Quæst. Jur. Pub., lib. 2, cap. 10; Puffendorf, De Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 8, cap. 12. § 2; Heineccius, Elementa Juris Nat. et Gent., lib. 2, § 231; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 1, §§ 6-8; Heffter, Droit International, § 25.)

§ 26. The dismemberment of a state, by the loss of a portion of its subjects and territory, does not affect its identity, whether such loss be caused by foreign conquest, or by the revolt and separation of a province. Such a change no more effects its rights and duties, than a change in its internal organization, or in the person of its rulers. This doctrine applies to debts due to, as well as from, the state, and to its rights of property and its treaty obligations, except so far as such obligations may have particular reference to the revolted or dismembered territory or province. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 11; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. 2, cap. 9, §8; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 8, cap. 12, §§ 1, 2, 3; Heffler, Droit International §§ 24,25; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 137; Heineccius, Elementa Juris., lib. 2, § 231; Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, p. 546; Terrett et al. v. Taylor, 9 Cranch's Rep., p. 50; Calvin's Case, 7 Coke Rep., p. 27; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 68.)

§ 27. The case is slightly different where one state is divided into two or more distinct and independent sovereignties. In that case, the obligations which had accrued to the whole, before the division, are, (unless they have been the subject of a special agreement,) rateably binding upon the different parts. This principle is established by the concurrent opinions of text-writers, the decisions of courts, and the practice of nations. It was incorporated into the treaty by which the modern kingdom of Belgium was established. Kent says: "If a state should be divided with respect to territory, its rights and obligations are not impaired; and if they have not been apportioned by special agreement, those rights are to be enjoyed, and those obligations fulfilled, by all the parts in common." Story says: Story says: "It has been asserted, as a principle of common law, that the division of an empire creates no forfeiture of previously vested rights of property; and this principle is equally consonant with the common sense of mankind, and the maxims of eternal justice." (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 68; Kent, Com. on Amer. Law, vol. 1, p.

26; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 9; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 137; Heffler, Droit International, § 25; Zacharia, Staats un Bundesrecht, § 58; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac, liv. 2, ch. 9, § 10; Terrett et al v. Taylor et al, 9 Cranch's Rep., p. 50; Kelly v. Harrison, 2 Johnson's Cases, p. 29; Jackson v. Dunn, 3 Johnson's Cases, p. 109; Calvin's Case, 7 Coke Rep., p. 27; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Souveraineté.)

§ 28. The converse of this rule is also generally true; that is, where several separate states are incorporated into a new sovereignty, the rights and obligations which had accrued to each one separately, before the incorporation, belong to, and are binding upon the new state which is created by such incorporation. But the rule must be varied or modified to suit the nature of the union formed, and the character of the act itself of incorporation in each particular case. Thus, a distinction must be made between the mere union, or confederation of states, and the creation of a new sovereignty, or composite state. In the one case, the obligations would remain with the states originally separate, while in the other case, they would, as a general rule, be transferred from the constituent parts to the new body politic. But if, by the act of incorporation, and by the constitution of the composite state, the rights and obligations of the component parts were to remain with the states originally separate, it could hardly be contended that the new sovereignty had either acquired the one or incurred the other. What might be claimed or incurred, under a general rule of presumptive law, could hardly be enforced against written instruments which provide especially against such claims or obligations. Nevertheless, if one of these constituent parts, originally a separate state, should, by the act of incorporation, vest in the new sovereignty all its means of satisfying its debts and obligations, the new state would, even in the case of a mere federal union, be bound to assume such debts and obligations to the extent of the means so transferred. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §137; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §9; pt. 4, ch. 1, § 12; Wheaton, Hist. Law, of Nations, pp. 492-546; Florida Bonds, Com. of Claims between U. S. and G. B., pp. 246, et seq.; Holford's Case, Com. of Claims between U. S. and G. B. pp. 382, et seq.; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 68; Grotius,

Jur. Bel. ac. Pac., lib. 2, cap. 9, §9; Heineccius, Elementa Juris, lib. 2, p. 231; Flassan, Hist. de la Diplo., tome 3, p. 129; Merlin, Repertoire verb. Souveraineté.)

CHAPTER IV.

RIGHTS OF INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-PRESERVATION.

CONTENTS.

1. Independence of a sovereign state-2. Foreign interference in its internal government - 3. Its right to choose its own rulers - 4. Such interference in dependent and confederated states-25. Interference in virtue of treaty stipulations - 6. Proffered mediation, and mediation by invitation 7. Distinction between pacific mediation and armed intervention-8. When an arbitrator may employ force 29. Interference to preserve a balance of power - 10. Treaty of Paris and Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815 — 11. Attempted tripartite treaty respecting Cuba 12. Interference for self-security- 13. This a pretext rather than an excuse — 14. Independence of a state in its legislation - 15. In its judiciary16. In rewarding and punishing its own subjects - 17. The case of Martin Koszta 18. Right of self-preservation - 19. Means incidental to general right—¿ 20. Use of these means may be limited by treaty-21. By the rights of others- 22. Extraordinary increase of army and navy - 23. Fortifications and military schools- 24. Right of self-defence without the limits of a state- 25. Mr. Phillimore's basis of this pretended right- 26. Defect of his argument - 27. Such acts are belligerent, even when justifiable.

§1. Every sovereign state may, from the very nature of its organization, freely exercise its sovereign rights in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of other states. The very fact of its sovereignty implies its independence of the control of any other state. It may therefore exercise all rights and contract all obligations incident to its sovereignty,

as a separate, distinct, and independent society, or political organization. These rights and obligations are limited only by the law of nature and the existence of similar rights in others. The international rights of sovereign states have therefore been divided into two classes: absolute and conditional, the former, including those rights to which a state is entitled as a distinct being or sovereignty, and the latter including those rights to which it is entitled only under particular circumstances in its relation to others. (Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 1, §1; Kluber, Droit des Gens, § 36; Vattel, Droit des Gens, prelim., §15; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit Nat., liv. 2, ch. 1; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 1, §7; Heffler, Droit International, §§ 29-31; Riquelme, Derecho Internacional, lib. 1, tit. 1, sec. 1, cap. 5; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1, ch. 3.)

§ 2. The right of every sovereign state to establish, alter, or abolish, its own municipal constitution and form of government, would seem to follow, as a necessary conclusion, from these premises. And from the same course of reasoning, it will be inferred, that no foreign state can interfere with the exercise of this right, no matter what political or civil institutions such sovereign state may see fit to adopt for the government of its own subjects and citizens. It may freely change from a monarchy to a republic, from a republic to a limited monarchy, or to a despotism, or to a government of any imaginable shape, so long as such change is not of a character to immediately, or of necessity, affect the independence, freedom and security of others. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 47, 68; Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 1, §12; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 148; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §78; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1, ch. 2; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, ch. 9, §8; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 2, ch. 21, §1; Heffter, Droit Internacional, § 26.)

§ 3. The right of a sovereign state to the choice of its own rulers rests upon the same foundation as its right to determine the form of its own internal constitution; and the interference of a foreign state in the one case cannot be justified except under the same circumstances and upon the same grounds as in the other, viz., the immediate and pressing danger