and quality, was put on board. "It was held that, under these circumstances, the parties were not deprived of the protection of the license. The case would have been widely different, if goods of a different description had been taken instead of the original cargo. Here the original purpose was pursued; no new speculation was originated, nor was there any change, except such as was produced by time, and unavoidable accidents. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 607; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 258; The Wolfarth, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 305; Siffkin v. Glover, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 717.)

§ 18. A license to export goods to an enemy's port, although limited in terms to the outward voyage, is sufficient to protect both ship and cargo on the return, if the delivery of the goods at the port of destination was prevented by some inevitable accident, as a blockade, or a reasonable apprehension of seizure. But to entitle himself to the benefit of this liberal construction, the claimant must prove that the goods brought back are the identical goods exported under the license. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 607; The Jonge Frederick, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 357.)

§ 19. It is never admitted as a valid excuse for receiving on board goods not permitted in the license, that compulsion had been used by the hostile government, and that they were received only to avoid the seizure of the vessel. If such an excuse were admitted, it would open the door to fraud and collusion, as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover whether such a transaction, taking place in an enemy's port, was voluntary or not. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 608; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 256; The Catharina Maria, Edw. Rep., p. 337; The Seyerstadt, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 241.)

$20. Where a license is given expressly for importation, it is held that it can be used for that purpose only, and not for reëxportation. Although the application should be made for a license to import, for the particular and special purpose of reëxportation, the permission to import would extend no further than was expressed in the instrument itself. So, also, a license to import for the purpose of exportation, with condition of putting cargo in government warehouses, as security for reëxportation, must be strictly complied with. Such a

license does not cover importations for sale. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 257; The Vrouw Deborah, 1 Dod. Rep., pp. 160, et seq.)

§ 21. The fourth point to be considered, in determining the due execution of the license, is, the course and route of the voyage. The requisitions of a license as to the port of shipment or delivery, of departure or destination, must be strictly followed. The same may be said, in general, with respect to the course of the voyage. If the license directs that the ship shall stop at a particular port for convoy, the neglect or omission to comply with the direction invalidates the license. The same result would follow the touching for orders at an interdicted port; but a deviation, for the same purpose, to a neutral or other port not forbidden, although not authorized, seems not to impair the legal effect of the license. Any deviation from the prescribed course of the voyage, if produced by stress of weather, or other unavoidable accident, does not invalidate the license; if the necessity is proved, it is deemed a valid excuse. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 260; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 612-614; The Europa, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 341; The Minerva, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 375; The Frau Magdalena, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 367; The Emma, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 366; The Hoppet, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 369; The Twee Gebroeders, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 97; The Manly, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 357; The Vrow Cornelia, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 349; The Byfield, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 188.)

§ 22. An enemy's ship and cargo, belonging to the same owner, and licensed to go to Dublin, were taken going to Leith, a place not named in the license, and to be reached by a course totally different from that indicated; both ship and cargo were condemned. The party not being within the terms of the license, the character of enemy revives, and the property, thus become hostile, is subject to the ordinary rule of confiscation. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 260; The Manly, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 257; The Europa, Edw. Rep., p. 342; The Edel Catharina, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 55; Wainhouse v. Cowie, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 178.)

§ 23. An intended ulterior destination does not vitiate the protection of a license, if the parties keep within the terms

expressed and intended by the instrument. Thus, a vessel with a license to import a cargo into Leith from a port of the enemy, with an ulterior destination to Bergen. It was held that such ulterior destination did not vitiate the license for the voyage to Leith; but had the vessel been captured after completing the licensed part of the voyage, and on the way from Leith to Bergen, the license would have afforded her no protection. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 263; The Henrietta, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 363.)

§ 24. The condition introduced in the license, that the vessel shall stop at a particular port for convoy, is regarded as fundamental, and the breach of it as fatal. The reason for introducing the condition is, that the vessel may be subject to inspection in that part of her navigation. In case where the admiral under whose direction the convoy is to be furnished orders, a deviation for the purpose of taking convoy at another place, the court felt itself bound to uphold the acts of the admiral. Such a deviation was placed on the same ground as that caused by stress of weather. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 264; The Europa, Edw. Rep., p. 358; The Minerva, Edw. Rep., p. 375; The Anna Maria, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 209.)

§ 25. The effect of a deviation from the direct voyage described in the license, by touching at an intermediate port, depends in some degree upon the time of capture. If such vessel be seized on her way to such intermediate port, the presumption of law is, that she was going thither for the purpose of violating the license. But if taken after leaving the intermediate port, with the identical cargo which she carried in, and while actually proceeding for her lawful destination, the presumption of mala fides would be removed. Touching at an interdicted port, vitiates the license, unless expressly permitted in the license itself. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 262; The Europa, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 342; The Frau Magdalena, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 367; The Hoppet, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 369; The Emma, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 379.)

§ 26. The fifth point to be considered is, the time limited in the license. There is a material distinction between the construction of a license for the exportation of goods to an ene

my's port, and one for an importation merely. Where the license requires that the goods to which it relates, shall be exported on or before a certain day, a delay for a single day beyond that which is specified, renders the license wholly void. But not so with respect to importations. If the party having a license, be prevented from commencing the voyage, or be delayed in its prosecution by stress of weather, the acts of a hostile government, or other similar cause, over which he has no control, the time thus consumed, is not to be considered in computing the period that the government intended to allow. But if he takes upon himself, at his own discretion, to extend the period specified, he loses the protection to which he would otherwise have been entitled. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 614-616; The Cosmopolite, 1 Rob. Rep., pp. 12, 13; The Goede Hoop, 1 Edw. Rep., 327; The Vrow Cornelia, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 349; The Johann Pieter, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 349; The Sarah Maria, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 361; The Diana, 2 Act. Rep., p. 34; The Eolus, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 300; Williams v. Marshall, 6 Taunt. Rep., p. 390; Tullock v. Boyd, 7 Taunt. Rep., pp. 468, 472; Freeland v. Walker, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 478; Effurth v. Smith, 5 Taunt. Rep., p. 329; Siffken v. Glover, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 77; Leevin v. Cormac, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 483; Siffken v. Allnut, 1 Maul and Sel., p. 39; Groning v. Crockatt, 3 Camp. Rep., p. 55.)

§ 27. A license does not act retrospectively, and cannot take away any interest which is vested by law in the captors. Thus, a vessel was captured on the 24th January, with an expired license on board. Another license was obtained, and its date carried back to January 20th. It was held by the court, that the vessel at the time of capture was not protected either by the license which had expired, or by that subsequently obtained. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 618, 619; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 265; The Vrouw Deborah, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 160; The St. Ivan, Edw. Rep., p. 376; The Edel Catharina, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 45; Henry v. Stanniforth, 4 Camp. Rep., p. 270.)

§ 28. Moreover, a license, not on board at the time of capture, but afterwards endorsed for it by the shipper, is no protection. If the license is general in its terms, the mere fact of its being found on board is not sufficient, unless it has

been appropriated to such ship by an endorsement to that effect, or by some positive evidence that this application was intended by the parties entitled to its use. These rules are

obviously necessary to prevent a misapplication of the license by persons not having a right to avail themselves of its protection. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 62; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 266; The Speculation, Edw. Rep., p. 344; The Fortuna, Edw. Rep., p. 236; The Carl, Edw. Rep., p. 339.)

§ 29. A license is vitiated and becomes a mere nullity by an alteration of its date. In this respect, licenses are governed by the same rules as other grants issued by the supreme power of the State; they are utterly vitiated by any fraudulent alteration, and any change is prima facie fraudulent. It may, however, be explained. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 618; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 266; The Louise Charlotte, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 308; The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 13; The Aurora, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 218; The Diana, 2 Act. Rep., p. 54.)

§ 30. A license to trade with a port of the enemy, does not serve as a protection for a breach of blockade, in case the port is blockaded; nor does it afford any protection for carrying goods contraband of war, enemy's despatches, or military persons, or for a resistance of the right of visitation and search; in fine, it can cover no act not expressly mentioned in the license or implied as a means necessary for its execution. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 262; The Nicoline, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 364; The Acteon, 2 Dod. Rep., p. 54; The Byfield, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 190.)