cannot make any change contrary to fundamental principles; that he cannot, for instance, exempt the inhabitants of the conquered territory from the power of parliament, or the laws of trade, or give them privileges exclusive of his other subjects. Thus, Ireland received the laws of England by the charters and commands of Henry II., John, Henry III., Edward I., and the subsequent kings, without the interposition of the parliament of England. The same is said of Wales, Berwick, Gascony, Guienne, Calais, Gibraltar, Minorca, etc. So, of New York; after its conquest from the Dutch, Charles II. changed its constitution and political government by letters patent to the Duke of York. If the king comes to a kingdom by conquest, he may change and alter the laws of that kingdom; but if he comes to it by title and descent, he cannot change the laws of himself without the consent of parliament. The constitutions of most English provinces, immediately under the king, have arisen not from grants, but from commissions to governors to call assemblies. In 1722, Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Clement Wearge reported on the assembly of Jamaica's withholding the usual supplies, that "If Jamaica was still to be considered a conquered island, the king had a right to levy taxes upon the inhabitants; but if it was to be considered in the same light as the other colonies, no tax could be imposed on the inhabitants but by an assembly of the island, or by an act of parliament." They considered, says Lord Mansfield, the distinction in law as clear, and an indisputable consequence of the island being in the one state or in the other. Whether it remained a conquest, or was made a colony, they did not examine. A maxim of constitutional law, as declared by all the judges in Calvin's case, and which to such men, in modern times, as Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Clement Wearge, took for granted, will require some authorities to shake. But, on the other side, no book, no saying, no opinion has been cited, and no instance in any period of history produced, where a doubt has been raised concerning it. (Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper Rep., p. 205; Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 1 Cowper Rep., p. 165; Calvin's Casc, Coke Rep., part 7; Callett v. Lord Keith, 2 East. Rep., p. 260; Blankard v. Guldy, 2 Salkeld. Rep., p. 411; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 16, p. 158.)

§16. The right of the king to change the laws of a conquered territory, after the war, results, according to the decisions of English courts, from his constitutional power to make a treaty of peace, and consequently to yield up the conquest, or to retain it upon whatever terms he pleases, provided those terms are not in violation of fundamental principles. But the President of the United States can make no treaty without the concurrence of two-thirds of the senate, and his authority over ceded conquered territory, though derived from the law of nations, is limited by the constitution and subordinate to the laws of congress. It, however, is well settled by the supreme court, that, as constitutional commander-in-chief, he is authorized to form a civil or military government for the conquered territory during the war, and that when such territory is ceded to the United States, as a conquest, the existing government, so established, does not cease as a matter of course or as a consequence of the restoration of peace; that, on the contrary, such government is rightfully continued after the peace, and till congress legislates otherwise; but, that the President may virtually dissolve this government by withdrawing the officers who administer it; provided, he does not thereby neglect his constitutional obligation "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." He is bound, for example, to prevent the landing of foreign goods in the United States out of any collection district and without the payment of duties, and to do this he must employ the constitutional means at his disposal. He may do this through the government which he had established during the war, by the right of conquest, and which existed when that conquest was ratified by peace, or, if he dissolve that government, the constitutional obligation remains to be performed by other means. So long as that government continues, with the express or implied sanction of the president, it represents the sovereignty of the United States, and has the legal authority to enforce and execute the laws which extend over such territory. Congress may, at any time, put an end to this government of the conquered territory, and organize a new one; or it may permit the people of such territory to form a constitution, and admit it as a new state into the union. The power of congress over such territory is clearly exclusive and

universal, and their legislation is subject to no other control or limit than the stipulations of cession and the constitution. But, connected with these general rights and powers of congress, there are also obligations and duties. These are to be ascertained from the law of nations, the stipulations of cession, and the principles of the federal constitution. But so long as neither congress nor the President direct otherwise, the government established during the war, and existing on the restoration of peace, continues with the implied consent of both. "The right inference," says Mr. Justice Wayne, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the supreme court, "from the inaction of both, is, that it was meant to be continued until it had been legislatively changed. No presumption of a contrary intention can be made. Whatever may have been the cause of delay, it must be presumed that the delay was consistent with the true policy of the government." California and New Mexico were acquired by conquest, confirmed by cession. During the war they were governed as conquered territory under the law of nations, and in virtue of the belligerent rights of the United States as the conqueror, by the direction and authority of the president, as commander-in-chief. By the ratification of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, on the 20th of May, 1848, they became a part of the United States, as ceded conquered territory. The civil governments, established in each during the war, and existing at the date of the treaty of peace, continued in operation after that treaty had been ratified. California, with the assent and coöperation of the existing government, formed a constitution, which was ratified by its inhabitants, and a state government was put in full operation in December, 1849, with the implied assent of the President, the officers of the existing government of California publicly and formally surrendering all their powers into the hands of the newly constituted authorities. The constitution so formed and ratified was approved by congress, and California was, on the 9th of September, 1850, admitted into the union as a state. New Mexico also formed a constitution, and applied to congress for admission as a state; the application was not granted; but, on the 9th of September, 1850, New Mexico and the part of California not included within the limits of the new

state were organized into territories, with new territorial governments, which took the place of those organized during the war, and existing on the restoration of peace. (Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper Rep.. p. 204; U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 9, pp. 446, 452, 453; Cross, et al., v. Harrison, 16 Howard Rep., p. 164; Dunlop, Digest of Laws of U. S., pp. 1238–1250; Brightly, Digest of Laws of U. S., pp. 105, 693, 890; Story, On the Constitution, b. 3, ch. 31, § 668; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. Rep., p. 393.)

§17. It seems to be a well established rule of the law of nations, that, on the cession of a conquered territory by a treaty of peace, the inhabitants of such territory are remitted to the municipal laws and usages which prevailed among them before the conquest, so far as not changed by the constitution or political institutions of the new sovereignty, and the laws of that sovereignty which proprio vigore extend over them. This leads us to enquire, first, whether the municipal laws in force prior to the conquest, and suspended or changed during the war, are revived ipso facto by the treaty of peace; and second, what laws of the new sovereignty are considered as extending over the acquired territory immediately on its cession, and without any special provisions to that effect, either in the laws themselves, or, as enacted by the legislative power. It has already been shown that, according to the decision of the English courts, the laws of the conquered territory must be subordinate to the British constitution, as the king himself cannot there establish laws, or confer privileges contrary to fundamental principles. And there can be little doubt that the federal constitution is extended over conquered territory which, by confirmation or cession, becomes a part of the United States. It is true that the territory acquired as a conquest is to be preserved and governed as such, until the sovereignty to which it has passed, legislate for it, or gives it the authority to legislate for itself. In conquests made by England, this may be done by the commands or letters-patent of the king, and in those made by the United States, by the law of congress. In the former case, the local government acting under royal authority, represents the crown, and must act in subordination to parliament, and the fundamental principles of the British

constitution. In the latter case, the local government, acting under the direction of the president, represents the sovereignty of the United States, to which the territory has passed. And, as that sovereignty is the United States, under the federal constitution, no powers can be exercised in that territory, either by the president, or by congress, which are opposed to the federal constitution, and it necessarily follows that the inhabitants of such territory, acquire, immediately on its becoming a part of the United States, the privileges, rights, and immunities guaranteed by the constitution. They do not, indeed, thereby acquire the political rights of citizens, entitling them to vote for representatives in congress, or to sue and be sued in the federal courts; but they thereby become privileged as subjects of the United States, and no powers opposed to the federal constitution can be exercised over them; they owe an allegiance to the government of the United States, and are entitled to its protection. (Calvin's Case, Coke Rep., part 7; Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper Rep., p. 204; Cross, et al. v. Harrison, 16 Howard Rep., p. 165; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard Rep., p. 293.)

§ 18. We have already remarked, that the relations of the inhabitants of the conquered terrritory, inter se, are not, in general, changed by the act of conquest and military occupation; nevertheless, that the conqueror, exercising the powers of a de facto government, may suspend or alter the municipal laws of the conquered territory, and make new ones in their stead. Such changes are of two kinds, viz: those which relate to a suspension of civil rights and civil remedies, and the substitution of military laws, and military courts and proceedings; and those which relate to the introduction of new municipal laws, and new legal remedics and civil proceedings. There can be no doubt that when the war ceases, the inhabitants of the ceded conquered territory cease to be governed by the code of war. Although the government of military occupation may continue, the rules of its authority are essentially changed. It no longer administers the laws of war, but only those of peace. The governed are no longer subject to the severity of the code military, but are remitted to their rights, privileges, and immunities, under the code civil. Hence, any laws, rules, or regulations introduced by