13. There are certain cases where the very character of the constitution or government of one state may authorize the interference of another in the choice of its rulers. cases, however, are mainly confined to semi-sovereign, or dependent states. But the states of the church have usually been regarded, in the international law of Europe, as sovereign and independent. Nevertheless, Austria, France, and Spain, as catholic countries, have a voice in the election of the Pope, who is the temporal sovereign of the Roman states, as well as the supreme Pontiff of the Roman Catholic church. But if these spiritual and temporal officers should be separated, the right of foreign states to interfere in the choice of the person to fill the office of civil ruler, might well be questioned. In the case of a composite state, or a confederation of several states, the right of one state to interfere in the affairs of another, or of the supreme government to interfere with that of one of its constituents, will depend upon the constitution or plan of confederation; it does not result from

any general right in sovereign states, as recognized by international law. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 1, §§ 13– 16; Mayer, Corpus Juris Germ., lib. 2, p. 196; Kluber, Droit des Gens, pt. 2, tit. 1, ch. 2; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 76; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1, pt. 3, § 6; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 40, 41; Acte, Final du Congress de Vienna, art. 74; Constitution of the United States, art. 3.)

§ 14. Another incident to the sovereignty of a state is its independence of every other in its legislative power, so far as such independence does not conflict with the sovereign rights of other states, and is not limited or modified by acts of union or the stipulations of treaty. There is, however, properly speaking, no conflict in laws relating to public international jurisprudence, so long as each sovereign state confines its legislation within its own proper and legitimate limits, that is, to the regulation of the rights and duties of its own subjects inter se, and in their relations to their own government. But in what is called private international law, which regulates the rights of individuals of one state with respect to the laws and institutions of other states, there is not unfrequently a conflict of laws. A consideration of this subject belongs to another chapter. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1; Foelix, Droit International Privé, § 3; Vide Post, ch. 7, §§ 1 et seq.; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1, pt. 3, §7; Rayneval, Droit de la Nat., etc., liv. 1, ch. 11; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 2, tit. 1, cap. 1.)

§ 15. So, also, every sovereign state is independent of every other in the exercise of its judicial power, which, subject to the exceptions already mentioned, is coëxtensive with its legislative power. At the same time, this power does not embrace cases where the municipal institutions of another nation operate within its territory, as in cases of a public minister, a foreign fleet or army, rights of exterritoriality conceded by treaty, etc. But these questions will be more particularly discussed elsewhere. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 12; Bynkershoek, De Foro Legat., cap. 3; Casaregis, Discursus, Leg., pp. 136, 174; The Exchange v. McFaden, 7 Cranch., Rep., p. 135; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1, pt. 3, § 7; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 4, §4; Rayneval, Droit de la Nat., etc., liv. 1, ch. 11.)

§ 16. Every sovereign state being independent of all others in the exercise of its legislative and judicial powers, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that it is also independent of all others in the rewards and punishments of its own subjects. It may make its own laws defining offenses, organise its own tribunals for trying them, and for awarding punishments to its own subjects, and it may inflict its punishments upon its own subjects found in its own vessels upon the high seas, or within its own territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, its laws and penalties follow its citizens into all places and all countries; but it can neither arrest nor punish them within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state, except where such a right is conceded by treaty stipulations. (Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum, cap. 2, §8; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, cap. 2, §2, Huberus, Praelect, tome 2, liv. 1, tit. 3; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 60; Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch. Rep., p. 278; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1,pt. 3, §7.)

§ 17. The case of Martin Koszta, in 1853, and the discussions resulting from his seizure and forcible release, have given to the foregoing rule of international law a prominent position in the public mind. Koszta, a Hungarian banished from Austrian dominions for political offenses, had acquired a domicil and taken the preliminary steps to naturalization in the United States. While thus clothed with the national character of the United States, his business called him to the Turkish port of Smyrna, where he was seized by Austrian agents, and confined in an Austrian vessel of war, the Husza, preparatary to transportation to the Austrian port of Trieste. The Turkish authorities not only disavowed this act of Austrian officials, but protested against their conduct as in violation of Turkish sovereignty. Under these circumstances, the captain of the United States vessel of war, the St. Louis, demanded and enforced Koszta's release from the Austrian vessel. Austria not only demanded a disavowal by the United States of the acts of the American agents, and satisfaction for what she deemed an offense to her own flag, but also sent a circular to other European courts, complaining of the rescue of Koszta as a violation of international law. All these allegations were most clearly and satisfactorily disproved in the masterly despatch of Mr. Marcy, the American Secretary of

In an

State, to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, in which it was shown that Austria had been the real aggressor, and that the United States had made no intentional encroachment upon the sovereign territorial rights of Turkey. Had that power been able to protect the integrity of her soil from Austrian encroachment, in the seizure of a person clothed with American nationality, there would have been no occasion for the interposition of American authority for the protection of that person. But in her own inability to protect the rights of Americans against Austrian aggression, she assented to and approved the acts of the American agents in doing so themselves; and certainly if she was satisfied, others had no right to complain in a matter which in no way affected them. Baron de Cussy, in reviewing this transaction, has not duly considered this point, nor indeed has he correctly and fully stated the true facts and circumstances of the case. swer to the charge of a violation of international law by the United States, with respect to Turkey, Mr. Marcy said: "Before closing this communication, the undersigned will briefly notice the complaint of Austria against Captain Ingraham, for violating the neutral soil of the Ottoman Empire. The right of Austria to call the United States to an account for the acts of their agents, affecting the sovereign territorial rights of Turkey, is not perceived, and they do not acknowledge her right to require any explanation. If anything was done at Smyrna in derogation of the sovereignty of Turkey, this government will give satisfactory explanation to the Sultan when he shall demand it, and it has instructed its minister resident to make this known to him. He is the judge, and the only rightful judge, in this affair, and the injured party too. He has investigated its merits, pronounced judgment against Austria, and acquitted the United States; yet, strange as it is, Austria has called the United States to an account for violating the sovereign territorial rights of the Emperor of Turkey." (Marcy to Hulsemann, Sept. 26th, 1853; Cong. Doc., 33d Cong., 1st sess. Sen., Ex. Doc. No. 1; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 5, note (a); De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 2, ch. 12, § 12.)

§ 18. Another right immediately resulting from the independence of sovereign states, is that of self-preservation. This

is one of the most essential and important rights incident to state sovereignty, and lies at the foundation of all the rest. It is not only a right with respect to other states, but a duty with respect to its own members, and one of the most solemn and important duties which it owes to them. "The right of "self-preservation," says Phillimore, "is the first law of "nations, as it is of individuals. A society which is not in "a condition to repel aggression from without, is wanting in "its principal duty to the members of which it is composed, "and to the chief end of its institution." (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 210; Vattel, Droit des Gens, lib. 1, ch. 24, § 177; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 1, §2; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 116; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1, pt. 3, § 5; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1, ch. 3.)

§ 19. This right of self-preservation necessarily involves all other incidental rights which are essential as means to give effect to the principal end. And other nations have no right to prescribe what these means shall be, or to require any account or explanation of the conduct of a sovereign state in this respect, except so far as their own peace and safety may be affected or threatened. The means usually resorted to for this purpose are the construction of fortifications, the organization of military and naval forces, and the contraction of alliances with other states. "The full liberty of a nation in this respect," says Phillimore, "cannot, as a general principle of international law, be too boldly announced or too firmly maintained." (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 211; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, §2; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 117.)

§ 20. But the exercise of these incidental rights may be modified or controlled by special compacts freely entered into with other states. Thus, by the treaties of 1748, and 1763, France engaged to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk, and this stipulation, so humiliating to the French nation, was not effaced till the treaty of 1783. Again, by the treaty of 1815, France engaged to demolish the fortifications of Huningen, and never to renew them nor to replace