and however general may be the terms in which the grantees are described, those who claim for their property its protection, must show that the application on which it was issued was made in their behalf, and that the applicant named in the license was, in truth, their agent. But if granted to a particular person by name, in behalf of himself and others, it is not necessary that the person named should have any share or interest in the property to which the license relates; it is sufficient if he acted as agent of those to whom its exclusive use is appropriated. If the license is, by express words, made negotiable, or if no mention whatever is made of the persons upon whose application it is granted, or by whom it is to be used, it is a legitimate subject of transfer and sale, and the purchaser is as fully protected as if it had been granted to him on his personal application. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 599-606; Feise v. Thompson, 1 Taunt. Rep., p. 122; Warin v. Scott, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 605; Robinson v. Morris, 5 Taunt. Rep., p. 725; Barlow v. M'Intosh, 12 East. Rep., p. 311; Busk v. Bell, 16 East. Rep., p. 3; Rawlinson v. Janson, 12 East. Rep., p. 223; The Jonge Johannes, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 263; The Acteon, 2 Dod. Rep., p. 48; The Louisa Charlotte, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 308; Fenton v. Pearson, 15 East. Rep., p. 419; Morgan v. Oswald, 3 Taunton Rep., p. 555; Flindt v. Scott, 5 Taunton Rep., p. 674.)

§ 9. But where the license is not made negotiable, and the persons named in the license obtained it in their own names and not as the representatives and agents of others—the license being for themselves, their agents, or holders of their bills of lading-it cannot protect the property of others for whom the grantees act as agents, and in which they are not interested. Thus, a license to B. & S. and their agents, will not protect the property of others for whom B. & S. may see fit to act as agents. But where a license is issued to B. S. & Co., meaning under that denomination to include persons who had agreed to take part in the shipment made under such license, such persons are held to be protected. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 254, 255; The Jonge Johannes, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 263; The Christina Sophia, cited 4 Rob. Rep., p. 267; Feize v. Waters, 2 Taunton Rep., p. 248.)

§ 10. The second point to be considered, in determining upon the proper execution of a license, is, the character of the vessel. The national character of the ship, as described in the license, is, in most cases, a condition necessary to be fulfilled. Where the license directs the employment of a neutral vessel belonging to a particular nation, the substitution of a neutral ship of a different state, standing in the same political relations to the belligerent powers, would, probably, not be be regarded as prejudicial. The same may be said of the employment of two ships, when the terms of the license refer only to one, if both vessels bear the same national character, and there be no variation in the quantity or quality of the goods described in the license. But, in both these changes, a good and satisfactory cause must be shown. If a neutral ship is mentioned in the license, the employment of a ship of the state issuing the license is considered an essential deviation, which will lead to a condemnation. So, the employment of a ship belonging to the enemy, when not authorized by the license, is, in all cases noxious and fatal. When the license authorizes the importation of goods from an enemy's country, in an enemy's ship, although confined, in terms, to the goods, by the just construction of law, it is extended to the vessel also. For the necessary effect of such a license is to legalize the voyage as described, in all its incidents, and hence the ship is just as much a legitimate object of protection as the cargo which is to be brought in it. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 609, 612; Kensington v. Inglis, 9 East. Rep., p. 273; The Dankbaarheit, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 183; The Vrouw Cornelia, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 340; The Jonge Arend, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 14; The Goede Hoffnung, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 257; The Bourse, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 369; The Jonge Clara, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 371; The Speculation, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 344; The Hoffnung, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 162.)

§ 11. When the license authorizes the transportation of goods by any ship or ships except those under the flag of a particular nation, the exception refers to the fact of the nationality of the ship, and merely to the external signs. Although the vessel may be documented as belonging to, and actually bear the flag of, another state, if it be shown

that she really belonged to the excepted nation, she will not be protected by the license and the flag. The reason of this rule is, that vessels of the excepted nation might otherwise engage in the prohibited navigation, by substituting a foreign flag for their own. But the unauthorized employment of such excepted vessels is not permitted to effect the goods of shippers who were not privy to the deception, or cognisant of the fact. Where there is no ground for imputing to them a voluntary departure from the conditions of the license in this respect, their property, if embraced by its terms, retains its protection. The vessel itself is condemned. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 611; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 253; The Bourse, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 370; The Jonge Clara, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 371; The Dankbaarheit, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 183.)

§ 12. Again, if the vessel was, in fact, not of the excepted nation when she sailed, but became so during the voyage, by some unexpected change of circumstances, as the conquest or annexation of the country to which she belongs, by the excepted state, such change of political relations will not deprive her of the protection of the license, where the parties have acted fairly under it. Thus, where the license was for a ship bearing any other flag than that of France, and the owners had become French subjects during the voyage by the sudden annexation to France of the port and territory in which they resided, it was held by Sir Wm. Scott, that the ship continued under the protection of the license, notwithstanding this change of national character. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 253; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 611, 612; The Jonge Clara, Edw. Rep., p. 371.)

§ 13. A license to a vessel to import a particular cargo, is held to protect a vessel, in ballast, on her way to the port of lading, for the express purpose specified in the license. So, also, a license to export a cargo to an enemy's port, covers the ship, in ballast, on her return. In each of these cases the voyage to which the license is extended by implication, has a necessary connection with that to which it expressly relates. But the protection extends no further than is necessarily implied in the license; the taking of any part of a cargo on board in the outward voyage in the case of impor tation, or in the return voyage in the case of exportation,

subjects both ship and goods to confiscation. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 614; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 252; The Cornelia, Edw. Rep. 360; Le Cheminant v. Pearson, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 367; The Freindschaft, Dod. Rep., p. 316.)

§ 14. The third point to be considered in the execution of a license is, the quality and quantity of goods it protects. A small excess in quantity, or the partial substitution of those of a different quality, if free from the imputation of concealment or fraud, will not absolutely vitiate the license, under the color of which they were introduced. The goods not protected by it are condemned, while those which it is admitted to embrace, are restored. If the excess in quantity be very small, and not attributable to design, it is intimated by Sir William Scott, that it would not be regarded as an essential deviation; but any change in the quality of the goods, cannot be justified or excused, and the articles not protected by the license are condemned. The fraudulent application of a license to cover or conceal goods not intended by the grantor, renders it wholly void, and exposes to confiscation even the goods that are embraced in its terms. Thus, where a vessel was licensed to proceed only with a cargo of corn on the voyage described, and a quantity of fire arms was stowed under the cargo for concealment, both ship and cargo were condemned. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 256, 257; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 606, 617; The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., pp. 11-18; The Jonge Clara, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 371; The Juffrow Catharina, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 141; The Nicoline, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 363; The Vriendschap, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 96; The Goede Hoop, Edw. Rep., p. 336; The Catharina Maria, Edw. Rep., p. 337; The Wolfarth, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 365; The Seyerstadt, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 241; Kier v. Andrade, 6 Taunt. Rep., p. 498.)

§ 15. It was at one time held, that express words were necessary to protect the property of an enemy; but it was finally decided by the court of exchequer chamber, that a license containing the words, "to whomsoever the property may appear to belong," included goods shipped on account of enemy's subjects. But Mr. Duer expresses a doubt whether this last decision was not to be referred to the peculiar circumstances of the war, and to be regarded as the

fruits of the extreme liberality of construction which prevailed in England at that particular time. (Duer, On Insurauce, vol. 1, pp. 604, 605; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 255; The Cousine Marianne, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 346; The Hoffnung, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 162; The Beurse Van Koningsberg, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 169; Flindt v. Scott, 5 Taunt. Rep., p. 674; 15 East. Rep., p. 525; Mennett v. Bonham, 15 East. Rep., p. 477; Usparicha v. Noble, 13 East. Rep., 332; Foyle v. Bourdillon, 3 Taunt. Rep., p. 546; Morgan v. Oswald, 3 Taunt. Rep., p. 555; Feise v. Bell, 4 Taunt. Rep., p. 478; Anthony v. Moline, 5 Taunt. Rep., p. 711; Schnakoneg v. Andrews, 5 Taunt. Rep., p. 716; Robinson v. Touray, 1 Maule and Selw. Rep., p. 217; Hullman v. Whitmore, 3 Maule and Selw. Rep., p. 337.)

§ 16. A license to an alien enemy, removes all his personal disabilities, so far as is necessary for his protection in the particular trade which is rendered lawful by the operation of the license. In respect to the voyage and trade which the license is intended to authorize and cover, he is not to be regarded as and enemy, but has all the legal privileges of a subject. So far as that particular voyage, trade, or cargo is concerned, he has a persona standi in all the courts, and may maintain suits in his own name, the same as a subject. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 606; Morgan v. Oswald, 3 Taunt. Rep., p. 555; Usparicha v. Noble, 13 East. Rep., p. 332; Flindt v. Scott, 5 Taunt. Rep., p. 674; 15 East. Rep., p. 525; Fenton v. Pearson, 15 East. Rep., p. 419.)

§ 17. The protection of a license is not limited, in all cases, to the cargo originally shipped; for if the original cargo should be accidentally injured or spoiled, it may be replaced by a second one, precisely corresponding with that described in the license. A license, says Wildman, was granted to a neutral vessel to import a specified cargo from Amsterdam; the ship having taken on board her cargo, sailed from Amsterdam, but was obliged to put into Medemblick, which bears the same relative situation to Amsterdam that Gravesend does to London. At Medemblick it was necessary to unload the cargo, which was found to be so much damaged that it was not fit to be put on board again. The old cargo was therefore sold, and a new one of the same identical nature with the first, corresponding with it both in substance