of the ordinary state of war; but the adverse belligerent may justly consider them as per se a ground of capture and confiscation. Licenses are necessarily stricti juris, and cannot be carried beyond the evident intention of those by whom they are granted; nevertheless, they are not construed with pedantic accuracy, nor will their fair effect be vitiated by every slight deviation from their terms and conditions. Much, however, will depend upon the nature of the terms which are not complied with. Thus, a variation in the quality or character of the goods will often lead to more dangerous consequences than an excess of quantity. Again, a license to trade, though safe in the hands of one person, might become dangerous in those of another; so, also, with respect to the limitations of time and pluce specified in a license. Such restrictions are often of material importance, and cannot be deviated from with safety. (Manning, Law of Nations, p. 123; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 26; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 163, 164; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 3, cap. 21, § 14; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 595-619; The Abigail, Stewart Vice Ad. Rep., p. 360; The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 8; The Twee Gebroeders, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 96; Schroeder v. Vaux, 15 East. Rep., p. 52; The Jorge Johannes, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 263; Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des Prises, tit. 6, ch. 2, sec. 6.)

§ 2. A general license is a suspension or relaxation of the exercise of the rights of war, generally or partially, in relation to any community or individuals, liable to be affected by their operation. It must emanate from the sovereignty of the state, for the supreme authority alone is competent to decide what considerations of political or commercial expediency will justifiy a suspension or relaxation of its belligerent rights. That branch of the government, to which, from the form of its constitution, the power of declaring or making war is entrusted, has an undoubted right to regulate and modify, in its discretion, the hostilities which it sanctions. This may be done by a general ordinance, by instructions to armed vessels, or by licenses issued to certain communities or individuals exempting them from capture. In England, licenses are either granted directly by the crown, or by some subordinate officer, to whom the authority of the

crown has been delegated, either by special instructions or under the provisions of an act of parliament. In the United States, as a general rule, licenses are issued under the authority of an act of congress, but in special cases, and for purposes immediately connected with the prosecution of a war, they may be granted by the authority of the president, as commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the United States. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 245, 255; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 355, 541, 594-619; Vandyke v. Whitmore, 1 East. Rep., p. 475; Taulman v. Anderson, 1 Taunt. Rep., p. 227; Shiffner v. Gordon, 12 East. Rep., p. 296; The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 11; The Hope, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 226; The Charlotte, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 387.)

§ 3. For the same reasons, a special license to individuals for a particular voyage, or for the importation or exportation of particular goods, must, as a general rule, also emanate from the supreme authority of the state. But there are exceptions to this rule growing out of the particular circumstances of the war in particular places. The governor of a province, the general of an army, or the admiral of a fleet, may grant licenses to trade within the limits of their own commands, and such documents are binding upon them and upon all persons who are under their authority, but they afford no protection beyond the limits of the authority of those who issue them. Thus, in the war between the United States and the republic of Mexico, the governor of California and the commander of the Pacific squadron, issued such licenses, but it was not pretended that such protection extended beyond the limits of their respective commands. The peculiar circumstances of the case, the great distance from the seat of the supreme federal authority, the scarcity of provisions and supplies, and the want of American vessels on that coast, were deemed sufficient reasons for the exercise of that power. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 27; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 247; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 597; The Hope, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 226; Letter of Sec'ty of California, 31st Cong., 1st sess. H. of R., Ex. Doc., No. 17, p. 671; Cushing, Opinions U. S. Att'ys Gen'l, vol. 6, p. 630.)

§ 4. Licenses have frequently been granted during the operations of a war, not only for the protection of an enemy trading in the country of a belligerent, but to authorize subjects to trade with the enemy; and the cases relative to their authority and legal effect, are numerous, both in the reports of courts of admiralty, and of common law. The leading case on this subject is that of The Hope, an American ship, laden with corn and flour, and captured whilst proceeding from the United States to the Spanish peninsula, under the protection of instruments granted by the English admiral on the Halifax station, and the British consul at Boston. In pronouncing judgment in that case, Sir William Scott remarked, that no consul in any country, particularly in an enemy's country, is vested with power, in virtue of his office, to exempt the property of enemies from the effects of hostilities; and that an admiral could restrain the ships under his immediate command from committing acts of hostility, but could grant no safe conduct of this kind beyond the limits of his own station. But such acts might be regarded as sponsiones, or agreements sub spe rate, to which a subsequent ratification, by the proper authority, would give validity. It was shown that these acts of its officers had been confirmed by an order in council, and a restitution of the property was decreed accordingly. But, in the case of The Charles, and other similar cases, where the safe conducts had been signed by the English admiral, and also by the Spanish minister in the United States, but not confirmed by the British government, it was decided that the licenses afforded no protection, being issued without proper authority. So, also, in cases of safe conducts granted by the British minister, in the United States, to American vessels sailing with provisions to the island of St. Bartholomew. All were condemned where the licenses were not expressly included within the terms of the confirmation by the order in council. (The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 11; The Hope, 1 Dod. Rep., p. 226; Johnson v. Sutton, Doug. Rep., p. 254; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 597, 598; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 27.)

§ 5. There are very few American decisions on the subject of licenses, and there is a great want of uniformity in those of the British admiralty. Mr. Duer has pointed out

and commented on the causes of this irregularity. Prior to the peace of Amiens, licenses were regarded as an act of special grace, and most strictly interpreted, but, on the renewal of the war, the issuing of licenses by England was regarded as a matter of national policy, rather than personal favor. The courts, in consideration of this policy, gave to these instruments the largest interpretation possible. "Most

of the reported cases on the subject of licenses, were decided during the period that this liberal doctrine prevailed, and in many of them it is a matter of extreme difficulty to say, whether the determination was governed by the peculiar circumstances and character of the war, or by reasons of general and permanent application. It is evident, however, that it is only rules of a permanent character, that can be justly said to form a part of the existing law, and that it would be useless to state those that were, in truth, occasional exceptions, arising from a state of things so extraordinary, that it is highly improbable it will ever again occur." (Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tome 1, p. 19; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 594-596; The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 11; The Goede Hoop, 1 Edw. Rep., p. 328-331; The Juno, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 117; Morgan v. Oswald, 3 Taunt. Rep., p. 555; Flindt v. Scott, 5 Taunt. Rep., p. 693.)

§ 6. The validity of a license depends not only on the sufficiency of the authority by which it is granted, but also on the good faith of the party to whom it is issued. Like every other grant, although issued in due form, and by the proper authority, a license may be vitiated by fraudulent conduct in obtaining it. The misrepresentation or suppression of material facts-of facts that, if known, would probably have influenced the discretion of the grantor-renders the license a nullity, and exposes the property it is invoked to protect to certain condemnation. Nor is it necessary, in order to invalidate the license, that such misrepresentations or suppressions of material facts should, in all cases, involve an imputation or suspicion of fraud. Thus, where the agent who procured the license was described as a merchant of London, but it appeared on trial that, when the license was granted, he was, in fact, a resident of a foreign country, the error was held to invalidate the license. So, where a license was granted

to a person by name, describing him as a British merchant, and it was found that he, in person, visited Holland, at that time an enemy's country, mixed and incorporated himself, when there, in the national commerce, and exported the goods as a Dutch merchant, instead of importing them as an English merchant, the license was regarded as invalidated, and his property confiscated. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 250; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 594, 601, 602; The Clio, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 69; The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 11; The Jonge Klassina, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 269; Klingender v. Bond, 14 East. Rep., p. 484.)

§ 7. Although a license may have been issued by competent authority, and on the good faith of the party obtaining it, in order to render it available for the protection of the property to which it relates, the intentions of the grantor, as expressed in the license, must be pursued in its mode of execution, and there must be an entire good faith on the part of the user, in executing it. And although, as before remarked, licenses are not to be construed with a literal and pedantic accuracy, yet no greater latitude of interpretation. is permitted than corresponds with the intentions of the grantor, fairly understood; no other or greater deviation is allowed, than it may be justly presumed the grantor with a knowledge of the circumstances, would himself have sanctioned. "It is a mistake," says Duer, "to suppose that the rights of the user may not be prejudiced by a construction of the grant that is merely erroneous. It is absolutely essential, that the will of the grantor shall be observed; so that, that only shall be done which he intended to permit; whatever he did not mean to permit is absolutely interdicted. Hence, the party who uses the license, engages, not only for fair intentions, but for an accurate interpretation and execution of the grant." (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 245, et seq.; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 598, 599; The Cosmopolite, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 11; The Jonge Johannes, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 263; The Vriendschap, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 96.)

§ 8. The first material circumstance to be considered in the execution of a license, with respect to the intentions of the grantor and the good faith of the user, is, the persons entitled to use it. A license is not a subject of transfer or assignment,