sidered that a wife divorced, a mensâ et thoro, may, after her divorce, choose her own domicil. But not so in case of a mere separation. A minor, who is not sui juris, cannot change his domicil of his own accord, (propria marte ;) his domicil is that of the father, or of the mother during widowhood, or, perhaps in some cases, of the legally appointed guardian. With respect to the question of succession to an intestacy, some writers contend that neither the mother nor the guardian can change the domicil of a minor whose father is deceased, while others hold the contrary doctrine; all, however, agree that the forum of the minor is that of the surviving parent or legal guardian. The domicil of an illegitimate minor is that of the mother. Students, whether majors or minors, are not considered as acquiring a domicil in the place where they sojourn merely for the purpose of prosecuting their studies. Servants may, or may not, have the same domicil as their masters, according to the particular circumstances of the case. (Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 5; Phillimore, Law of Domicile, §§ 39-112; Justinian, Dig. 50, 1, 37; Code xii, 1, 13, x, 40, 9; Sir Leoline Jenkins, (Wynne's Life of,) vol. 2, pp. 665-670; Cochin, Oeuvres, tome 2, p. 223; Donnegal v. Donnegal, 1 Addams Rep., pp. 5, 19; Whitcombe v. Whitcombe, 2 Curteis Rep., p. 352; Gambier v. Gambier, 7 Simon Rep., p. 263; Guyer v. O'Daniel, 1 Binney Rep., p. 349; School Directors v. James, 2 Watts and Serg. Rep., p. 568; Freetown v. Taunton, 16 Mass. Rep., p. 51; Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Rep., p. 405; Granby v. Amherst, 7 Mass. Rep., p. 1; Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. Rep., p. 498; Westlake, Private Int. Law, §§ 35, 36, 42, 43, 51; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 58, 59; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 4.)

§ 22. According to the Roman law, a soldier's domicil was in the country where he served, if he possessed nothing in his own country; but if he had any property in his own country, he would be allowed a double domicil. The leading modern case on this point is that of the Duke of Guise, who contracted a marriage while in the service of the King of Spain and the Emperor of Austria, during his residence at Brussels. The validity of this marriage depended upon his domicil at the time it was contracted. By the law of all

European countries, the prisoner preserves the domicil of his country. This principle is applied to the continued residence of a merchant in a foreign country. If such residence in a hostile country during a war is not voluntary, but proceeds from compulsory restraint imposed by the enemy, and his intention to leave is clearly manifested by overt acts previous to the capture of his property, it has been decided that such violent detention will not prevent its restoration. The same reasoning applies to a neutral merchant domiciled in a hostile country before the war. With respect to exiles, the civil jurists distinguish between banishment for life, and for a term of years; in the first, the exile loses his original domicil, but preserves it in the second, being regarded in the same light as a person on a long voyage. The fugitive or emigrant from his country, on account of civil war, is held not to have lost his intention of returning to it, and, therefore, retains his native domicil. But if the prisoner, exile, or fugitive continue to reside in a foreign country after the coercion has been withdrawn, and after his power of choice has been restored, he may acquire a domicil therein. (Phillimore, Law of Domicile, § 146, et seq.; Justinian, Dig. 50, t. 1, 1. 23; Domat, Traité des Lois, liv. 1, tit. 16, § 2; D'Agueseau, Oeuvres M. de le Chancelier, tome 5, pp. 1, et seq.; Morrison, Dic. of Decisions, vol. 1, p. 4627; Burge, Com. on Foreign and Col. Law, vol. 1, p. 47; White v. Repton, 3 Curteis Rep., p. 818; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 510; Phillips, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 61; The Ocean, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 91; Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Ves. Jun. Rep., p. 201; The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Rep.. p. 18; The Ann, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 221; The Venus, 8 Cranch. Rep., p. 279; Westlake, Private Int. Law, §§ 52, 53.)

§ 23. Suppose the government of the country of residence prohibits a foreigner from acquiring a domicil? It has been decided in France that a de facto domicil may be acquired, notwithstanding such prohibition, even with respect to the country of residence. This is placed on the ground that, although not entitled to the privileges of a domiciled subject, he may incur the liabilities. Again, suppose the gov ernment of a country forbade its subjects to establish a domicil out of their native land, may they not acquire a de facto foreign domicil. Undoubtedly they may, so far as respects

their national character in war, and Phillimore is of opinion that the personal property of such subjects who, having established a de facto domicil in a foreign country, must be distributed according to the law of the de facto domicil. He, however, admits that the case would be open to some argument on the other side. (Phillimore, Law of Domicile, §§ 301 -306; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 13; Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curteis Rep., p. 885; Westlake, Private Int. Law, § 32; Code Civil Francaise, art. 13; Bremer v. Freeman, 1 Deane Rep., p. 192; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, § 4.)

§ 24. Treaties sometimes have the effect of preserving to the resident in a foreign country his original domicil, or of giving to him a commercial domicil, neither of the country of his origin nor that of his residence. Such has been the general effect of the treaties and commercial intercourse between Christian and Mohammedan states. In the Turkish dominions the control over and disposal of their property, its exemption from municipal laws, and other privileges, have been secured to Christians by treaty stipulations. In such cases, the domicil of their own countries is considered as preserved to foreign residents in the east, the ordinary rules of the international law of domicil not being applicable to such residence. In general, European and American merchants residing in the east under the protection of trading factories, are considered as retaining the national character of the factory to which they belong. This distinction results from the nature and habits of the east, foreigners not being permitted to mix freely with the native inhabitants, or to become incorporated into the mass of society. They, therefore, always continue to be strangers and mere sojourners, no matter what may be the circumstances, or length of time of their residence. As they cannot acquire the national character of the country where they reside, the law very properly considers them to have retained that of the country to which they belong. But this doctrine does not apply to christian countries. An attempt was at one time made to extend it to British merchants residing in Portugal, with special privileges which distinguished them from the native inhabitants, and from all foreigners of other countries; but the courts held, that the law of domicil of Europeans resid

ing in the east was wholly inapplicable to such cases. (Philli more, Law of Domicil, § 278, et seq.; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 511, 512; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 42; The Indian Chief, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 29; The Twee Frienden, etc., 3 Rob. Rep., p. 29–31; Ruding v. Smith, 2 Hagg. Rep., p. 386; Moore v. Darell & Budd, 3 Hagg. Rep., p. 350; Maltass v. Maltass, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 81.)

§ 25. If a neutral merchant go into an enemy's country during the war merely to collect his debts, or to withdraw the property which he may have there, his temporary residence, for that purpose alone, will not confer upon him a hostile character, and the property and funds thus sought to be withdrawn will not be subject to confiscation. But he must bring himself clearly within the rule, for, if instead of confining himself to the legitimate object of his visit, he engages in a trade purely national, his character with respect to such trade is regarded as hostile, and the property embarked in it, if captured, is condemned. It is contended by some that a neutral merchant residing in the enemy's country at the commencement of the war, should have the same privilege of withdrawing his property, and that for a reasonable time, it should be exempt from capture. But this doctrine has not been established by the positive adjudication of any court of prize. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 40; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 4, § 63; Azuni, Droit Maritime, pt. 2, ch. 4, art. 2, § 17; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 502; The Dree Gebroeders, 4 Rob. Rep., pp. 233, 234; The Ariadne, 1 Rob. Rep., pp. 315, 316; The Nereide, 9 Cranch. Rep., p. 388.)

§ 26. The active spirit of commerce and enterprise in the present day, and the increased facilities for travel afforded by steam navigation and railroads, are well calculated to perplex the mind of a court in assigning accurately a merchant's national character, at different periods of a divided transaction. Thus, if he have charge of a complex mercantile business, he may be found, at no great intervals of time, in a variety of local situations, without any permanent residence in any one place. It is, therefore, held, that a merchant carrying on commerce in different countries, in time of war, has the national character of each, in his respective trades. This agrees with the maxim of the Roman law, that when a

man has so set up his household goods in two different places as to be equally established in both, both are to be regarded as his domicil. It, however, was remarked by Domat, (and this opinion was adopted by other jurists,) that although a man may have two or more domicils for particular purposes, yet it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for him to have two which should be equally the centre of his affairs. Hence municipal law, both in Europe and America, requires the characteristics of a principal domicil for cases of a testament, or a distribution under intestacy, while it permits the same person, at the same time, to have other domicils for certain purposes, and with respect to particular rights and property. (Phillimore, Law of Domicil, § 17, et seq.; Domat, Traité des Lois, liv. 1, tit. 16, § 6; Merlin, Repertoire, tit. 8, Domicile, §7; Felix, Droit International Privé, liv. 1, tit. 1, § 29; Curling v. Thornton, 1 Addams Rep., p. 19; Stanley v. Bernes, 3 Hagg. Rep., p. 373; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 49, 78; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 499; The Ann, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 223; The Harmony, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 323; The Portland, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 44; The Jonge Klassina, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 297; Guier v. Daniel, 1 Binney Rep., p. 349, note; Westlake, Private Int. Law, §§ 28, et seq.; Massé, Droit Commercial, tome 3, p. 54; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Domicile, §§ 3, 4.)

§ 27. The native national character, lost, or suspended by a foreign domicil, easily reverts. The adventitious character imposed by domicil, ceases with the residence from which it arose. An actual return to his native country is not always necessary, nor even an actual departure from the country of his domicil, if he has actually put himself in motion bona fide to quit the country sine animo revertendi. But the commencement of the journey to return to his native country, although it may restore to the party his native national character, will not exempt his property from the hostile character acquired by residence, only in cases where such property has been engaged in a trade completely lawful in the native character. The principle can never be extended to protect a trade which is illegal in a native subject or citizen. Thus, an American citizen, domiciled in England previous to the war between the two countries, shipped goods from that country a long time after the commence