conqueror, and not to the orders of the displaced government. Of lands and immovable property belonging to the conquered state, the conqeror has, by the rights of war, acquired the use so long as he holds them. The fruits, rents and profits are, therefore, his, and he may lawfully claim and receive them. Any contracts or agreements, however, which he may make with individuals farming out such property, will continue only so long as he retains control of them, and will cease on their restoration to, or recovery by, their former owner. (Heffler, Droit International, § 131–133, 186; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 13, § 197, et seq.; Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters Rep., p. 542; Flemming, et al. v. Page, 9 Howard Rep., p. 603; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 7; Schwartz, De Jure Vic. in Res Incorp., th. 27; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, pp. 163, et seq.)

5. The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of the conqueror. Important changes of this kind are seldom made, as the conqueror has no interest in interfering with the municipal laws of the country which he holds by the temporary rights of military occupation. He nevertheless has all the powers of a de facto government, and can, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws, or make new ones. Such changes, however, are, in general, only of a temporary character, and end with the government which made them. On the confirmation of the conquest by a treaty of peace, the inhabitants of such territory are, as a general rule, remitted to the municipal laws and usages which prevailed among them prior to the conquest. Neither the civil nor the criminal jurisdiction of the conquering state is considered, in international law, as extending over the conquered territory during military occupation. Although the national jurisdiction of the conquered power is replaced by that of military occupation, it by no means follows that this new jurisdiction is the same as that of the conquering state. On the contrary, it is usually very different in its character, and always distinct in its origin. Hence, the ordinary jurisdiction of the conquering state does not extend to actions, whether civil or criminal, originating

in the occupied territory. "Military occupation and military government," says Ortolan, "is not sufficient to change the national jurisdiction, and to substitute the jurisdiction of the occupying state for that of the territory temporarily occupied. Such an effeet is produced only by incorporation or definitive occupation. We refer here only to the jurisdiction of common law, and the ordinary and usual cognisance of cases, without in any manner diminishing the rights derived from war and the measures necessary for the government of military occupation." The author then refers to a decision of the court of cassation on appeal from the court of assizes of the Pyrénées Orientales, in the case of Villasseque, a Frenchman, charged with the crime of assassination committed in the territory of Catalonia, Spain, during the military occupation by France, in the summer of 1811. It was contended by the prosecution that, inasmuch as Catalonia was occupied by French troops, and the government administered by French authorities, it must be considered as French territory; but the court in its decision (Arrêt du 22 Janvier, 1818,) said: "This occupation and this administration by French troops and French authorities, had not communicated to the inhabitants of Catalonia the title of Frenchmen, nor to their territory the quality of French territory; this communication could result only from an act of union emanating from the public authority, which never existed." The same view has been taken by the Attorney General of the United States, with respect to crimes committed in Mexico during the military occupation of that country by the United States. (Hefter, Droit International, § 131; Ortolan, Diplomatic de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 13; Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper Rep., p. 204; Cross, et al. v. Harrison, 16 Howard Rep., p. 193; Toucey, Opinions U. S. Att'ys Gen'l, vol. 5, p. 55; Kamptz, Literatur des Volkerrecht, § 307; Cocceius, De Jure Vic. in Res Incorp, passim.)

§ 6. How then are crimes to be punished which are committed in territory occupied by force of arms, but which are not of a military character nor provided for in the military code of the conquering state? To solve this question it will be sufficient to recur to the principles already laid down. Although the laws and jurisdiction of the conquering state

do not extend over such foreign territory, yet the laws of war confer upon it ample power to govern such territory, and to punish all offenses and crimes therein by whomsoever committed. The trial and punishment of the guilty parties may be left to the ordinary courts and authorities of the country, or, they may be referred to special tribunals organized for that purpose by the government of military occupation; and where they are so referred to special tribunals, the ordinary jurisdiction is to be considered as suspended quoad hoc. It must be remembered that the authority of such tribunals has its source, not in the laws of the conquering, nor in those of the conquered state, but, like any other powers of the government of military occupation, in the laws of war; and, in all cases not provided for by the laws actually in force in the conquered territory, such tribunals must be governed and guided by the principles of universal public jurisprudence. How far the laws of the former government continue in force after the conquest, and how far they are replaced by those of the conquering state, by those enacted by the government de facto, or by new principles of jurisprudence, or usages and customs introduced with the conquerors, is considered in other places, and need not be repeated here. In the war between the United States and the republic of Mexico, it was found that no provisions had been made in the United States rules and articles of war for numerous cases, civil and criminal, between citizens of the United States and between such citizens and foreigners, in Mexican territory occupied by our troops, and consequently without the jurisdiction of any court of the United States. All such cases, of a eriminal character, arising in the territory of Mexico occupied by the "main army" under General Scott, were referred by him to "military commissions," which were special tribunals constituted and appointed for that purpose; in California, they were usualy left to be decided by the ordinary tribunals of the country, although special tribunáls were there organized, in a few special cases, by the government of military occupation. This was in conformity to principle,― martial law of the conqueror, or, as it has been called, "extra-territorial martial law," was the governing rule, while the civil or special tribunal was the instrument

of, or acted in subordination to, the military power, and the limitations to this power were the laws of war. (Heffter, Droit International, § 131; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 13; Kamptz, Literatur des Volk, §§ 307, 308; Gardner, Inst. of Am. Int. Law, p. 208; Cushing, Opinions of U. S. A. G., pp. 365, et seq.; Howard, Parl. Deb., N. S., vol. 115, p. 880; Scott, Gen'l Orders, No. 20, Feb. 19th, 1847; Marcy, to Scott, Feb. 15, 1847; Cong. Doc., No. 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess. H. of R., p. 874.)

§ 7. It is said by English writers, that when a country has been conquered by British arms, it immediately becomes a dominion of the king in right of his crown, and that the inhabitants of such conquered territory, once received under the king's protection, become his subjects and are universally to be regarded in that light, and not as enemies or aliens. As no other act than that of conquest is requisite to make the conquered territory a dominion of the crown, and nothing more than submission to the king's authority and protection, on the part of the inhabitants of such territory, is necessary to make them subjects of the king, such territory is no longer to be regarded, either by other nations or by other parts of the British empire, as a foreign country, or its inhabitants as aliens. In other words, foreign territory becomes a dominion, and its inhabitants the subjects of the king, ipso facto, by the conquest made by the British arms, without any action of the legislature,—the parliament of Great Britain. (Calvin's Case, Coke Rep., part 7; Elphinstone v. Bedreechund, Knapp. Rep., p. 338; Campbell v. Hall, 23 State Trials, p 322; Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowper Rep., p. 205; Fabrigas v. Moslyn, 1 Cowper Rep., p. 165; Callet v. Lord Keith, 2 East Rep., p. 260; Blankard v. Guldy, 4 Mod. Rep., p. 225.)

§ 8. But a different rule holds in the United States. The peculiar character of our government, and the powers vested in it by the federal constitution, have given rise to rules somewhat peculiar and anomalous, with respect to the government of conquered territory. The President, in the exercise of his constitutional power as commander-in-chief of the army, and the military officers under his authority, may, when war has been declared, seize the enemy's possessions, and estab

lish a government and laws for the territory so seized and occupied. Such territory is subject to the sovereignty and dominion of the United States as soon as the enemy is driven out or submits to our arms. But neither the President nor his officers can extend the limits, or enlarge the boundaries of the union. This can only be done by congress. As the institutions and laws of the United States do not extend beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power, the inhabitants of a conquered territory, during its military occupation by the United States, can claim none of the rights and privileges established by such laws. And even where these institutions and laws are adopted by the government of military occupation, the rights which they confer upon the inhabitants of the conquered territory, do not extend to the states or territories of the United States. The conquered territory is under the sovereignty and authority of the union; but it is not a part of the United States; nor does it cease to be a foreign country, or its inhabitants cease to be aliens, in the sense in which these words are used in our laws. They are to be governed by martial law, as regulated and limited by public law. But while such territory forms no part of the union, and its inhabitants have none of the rights, immunities, and privileges of citizens of the United States, under the federal constitution and laws; nevertheless, other nations are bound to regard the conquered territory, while in our possession, as territory of the United States, and to respect it as such, and to regard its inhabitants as under our protection and government; "for, by the laws and usages of nations," says Chief Justice Taney, "conquest is a valid title, while the victor maintains the exclusive possession of the conquered country. The citizens of no other nation, therefore, have a right to enter it without the permission of the American authorities, nor to hold intercourse with its inhabitants, nor to trade with them. As regards all other nations, it is a part of the United States, and belongs to them as exclusively as the territory included in our established boundaries." (Gardner, Institutes, p. 208; Flemming, et al. v. Page, 9 Howard Rep., p. 615; Cross, et al. v. Harrison, 16 Howard Rep., p. 164.)